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ABSTRACT 
 
Life as we know it in modern society relies on the smooth functioning of the electric Grid – 
the Critical Infrastructure system that generates and delivers electricity to our homes, 
businesses, and factories. Virtually all other Critical Infrastructure systems depend on the 
Grid for the electricity they require to execute other essential societal functions such as 
telecommunications, water supply and waste water services, fuel delivery, etc. This study 
examines the concepts of Critical Infrastructure and electric Grid resilience, and the role 
nuclear power plants do and might play in enhancing U.S. Grid resilience. Grid resilience is 
defined as the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers 
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy. The question of whether current U.S. nuclear 
power plants are significant Grid resilience assets is examined in light of this definition.  
Despite their many virtues and their “fuel security,” the conclusion is reached that current 
U.S. nuclear power plants are not significant Grid resilience assets for scenarios involving 
major Grid disruptions. The concept of a “resilient nuclear power plant” or “rNPP” – a 
nuclear power plant that is intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a 
manner to enhance Grid resilience – is presented.  Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP 
Functional Requirements are defined.  Several rNPP design features (system architectures 
and technologies) that could enable a plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional 
Requirements are described. Four specific applications of rNPPs are proposed: (1) rNPPs 
as flexible electricity generation assets, (2) rNPPs as anchors of hybrid nuclear energy 
systems, (3) rNPPs as Grid Black Start Resources, and (4) rNPPs as anchors of Resilient 
Critical Infrastructure Islands. The last two applications are new concepts for enhancing 
U.S. strategic resilience. Finally, a few key unresolved issues are discussed and 
recommendations for future research are offered. Study results support the overall 
conclusion that successful development and deployment of rNPPs could significantly 
enhance U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience, while transforming the 
value proposition of nuclear energy in the 21st century. 
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation deals with the role nuclear power currently plays, and potentially could 
play, in enhancing societal resilience in industrialized countries (the U.S. in particular). Any 
detailed examination of societal resilience requires the integration of knowledge and 
information from an unusually diverse range of scientific and technical arenas – both 
academic and industrial in nature. The core scientific and technical disciplines involved are 
the social sciences (primarily sociology, political science, and economics), natural sciences 
(primarily earth and space sciences), and (with respect to the dependence of societal 
resilience on access to electricity from nuclear power plants) the applied sciences of electric 
power system engineering and operations, and nuclear power station engineering and 
operations. Societal resilience and the challenge of achieving and maintaining it is by its 
very nature a Gordian Knot of difficult issues – an intimidating and inconvenient “wicked 
problem” [1, 2] intrinsic to life as we live it in the 21st century. The peril in investigating the 
relationship between societal resilience and nuclear power is the trap of providing analyses 
that are “a mile wide and an inch deep.” The analysis presented here, the issues raised 
here, and the solutions proposed here, are but starting points for a much-needed dialog 
within and between diverse communities and stakeholders – many who do not often find 
themselves at the same table or even in the same room. This work is presented with hope it 
will catalyze and inform this dialog as well as inspire others to dig deeper. 
 
1. Horst W. J. RITTEL and Melvin M. WEBBER, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning,” Policy Sciences, 4: 155-169. (1973) dos:10.1007/bf01405730 
 
2. Jeffrey CONKLIN, Dialogue mapping: building shared understanding of wicked 
problems, Wiley Publishing, (2005) ISBN-13: 978-0470017865. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
This dissertation is a “top-down” investigation of the current role and potential future role of 
nuclear power in enhancing U.S. societal resilience. Useful examination of this issue 
necessitates a basic understanding of a “long chain” of human-machine and machine-
machine dependencies, starting at the top with a nation-group of over 300 million people 
and ending, at the bottom, with a single human operator in the control room of a modern-
day or future commercial nuclear power plant. Considerable attention is given to 
establishing the global context for the exercise: basic definitions of societal resilience and 
engineered system resilience; and the relationship and dependences of societal resilience 
on Critical Infrastructures, energy infrastructure, electricity supply infrastructure, and nuclear 
power as an element of U.S. electricity supply infrastructure. Each resilience “layer” 
provides the essential context for examination of its underlying layers.  Useful examination 
of these intertwined issues is a lofty goal – one that is best approached with preconceptions 
laid aside, a hefty dose of humility, and great patience. The author has aspired to exercise 
these traits in the conduct of this analysis, and asks the same of the readers of this 
document.  
1.2 Document Organization 
This dissertation is a multi-part “Manuscript Dissertation.” As such, it is built around a core 
of four refereed / peer reviewed journal articles published by the author – each paper 
discussing a particular aspect of the societal resilience – nuclear power resilience arena.  
Chapter 2 discusses the motivation and context for research. Chapter 3 presents the 
dissertation problem statement and research approach employed for this study. The four 
journal papers that present the study results and comprise the core of this dissertation are 
presented in Chapters 4–7. Chapter 8 summarizes the study’s major results. The most 
significant unresolved issues and future research priorities are presented in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 10 provides a few closing thoughts. 
 
Appendix A presents the results of the literature review conducted as a launching point for 
this research effort. The information and observations gained from the literature review 
provided the context for synthesis of the research approach described in Chapter 3, and for 
the various analyses documented in Chapters 4–7. 
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Precise terminology is essential for effect communications – particularly in highly technical 
endeavors. This study of electric Grid, nuclear power plant, and Critical Infrastructure 
resilience necessarily involves the integration of knowledge bases and vocabularies from 
diverse social science, natural science, and applied science and engineering arenas. Thus 
many readers may be unfamiliar with terms employed by subject matter experts in any one 
of the knowledge domains integrated in this work. Useful terminology did not exist in some 
instances, and had to be “invented”. Many of the new or possibly unfamiliar terms employed 
in this dissertation are therefore defined in Appendix B.  
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2 MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
2.1 Resilience Of Industrialized Societies 
Every human being is a member of a society – a collection or group of people (local, 
regional, or national) who share geographic affinity as well as common traditions, 
institutions, and interests. Among those common interests is a collective desire to survive 
and prosper in an environment filled with hazards, threats, and seemingly countless 
unknowns and uncontrollable factors. “Societal resilience” has been defined in this context 
as the ability of a society to “contain a disaster or series of catastrophes in an adaptive 
manner and to react to them flexibly (by bending rather than breaking)… to bounce back 
from the low point of functionality reached following the disaster…” and to utilize “the 
unfortunate circumstances constructively by learning from its flaws and enhancing its 
functioning or by “bouncing forward” to an even more resilient position than before the 
disaster occurred.” [2.1] The response of the nation of Japan to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and tsunami of 2011, and of the island of Puerto Rico to Hurricanes Irma and 
Maria in 2017, are two recent and ongoing illustrations of societal resilience at play. 
 
Modern industrialized or “developed” societies are energy-intensive entities that rely on a 
readily available supply of electricity for the execution of their most essential societal 
processes and functions. Modern societies are typically characterized by their ubiquitous 
dependence on complex and interconnected human and physical infrastructure networks. 
Just as a house built upon a poor foundation is unlikely to withstand an extreme weather 
event, a society can be no more resilient than the human and physical infrastructures upon 
which it depends for its essential functions.  
2.2 Societal Resilience And Critical Infrastructure 
Concerns over societal resilience have multiplied at a rapid pace over the past decade as 
our dependence on electricity has grown, and natural disasters and human malevolent 
actions have revealed vulnerabilities in the systems and infrastructures that support life as 
we know it in industrialized countries [2.2, 2.3]. U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-
21) in 2013 defined the term “Critical Infrastructure” as “systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” [2.4] This definition of Critical 
Infrastructure (or one essentially equivalent to it) has been adopted by the international  
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community as well. PPD-21 also identified sixteen “Critical Infrastructure Sectors” (Figure 
2.1). Whether it’s the production and delivery of gaseous and liquid fuels; e-commerce and 
e-finance; communications; operation of water supply and wastewater management 
systems; or the transportation and storage of food – the smooth functioning of U.S. society 
depends on seamless operation of these sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors.  Thus the 
“health” and resilience of these sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors is of utmost strategic 
importance with respect to U.S. national and homeland security, economic prosperity, and 
the health and welfare of our citizens. 
2.3 Critical Infrastructure Sector Interdependencies – The Tangled 
Web We Weave 
Many of the challenges to societal resilience stem directly from the “interconnectiveness” 
and “interdependencies” of modern societies. The simplicity of Figure 2.1 conceals several 
embedded interdependences between the various Critical Infrastructure Sectors. For 
instance, the Dam Sector includes facilities that serve as critical assets in water 
management and flood control (i.e. the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector), and as 
electricity generating facilities (the Energy Sector). Seamless operation of the Energy 
Sector depends both on the capabilities of the Communications Sector, as well as those of 
the Transportation Systems Sector for delivery of fossil and nuclear fuels to power plants 
and removal of waste products from the plants. Most importantly, even a cursory 
examination of the sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors reveals that every sector is either 
directly involved in the generation of electricity, or depends on the availability of electricity to 
perform its critical functions.   
 2.4 Energy Infrastructure, The Grid, and Nuclear Power 
Figure 2.2 is a highly simplified and truncated taxonomy of societal resilience and Critical 
Infrastructure dependencies. The Energy Sector includes, among other things, the nation’s 
electricity supply system or the “Grid.” The Grid is the integrated network of electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution assets, and their supporting subsystems, that 
produce and deliver electricity to the end user. In many ways, the Grid is the “umbilical 
cord” of the nation.  Due to the ubiquitous need for electricity, the Grid is the one physical 
infrastructure upon which almost all other Critical Infrastructures depend. 
 
The Generation System embedded in the Grid is comprised of many types of electricity 
generating facilities. Though itself designated by PPD-21 as a Critical Infrastructure Sector, 
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Figure 2.1  Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
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Figure 2.2  Societal Resilience and Critical Infrastructure Dependencies 
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the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste (NRMW) Sector is also an element of the 
Grid’s generation system. Today, nuclear power supplies approximately 20% of total 
electricity generated in the U.S. [2.5]. But nuclear power’s contribution to our nation’s 
energy supply is far more important than this 20% metric would imply. This 20% of total 
generation is over 50% of total “carbon-free” U.S. electricity generation, avoiding the annual 
release of ~ 550 million metric tons of carbon dioxide that would otherwise escape into the 
atmosphere if the same power were generated via combustion of fossil fuels [2.6]. U.S. 
nuclear power fleet-average capacity factors (CFs) have ranged between ~ 90–92% for the 
past few years – far surpassing second place geothermal generation (74% CF), natural 
gas-fired generation (56% CF), coal-fired generation (53% CF), hydro generation (38% CF), 
wind generation (36% CF) and solar photovoltaic generation (27% CF) [2.7].  Indeed, one 
of the hallmark characteristics of nuclear power during the past few decades has been its 
“24x7” availability for the generation of baseload electricity – a foundation of Grid stability, 
reliability, and economic operations.   
2.5 The Changing Grid 
Given our nation’s dependence on a smooth functioning Grid, the concern over “Grid 
resilience” – exactly what it is and how it can be achieved – holds a special place in the 
societal and Critical Infrastructure resilience dialog. The (largely privately-owned) U.S. 
electric Grid has been subject to a cascade of regulatory, institutional, and physical 
changes during the past two decades. A shortlist of these changes includes:  
 
• Deregulation of electricity markets.  
• Consolidation and specialization of generation and transmission functions (and the 
business entities who own them).  
• The advent of wind and solar energy.  
• The fracking revolution and cheap natural gas. 
• The demise of coal-fired generation.  
• The growing frequency with which nuclear power plants are being retired due to 
their inability to provide electric energy that is cost-competitive with natural gas-fired 
and wind generation.  
• The reduction in electric generating system “fuel diversity” that has resulted from the 
superposition of these trends. 
 
Americans have during the past century become accustomed to a level of electric service 
availability that is the envy of the world. It is no exaggeration to characterize the current 
state of change in the electric Grid as a metamorphosis in society’s most essential Critical 
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Infrastructure. Some of the developments cited above have the potential to undermine the 
Grid’s performance in the face of our nation’s 21st century portfolio of malevolent human 
threats and natural hazards.  What kind of Grid will emerge from this metamorphosis? It is 
not a given that this metamorphosis will result in a more resilient Grid. 
2.6 The Demise Of Nuclear Power’s Value Proposition 
In parallel with the avalanche of developments that have shocked the electric power 
industry over the past decade, the nuclear power industry has been rocked by its own 
cascade of developments. The shortlist of developments includes:  
 
• Slower than anticipated growth in domestic U.S. electricity demand.  
• Cancellations of new nuclear plant construction. 
• The accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011.  
• The continuing trend to retire “healthy” commercial merchant nuclear power plants 
(NPPs) due to their inability to produce electricity that is cost-competitive with that 
generated from natural gas and wind power. 
• The Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Westinghouse Electric Company (the entity who 
commercialized the power reactor technology upon which two-thirds of the world’s 
commercial nuclear power plants is based).   
 
Much to the chagrin of nuclear power advocates, the combined impact of these 
developments has been to (once again) stop the long-anticipated “nuclear renaissance” in 
its tracks. These developments have caused many to question the future role of nuclear 
power in an electric world. At the very least, these developments support the view that 
nuclear power’s historic value proposition (that of providing cost-competitive and reliable 
baseload electricity) is no longer compelling in the 21st century. Nuclear power plants must 
do more than provide cost-competitive baseload electricity if they are to remain a major 
source of safe, emissions-free electricity throughout the 21st century. 
2.7 Grid Resilience And Nuclear Power:  The Nexus And The 
“Probletunity” 
The dual 21st century challenges of (1) achieving and maintaining the necessary level of 
electric Grid resilience and of (2) realizing the promise of nuclear power, constitute an 
interrelated “probletunity” – an opportunity masquerading as a problem. It is the author’s 
belief that a major component of the solution to the first challenge is also a component of 
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the solution to the second challenge – that there is a symbiotic solution to these coupled 
21st century challenges. This conviction is the genesis of the research documented in this 
dissertation. 
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3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH APPROACH 
3.1 Problem Statement 
This dissertation addresses the following question:  
 
“What role do today’s U.S. commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) play in enabling 
electric Grid resilience, and what type of future nuclear power plant might maximize 
nuclear power’s contribution to Grid resilience?”   
 
The answer to this question is an important consideration in the developing dialog regarding 
electric Grid resilience and the value of nuclear power to society in the 21st century. 
3.2 Research Approach 
The Problem Statement was investigated by deconvolving it into five questions (“The Five 
Research Questions”): 
 
1. What is electric Grid resilience and why is it so important? 
2. Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets, 
and why or why not? 
3. Concerning future resilient nuclear power plants (rNPPs): What performance 
attributes and functional requirements might maximize their value as Grid resilience 
assets? 
4. Concerning future rNPPs: What design features might enable the identified rNPP 
functional requirements? 
5. Concerning future rNPPs and the Grid they will serve: What specific applications of 
rNPPs might enhance their overall contribution to electric Grid, Critical 
Infrastructure, and societal resilience? 
 
The approach adopted for addressing The Five Research Questions is depicted in Figure 
3.1 and discussed in the following subsections. 
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Figure 3.1  Research Approach 
 
	
13 
3.2.1 Task 1: Define Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
The goal of this activity was to provide the context for answering Research Question 1 in 
Task 2. Available literature in the fields of Critical Infrastructure resilience and Critical 
Infrastructure interdependence analysis were identified and reviewed. The bulk of the 
available information was found to originate from two sources: governmental studies and 
modest analyses conducted by academia. Many of the relevant investigations to date have 
been conducted in Europe and in Asia. 
3.2.2 Task 2: Define Electric Grid Resilience 
This task provided the answer to Research Question 1, “What is electric Grid resilience 
and why is it so important?” A working definition of electric Grid resilience was developed – 
one that is consistent with higher-level definitions of Critical Infrastructure resilience 
identified in Task 1, and that is useful for examining the impact of generating plant behavior 
on Grid resilience. The relatively small body of literature dealing specifically with electric 
Grid resilience was reviewed. The results of the literature review indicated there is no 
consensus on the definition of Grid resilience; nor, at present, are there accepted 
quantitative metrics by which Grid resilience can be predicted and measured, or analytical 
schemes (computational approaches) for quantifying Grid resilience. Information and 
insights gained from the literature were supplemented by direct discussions with electric 
power industry subject matter experts (SMEs), including experts from both the generation 
and transmission organizations within the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Dominion 
Virginia Power, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the Electric Infrastructure 
Security (EIS) Council. The ultimate product of this task was a heuristic (non-numerical) 
definition of Grid resilience that was employed in Task 3 to assess the value of today’s 
commercial nuclear power plants as Grid resilience assets.  
3.2.3 Task 3: Evaluate The Grid Resilience Value Of Today’s NPPs 
This task provided the answer to Research Question 2, “Are current U.S. commercial 
nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets, and why or why not?” in the context 
provided by Tasks 1 and 2. The operating history and behavioral traits of today’s NPPs 
were examined in light of the definition of the Grid resilience and key Grid resilience 
attributes developed in Task 2. The impact of these NPP behavioral traits on Grid resilience 
were evaluated, and an assessment was made of the extent to which existing NPPs enable 
Grid resilience. The NPP behavioral traits that dictate the answer to Research Question 2 
were identified. 
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This task was, at its core, a synthesis of information from (a) analyses of NPP and NPP-
Grid interface designs, (b) nuclear power operational experience during routine (day-to-day) 
operations, and (c) NPP operating experience during major crises such as superstorms, 
hurricanes, and widespread Grid de-energizations (i.e. regional blackouts). The relevant 
literature consulted included NPP licensing documents (e.g., NPP Final Safety Analysis 
Reports), previous studies of NPP-Grid interfacial requirements, U. S. nuclear power plant 
Licensee Event Reports, and after-action forensic reports generated in the wake of major 
Grid disruptions. 
3.2.4 Task 4: Define The Concept Of A “resilient Nuclear Power Plant” (rNPP) 
This task provided the answer to Research Question 3. A “technology neutral” working 
definition of a resilient nuclear power plant or “rNPP” (a nuclear power plant that is 
intentionally designed, interfaced, sited, and operated to enhance Grid resilience) was 
synthesized in this task. The philosophy underpinning this exercise was that the definition of 
an rNPP should be anchored in its value as a Grid resilience asset, rather than the specific 
technologies or system architectures employed in the plant (i.e. “technology neutral”). In 
addition to a basic definition of an rNPP, the Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP 
Functional Requirements were defined.   
3.2.5 Task 5: Identify Enabling rNPP Design Features 
While it was not the intent of the proposed research to develop a specific rNPP concept or 
design, it was considered helpful to provide the advanced reactor vendor community 
insights with respect to design features that would enable an rNPP to deliver its 
promised Grid resilience benefits. This task, (which answers Research Question 4) 
endeavored to provide such guidance by (a) identifying NPP subsystems and components  
that constrain the plant’s ability to meet the functional requirements developed in Task 4, 
and (b) describing the NPP subsystem or component level performance attributes 
necessary to enable plant-level rNPP functionalities. Where evident, observations were 
offered regarding promising rNPP architectures, reactor sizes, subsystem and component 
technologies, and NPP-Grid interface technologies. Finally insights with respect to 
regulatory hurdles associated with development and deployment of rNPPs were identified 
when such obstacles were evident.  
3.2.6 Task 6: Identify High Impact rNPP Applications 
Task 6 addressed Research Question 5, by identifying and describing (in a preliminary 
manner) four specific rNPP applications that show promise for enhancing electric Grid and 
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Critical Infrastructure resilience. These four applications were defined in sufficient detail to 
gauge the nature of their impact on electric Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience, and 
the mechanism by which that impact could be delivered. 
3.3 Issues Outside Research Scope 
The preceding sections have described the scope of the proposed research – the questions 
and issues that were addressed. It is also important to clearly identify some issues and 
questions that were not addressed in this research effort. 
 
The research conducted lays a foundation for thinking about electric Grid resilience, and a 
(new) way of thinking about nuclear power in the 21st century. As such, it is preliminary 
work that others can – and hopefully will – build upon.  Attempts to define Grid resilience 
are in their infancy. The question of whether current nuclear power plants are truly Grid 
resilience assets has never been examined in a rigorous manner – though the topic has 
recently garnered some attention from the Trump Administration. The concept of a truly 
“resilient” nuclear power plant (defined in terms of its contribution to Grid resilience) is a 
new idea. No prior examination of the functional requirements, design features, and 
potential applications of such resilient NPPs has been performed.   
 
There are three important topics that were considered to be beyond the scope of this 
research effort. These three topics were only addressed in a superficial manner, or not 
addressed at all: 
• Development of a preconceptual rNPP design – The development of credible 
preconceptual reactor concepts requires the talents and skills of teams of subject 
matter experts. No effort was made here to develop a specific rNPP concept. 
However, preliminary suggestions regarding promising approaches to rNPP 
subsystem design and technology selection were developed.   
• Regulatory barriers to rNPP development – The electric Grid, the electric power 
industry, and the commercial nuclear power industry are regulated by an armada of 
federal and state (sometimes even local) governmental entities. Some obvious 
federal regulatory (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) challenges associated 
with the development, deployment, and operation of rNPPs were identified. 
However, it is premature to conduct a detailed evaluation of this topic until a 
consensus develops regarding the functional capabilities of rNPPs and the manner 
in which they are employed in the Grid.  
• The economic viability of rNPPs and market mechanisms to accelerate their 
development – Today’s nuclear power plants are not compensated for the capacity, 
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reliability, fuel security, or greenhouse gas avoidance benefits they deliver to the 
Grid. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), at the request of 
the Trump Administration, launched an effort in March 2018 to collect information 
and input from Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission 
Operators (RTOs) to inform the dialog regarding the market value of resilience and 
market mechanism to compensate generation assets owners for the resilience value 
they provide the Bulk Electricity System [3.1]. The subject of how rNPPs might be 
compensated for their Grid resilience contributions, how policies and market 
mechanisms might be engineered and implemented to compensate them, or how 
prototype and first-of-a-kind rNPPs might be financed, are all topics largely beyond 
the scope of this analysis. 
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This chapter is based on the Accepted Manuscript of an article published as an Open 
Access document by Taylor & Francis in the American Nuclear Society’s journal, Nuclear 
Technology, Volume 202, 2018, Issue 1, 15 March 2018. The Version of Record is 
available online at 
 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00295450.2018.1432966 . 
 
This article focuses on current U.S. NPPs and Grid resilience, contains the product of 
research Tasks 1–3 (as well as a brief introduction to the results of research Tasks 4 and 
5), and presents the answers to Research Questions 1 and 2: 
 
1. What is electric Grid resilience and why is it so important? 
2. Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets, 
and why or why not? 
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Chapter 4 Abstract 
 
This paper examines the concept of Grid resilience in the context of the North American 
electricity supply system and the role existing (Generation II) light water–cooled nuclear 
power plants (NPPs) play in enabling and enhancing Grid resilience. (Because of 
similarities in technology and plant design, it is likely that most of the discussion in the 
paper is also relevant to Generation III and Generation III+ light water NPP designs. The 
applicability of the analysis to Canadian CANDU and Russian VVER technology has not 
been assessed.) The paper asks and answers three compound questions: (1) what is Grid 
resilience, and what is a resilient Grid? (2) what is a resilient nuclear power plant (rNPP), 
and what are the basic functional requirements of rNPPs? and in light of the answers to 
these questions, (3) are today’s U.S. NPPs significant Grid resilience assets? The 
conclusion reached is that existing U.S. commercial NPPs are safe and efficient capacity, 
energy, and reliability assets and they have demonstrated some Grid resilience benefit 
during regional weather events. However, today’s NPPs do not deliver the Grid resilience 
benefits nuclear power can and should provide the nation. The author argues that nuclear 
power’s unique fuel security (an attribute that could allow NPPs to energize the Grid during 
extended periods in which fuel could not be delivered to other types of power plants) is a 
compelling reason to develop future rNPPs that would deliver strategic Grid resilience 
benefits in the face of evolving hazards and threats to the U.S. Grid. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The concept of societal resilience in a world of growing human populations, limited natural 
resources, seemingly intensifying natural hazards, and expanding man-made threats has 
become a matter of global importance [4.1]. Within this context, society’s ever-increasing 
dependence on several key critical infrastructures is a matter of concern for both governmental 
and private sectors [4.2]. Critical infrastructures are societal assets, systems, and networks so 
vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on national security, 
economic prosperity, public health and safety, etc. The U.S. electric power system or the 
“Grid” can arguably be viewed as the most critical of America’s critical infrastructures because 
it is the foundation upon which virtually every other critical infrastructure depends. The Grid 
consists of the integrated bulk electric system (comprising electricity generation and 
transmission networks) and the distribution system that delivers electricity over the “last mile” 
to the end user [4.3]. Indeed, in many ways the Grid is the “umbilical cord” of modern society. 
Resilient modern societies require resilient Grids. Given society’s dependence on electricity, 
the subject of Grid resilience is a matter of great relevance to U.S. economic, energy, 
homeland, and national security [4.4]. 
 
The U.S. Grid consists of some 7700 operating electric power generation facilities with capacities 
of 1 MW (electric) or larger, over 700 000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines (240 000 miles 
of which operate at or above 230 kV), approximately 56 000 substations, and 6.5 million miles of 
local distribution lines [4.5]. Of these 7700 operating power plants, 99 are commercial nuclear 
power reactors located in 61 nuclear power plants [4.6] (NPPs). These reactors produced 
approximately 20% of the total electrical energy generated in the United States in 2016 [4.7]. 
When considered in terms of their contribution to Grid reliability and greenhouse gas emissions 
avoidance, it is clear these NPPs play a much larger role in the nation’s electricity supply 
strategy than their numbers would otherwise suggest. 
 
This paper explores the concept of Grid resilience in the context of the U.S. and North 
American electricity supply system; the role current Generation II, light water–cooled reactor 
(LWR) NPPs play in enhancing Grid resilience; and the role a new type of NPP—a resilient 
NPP (rNPP)—could play in enabling and enhancing Grid resilience. The analysis is applicable 
to both pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) concepts. The 
general principles of Grid resilience discussed here are believed to be broadly relevant around 
the globe. However, the applicability of this analysis to any specific region other than the United 
States has not been assessed. Additionally, because of similarities in technology and plant 
design, much of the discussion here is believed to be relevant to existing Generation III and 
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Generation III+ light water–cooled NPP designs. The applicability of this analysis to Canadian 
CANDU and Russian light water reactors (VVER) technology has not been assessed. 
 
Section 4.2 presents a working definition of Grid resilience that is useful for exploring the 
characteristics of NPPs that impact Grid resilience. Based on the definition of Grid 
resilience provided in Section 4.2, Section 4.3 provides a definition of a generic resilient 
power plant (rPP) and an rNPP, the two key attributes of rNPPs, and the functional 
requirements of rPPs and rNPPs in particular. Section 4.4 discusses the response of 
today’s NPPs to Grid disruptions in terms of their ability to absorb and adapt to Grid 
anomalies. Given the likelihood that today’s NPPs will shut down in response to major Grid 
anomalies, Section 4.5 identifies and explores the principal Grid resilience implications of 
NPP shutdown in such situations. Section 4.6 discusses the role of today’s NPPs in Grid 
recovery operations. Based on the evidence presented in Sections 4.2 through 4.6, Section 
4.7 presents the conclusion that NPPs in the United States do not deliver the Grid resilience 
benefits today that nuclear power can and should provide the nation. However, the story 
does not end there. Section 4.8 discusses the fact that all NPPs possess one unique 
characteristic that should provide great motivation for enhancing the resilience of future 
NPPs. Finally, and in light of the analysis presented in the foregoing sections, Section 4.9 
presents a challenge for the designers and operators of future NPPs and the Grid they will 
serve. 
4.2 Grid Resilience: A Definition 
Given modern society’s growing dependence of critical infrastructure and the Grid in 
particular, it is perhaps surprising that a consensus definition of Grid resilience has not yet 
evolved. What is resilience? And precisely, what is Grid resilience? 
 
4.2.1 Basic Concepts Of System Resilience 
Resilience as an engineering term is one whose definition is surprisingly difficult to 
articulate in a precise manner. Resilience is typically defined and measured at the system 
level. One recent working definition of resilience is “the ability of a system to withstand a 
change or a disruptive event by reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability), 
by adapting itself to them (adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative 
capability).” [4.8] 
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Many of the basic elements of system resilience are captured in a system resilience curve (SRC). 
Figure 4.1 is an illustrative generic SRC (adapted from Reference 4.8) that depicts a system’s 
time-dependent performance in response to a disruptive event. The units of time and performance 
plotted in Figure 4.1 are arbitrary and obviously depend both on the system and the event under 
examination. The time period upon which the resilience curve is based begins at the far left of the 
curve, with the system operating within some nominal steady-state performance (functionality) 
range. The specific disruptive event of interest is assumed to begin at point 1 in Figure 4.1. The 
system’s initial response is to absorb the disturbance within its nominal band of operation. System 
performance, as viewed from the outside of the system, is still nominal. As a consequence, it is 
quite possible no one (including the system’s operators) would even be aware of the disturbance. 
However, in this case the disturbance is assumed to continue to point 2 (time duration Δt0) and to 
be of such severity that the system can no longer absorb the stressor without perceptible impact 
on the system’s performance. The normal operations phase of the event ends at point 2. 
 
Unable to cope with the stressor event while maintaining nominal system performance, the 
system’s event response cascade is triggered at point 2 and proceeds to point 3 (time 
duration Δt1), at which time the damage is complete. This shock and response cascade is the 
second phase of the event sequence. The shock and response cascade may consist of a 
diverse set of preplanned and unplanned actions inherent to the system architecture and 
composition, automatic control system actions, and human operator interventions, all of 
which impact the terminal point of the system’s response cascade, the magnitude of 
performance loss, the shape of the system response curve between points 2 and 3, and the 
duration Δt1 of the response cascade. 
 
The third or recovery phase of the event commences at the time the system performance 
has reached its minimum level (point 3 and minimum P) and ends at a point in time in which 
some minimally acceptable and stable level of system performance has been recovered 
through adaptive actions by the system and its human operators (point 4 and recovered P). 
The recovered P at point 4 in Figure 4.1 reflects restoration of some intermediate level of 
system performance in which the system’s high-priority functionalities are recovered and 
from which the system can be further reconstituted, reconfigured, and restored. 
 
The restoration phase of the event commences at point 4 and ends at point 5 with the 
system performance at restored P. As previously mentioned, the timescale depicted in 
Figure 4.1 (especially for the restoration phase) may not be linear as depicted. The duration 
of this restoration phase is Δt3, which may often be much longer than the duration of the 
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Figure 4.1  Generic SRC (adapted from Reference 4.8) 
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recovery phase Δt2. Depending on the damage inflicted on the system, the restored P might 
be higher, the same, or lower than the original system performance, original P. For cases in 
which system functionality is not restored to its original pre-disturbance value, system 
operators and those who are served by the system must become accustomed to a “New 
Normal” (typically reduced) level of system functionality [4.9]. The achievement of any stable 
New Normal can be a demanding long-term societal undertaking. 
4.2.2 Limitations Of SRCs 
System resilience curves are useful for visualizing and discussing the basic dynamics of 
system resilience, but they have many limitations. First, SRCs do not actually plot 
resilience; they plot system performance (however defined) versus time. The physical 
significance of the integral of performance over time (or conversely the performance 
decrement represented by the area between the nominal system performance curve and 
the disturbed system performance curve) is open to debate and in any event depends on 
the units (metrics) employed for performance. SRCs do not define or depict how 
performance is measured or the individual metrics that constitute performance. 
 
Major challenges faced by those seeking to employ SRCs for real-world engineered 
systems include the development of a meaningful definition of the performance plotted in 
the SRC, the development of approaches to predict performance in response to a specified 
disturbance, and the development of methods for testing and measuring this performance 
for disturbances of interest (particularly for systems that cannot easily be taken off-line for 
testing). In order to be useful, the performance plotted in the SRC must be a function of 
parameters and metrics that can be measured, estimated from prior experience, or 
simulated via computational modeling. For instance, consider the hypothetical case of a 
U.S. commercial airline operating out of three major hubs with connecting flights through a 
dozen connecting airports and providing customer service to 40 destination locations. In 
this case, the disruptive event might be the closure of one of the connecting airports due to 
extreme weather. The performance plotted on the ordinate axis in this case might be the 
average delay in destination arrival time for all of the airline’s customers as a function of 
time from the onset of the weather event. 
 
Finally, a SRC is a product of many unique time-dependent factors such as (1) the nature of the 
disruptive event (its type, magnitude, persistence, etc.), (2) the system’s evolving (time-
dependent) composition as individual system elements respond to the event, (3) the system’s 
evolving configuration as individual system elements respond to the event, and (4) the system’s 
automatic and manual control protocols and how they are implemented through time in 
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response to the disruptive event. Because items 2, 3, and 4 all depend on both intrinsic (to the 
system) actions and those of the system’s human maintainers and operators, the SRC actually 
masks most of the engineering details required to understand the “why” of what is transpiring as 
the system responds to the disruption. 
4.2.3 Grid Resilience 
Application of the resilience concept to both the Grid and to the NPPs it hosts is a nontrivial 
exercise. Arghandeh et al. [4.10] recently offered one possible working definition for “power 
system cyber-physical resilience”: “the system’s ability to maintain continuous electricity 
flow to customers given a certain load prioritization scheme.” The authors do not propose 
specific metrics by which Grid resilience can be measured or by which different systems 
can be compared. Their definition captures many system resilience considerations but 
appears to focus primarily on preventing interruptions in electricity flow. 
 
The National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recently released the report, 
“Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System,” [4.4] which offers the following 
observation regarding Grid resilience: “Resilience is not the same as reliability. While minimizing 
the likelihood of large-area, long-duration outages is important, a resilient system is one that 
acknowledges that outages can occur, prepares to deal with them, minimizes their impact when 
they occur, is able to restore service quickly, and draws lessons from the experience to improve 
performance in the future.” [4.4] In light of the National Academy’s observation (i.e., the concept 
of capturing prevention, recovery, and restoration in the definition of Grid resilience), the author 
has proposed the following working definition of Grid resilience:  
 
“Electric Grid resilience is the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity 
flow to customers given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.” [4.11]  
 
The National Academy’s report briefly reviews a variety of potential Grid resilience metrics, which 
are primarily those proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Grid Modernization 
Laboratory Consortium. These include metrics such as cumulative customer hours of outages, 
cumulative critical customer hours of outages, time to recovery, loss of utility revenue, and 
several other direct and indirect consequences. However, the report does not recommend 
specific metrics by which Grid resilience should be measured. Rather, it states the following: 
“Unlike reliability, there are no generally agreed upon resilience metrics that are used widely 
today.” [4.4] The report goes on to recommend (Recommendation 2.2) that the DOE, the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation, and others collaborate in the development and 
operationalization of appropriate resilience metrics. 
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Because Grids are composed of linked generation, transmission, and distribution elements, 
Grid resilience truly is a weakest-link issue. Ideally, every element of the Grid must possess 
essential resilience attributes: the ability to withstand, absorb, adapt to, and quickly recover 
from offending disturbances and disruptions. Alternatively, less resilient elements of the Grid 
must be buffered or isolated in some manner from offending disturbances by other more 
resilient elements of the system. Thus, an optimally designed and operated Grid should function 
in a manner in which every system element is resilient and each element also reduces the 
stress placed on the other elements of the system by offending Grid disturbances. 
 
The customer-focused definition of Grid resilience offered here is arguably the most relevant 
approach for defining Grid resilience from the societal perspective. However, the use of such a 
definition is greatly complicated by the reality that neither the ownership and operation nor the 
regulation of the Grid’s generation, transmission, and distribution assets is vertically integrated 
in today’s deregulated electricity markets. Because of the mosaic of regional transmission 
organizations and independent system operators, and because many entities own and operate 
only generation or transmission or distribution assets (or two of the three), an enormous 
challenge confronts those seeking to enhance the resilience of the U.S. electricity supply 
system. (This is a matter of great importance but one that is beyond the scope of this paper.) 
 
Figure 4.2 presents a simplified Grid resilience curve that follows directly from the concepts 
captured in the generic SRC in Figure 4.1 and the definition of Grid resilience offered above. The 
simplified Grid disruption behavior depicted in Figure 4.2 assumes the Grid operator has 
designated three load prioritization classes (high priority, middle priority, and low priority)—hence 
“3-step”—and that the system ultimately regains its pre-disturbance functionality. The Grid’s 
generation, transmission, and distribution subsystems (and the interfaces between them) all play 
a role in shaping the Grid’s SRC. The basic disruption response depicted in Figure 4.2 is one in 
which low-priority loads would be actively interrupted or passively surrendered first, as the 
system’s performance/ functionality decays or descends between points 2 and 3. Loads of 
increasing priority are interrupted as the performance descends to minimum P at point 3. Truly 
essential “must run” critical loads would all lie in the region beneath point 3 in Figure 4.2 and (at 
least theoretically) would never be interrupted. As is the case in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the reality that the time to recovery and to restore complete system functionality can be much 
longer than the duration of the original Grid disturbance. The serial impact of Hurricanes Irma 
and Maria on the island of Puerto Rico’s Grid during September 2017 (and their continuing 
aftermath) are grim reminders that the recovery and restoration phases of a system may last 
much longer than the duration of the disturbance that originally stressed the system. The  
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Figure 4.2  Notional 3-Step Grid Resilience Curve (SRC) 
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aftermath of these storms also graphically illustrates that the New Normal system performance 
may be greatly degraded in comparison with the system’s pre-disturbance performance. 
 
Figure 4.2 also reflects the difficulty in applying SRCs to real systems. What exactly is the 
performance being plotted in Figure 4.2? A fundamental difficulty in the application of 
resilience curves arises when system performance is not obviously a single number or a 
simple mathematical combination of multiple computed or observed metrics. This indeed is 
the case with respect to Grid resilience. The plotted performance should embody the 
metrics by which Grid resilience is measured. But, as previously discussed, there is no 
single measure of Grid resilience.  The performance plotted in Figure 4.2 might be a 
function of a weighted combination of expected frequency and duration of load loss or 
failure to serve for each class of loads in the operator’s load prioritization scheme. Or, the 
performance plotted in Figure 4.2 might be related to the percentage of total load being 
served at any moment in time. However, given that it is more acceptable to drop low-priority 
loads than high-priority loads (in keeping with the utility’s load prioritization hierarchy), the 
abscissa scale would not be linear in this case. The difficulty in defining a single 
performance metric for Grid resilience is evident and will be the subject of continuing debate 
and research in the future. 
 
Finally, Figure 4.2 is not simply the artifact of a managed load shedding protocol. It also 
reflects a system damage function. The magnitude of performance degradation or gain (and 
the shape of each segment of the SRC between points 2 and 5) would also be a complex 
function of a host of voluntary and involuntary actions involving the response and behavior of 
individual elements of interconnected generation, transmission, and distribution subsystems. 
4.2.4 Utility Of SRCs As Grid Resilience Assessment Tools 
If the challenges discussed above could be overcome to construct credible Grid SRCs, the 
tool could be applied to provide many useful insights to Grid operators, planners, and 
regulators. In the case of existing systems, SRCs might be employed by operators to 
optimize emergency operating procedures and Grid recovery and restoration procedures as 
well as to maximize the marginal resilience benefit of incremental investments in the Grid. 
Grid designers and planners might utilize SRCs to conduct comparative analyses of 
different potential Grid architectures and technologies, including the siting of key Grid 
assets such as new generating plants, substations, etc. Regulating authorities might 
employ SRCs to inform decisions regarding rate structures and to create incentives that enable 
infrastructure owners and operating entities to monetize system resilience, thereby creating a 
mechanism for financing system resilience investments. Unfortunately, for all their potential utility, 
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SRCs are currently more valuable as qualitative tools for discussing high-level Grid resilience 
issues than as quantitative Grid analysis and planning tools. Only time will tell whether SRCs will 
become useful tools for Grid resilience analysis and planning. 
4.3 rPP and rNPP Definitions, Key Attributes, And Functional 
Requirements 
What does the definition of Grid resilience discussed in Section 4.2 imply with respect to the 
electrical generating plants (particularly the NPPs) embedded in the Grid? Indeed, what is 
an rNPP? Given the definitions of critical infrastructure and Grid resilience discussed in 
Section 4.2 the author has proposed the following definition of an rNPP [4.11]: “A resilient 
rNPP is one whose performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance Grid 
resilience—the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers 
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.” Based on this definition of an rNPP, the author 
has also defined [4.11] two essential attributes of rNPPs: 
1. rNPP attribute 1: rNPPs enable the Grid to absorb and adapt to a broad spectrum of 
Grid anomalies and upsets. 
2. rNPP attribute 2: rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to quickly recover from upsets 
and to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s 
load prioritization hierarchy. 
 
It should be noted that both the definition of an rNPP and the two defining attributes of rNPPs 
are equally applicable to all types of resilient power plants (rPPs). Thus, one could also speak 
of a rPP as any power plant that exhibits the two rNPP attributes defined above.  In any event, 
rNPPs are NPPs defined not by the technologies they employ, nor their size, etc., but by the 
resilience value and impact they deliver to the Grid they serve. The design, siting, method of 
interface to the Grid, and operational characteristics of the rPP or rNPP would all impact the 
plant’s value as a Grid resilience asset. 
 
Given the foregoing discussion, what are the generic operational characteristics 
(functionalities) of power plants that would enable them to be major Grid resilience assets?  
Table 4.1 summarizes a key list of functional capabilities the author believes would 
characterize an ideal, generic rPP, along with the specific resilience attribute(s) they 
support. Of course, no existing technology and power plant design can deliver all of these 
idealized functionalities. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the real-world implications of 
this list of idealized generic power plant capabilities with respect to rNPPs. Table 4.2 lists  
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Table 4.1  Idealized Generic Resilient Power Plant (rPP) Capabilities 
 
rPP Capability 
Relevant 
Resilience 
Characteristics 
1.  Capable of supplying power to the Grid anytime the 
plant is called on to do so 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
2.  Capable of rapidly maneuvering over any power 
range between the plant’s housekeeping load and 
its rated capacity 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
3.  Capable of operating indefinitely at any dispatched 
power level 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
4.  Capable of riding through (tolerating) any Grid 
anomaly (aberration in load and offsite power 
magnitude or quality) without incurring damage, 
without isolating from the Grid, and without shutting 
down 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
5.  Capable of operating in an Island Mode (completely 
isolated from the Grid) indefinitely if / when forced 
to detach from the Grid 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
6.  Capable of independently maintaining a safe 
shutdown state indefinitely without drawing power 
or other resources from the Grid or offsite if / when 
the plant is required to shut down 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
7.  Capable of independently cranking (starting up) 
without drawing power or other resources from the 
Grid or offsite if / when the plant is required to shut 
down 
Restorative 
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Table 4.2  Six Functional Requirements of resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs) 
 
rNPP Functional Requirement 
Relevant 
Resilience 
Characteristics 
1.  Robust load-following 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
2.  Immunity to damage from external events (including 
Grid anomalies) 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
3.  Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in 
response to Grid anomalies 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
4.  Ability to operate indefinitely in Island Mode (i.e., 
without connection to offsite transmission load and 
electric power supply) 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
5.  Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling 
capability (i.e., requiring no offsite power or 
resupply of diesel fuel from offsite) 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
6.  Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e., 
the ability to start with no offsite power supply from 
the Grid) 
Restorative 
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the Six Functional Requirements the author considers to be essential to enable an NPP to 
satisfy the definition of an rNPP and that, as a package, distinguish rNPPs from today’s 
NPPs.  
 
Each of the six rNPP Functional Requirements in Table 4.2 addresses more than one 
resilience attribute category.  (Because of space constraints, a detailed discussion of Tables 
4.1 and 4.2 will be deferred to a forthcoming paper.) rNPP Functional Requirement 1 implies 
an rNPP is capable of functioning in modes beyond traditional baseload operations when 
called upon by system dispatchers to do so. Functional Requirements 2 and 3 assure the 
rNPP is not rendered inoperable by events that trigger the Grid’s need for the resilience 
contribution of the rNPP. Functional Requirement 4 reduces the time required for an rNPP to 
reload and support the Grid in extreme conditions that have necessitated the plant’s 
disconnection from the Grid. Functional Requirement 5 assures the rNPP is not a distraction 
or burden to Grid operators when it is not available, especially during emergencies involving 
reconstitution and recovery of Grid operations in the wake of a major blackout or other Grid 
disturbances. Finally, Functional Requirement 6 enables the rNPP to restart independent of 
offsite power supplies and without placing demands on an already stressed Grid during Grid 
recovery and restoration operations. 
4.4 Today’s NPPs’ Limited Ability To Absorb And Adapt To Grid 
Anomalies 
Given the discussions in Section 4.2 and 4.3, it is natural to ask the following question: What is 
the contribution of today’s nuclear power plants to Grid resilience? The answer to this question 
depends, in turn, on the answer to the following set of lower-level questions. How do modern 
commercial NPPs respond to changing conditions around them? How do they respond to 
disturbances and disruptions in the Grid? Do they enable and enhance the Grid’s ability to 
minimize interruptions in electric flow to customers in the face of major Grid disturbances?  The 
answers to these questions reveal much about the true value of today’s NPPs in terms of their 
contribution to Grid resilience. 
 
There is no question that electrical generation facilities (nuclear and nonnuclear) are 
impacted by events that occur in the Grid.  A cursory search of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s (NRC’s) online Licensee Event Report (LER) database [4.12] for the period 
2000 to 2017 returned 26 reports in which a Grid disturbance was a contributing cause to a 
reported event at a U.S. commercial NPP. A similar search with the keywords “transmission 
line” yielded 31 reports in which issues associated with the NPP transmission lines resulted in 
reported events. It is important to note that a single wide-area or regional event (e.g., a 
	
34 
weather event) can lead to multiple reported events in the NRC’s LER database.  This occurs 
when a single external (to the NPP) event impacts multiple reactors at a single site or multiple 
NPP sites [4.13]. 
 
Many aspects of a particular NPP’s response to a Grid anomaly would depend on plant-
specific issues, including the manner in which the NPP is interfaced to the Grid 
(Figure 4.3) and the Grid architecture beyond the interfaces [4.14]. Figure 4.3 is a highly 
simplified, generic depiction of the interfaces between a typical NPP and its surroundings. 
The Grid anomaly can appear at one, some, or all three of the NPP-Grid interfaces 
depicted on the right side of the drawing (i.e., the generator step-up “GSU” transformer, 
startup “SUT” transformer that energizes the plant’s startup systems, and the engineered 
safety features “ESF” transformer). The NPP’s response to the Grid anomaly (especially in 
the short term) will be heavily influenced by which NPP-Grid interfaces are involved and 
the specific nature of the Grid anomaly. 
4.4.1 The Response Of Today’s NPPs To Anticipated Grid Anomalies 
For cases in which an NPP operator receives advance notice of an impending Grid 
disruption, today’s NPP operators would take prudent preemptive action to protect the 
power plant. Such advance notice might originate through federally issued alerts from the 
space weather network, the plant’s supervisor control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, 
or other means. Theoretically, plant operators might respond to such alerts in four ways 
[4.14]: 
1. Watchful waiting: The NPP continues to operate as normal but enters a state of 
heightened situational awareness. Precautionary and prudent steps are taken to 
assure the plant is prepared to rapidly execute one of the other three actions 
described below if the plant is presented with boundary conditions it cannot 
otherwise accommodate. 
2. Manual runback or cutback: The NPP reduces its power level but remains 
attached to the Grid via transmission lines and offsite power connections to the 
plant’s switchyard. Every effort is taken to maximize and maintain situational 
awareness as the plant continues to operate at a reduced power level. 
3. Initiation of Island Mode operations: The plant operators both cut back reactor 
power and isolate the plant from the Grid. [This mode of operation is not allowed in 
the current NRC regulatory regime but is employed (indeed required) of at least 
some NPPs in Europe. As discussed below, many – perhaps most – U.S. NPPs are 
not designed to enable true Island Mode operations.] Power levels in Island Mode 
would likely be as close as possible to the plant’s housekeeping load level while 
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Figure 4.3  Simplified NPP-Grid Interfaces [4.14] 
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maintaining stable operation of the plant. This low power level is difficult to maintain 
for long periods in large power reactors due to operational stability issues and the 
stresses such operation imposes on hardware (the main condenser system, 
feedwater systems, etc.). 
4. Manual shutdown: The NPP operators manually shut down the plant (trip the 
reactors) and transition them to normal shutdown decay heat removal, possibly 
combined with managed (preemptive) transition at some point to onsite diesel-
driven power systems if there is reason to believe the anticipated Grid disruption 
could result in a loss of offsite power (LOOP). This action might be taken to avoid 
the possibility of unnecessarily harsh transitions in the event the anticipated Grid 
anomaly dictates rapid plant response. 
 
The choice of which of these four actions to execute depends on several factors, such as the 
nature of the anticipated Grid disruption and the warning time given to the NPP operators, the 
potential for direct damage to the NPP plant and equipment from the external initiating event, or 
the period of time offsite power might be unavailable (in the event of a Grid de-energization) to 
the NPP, etc. The selection of any of the actions other than the watchful waiting option results in 
a loss of some, or all, of the NPP’s generation capacity from the Grid for a period of time that 
depends both on the NPP’s individual response to the Grid disturbance and the response of the 
remainder of the Grid to the disturbance. 
4.4.2 Response Of Today’s NPPs To Unanticipated Grid Anomalies 
In contrast to anticipated Grid disturbances, unanticipated Grid disturbances would initially 
be “sensed” by an NPP as an anomaly in one or more of its NPP-Grid interfaces (voltage 
and frequency perturbations, phase angle/power factor anomalies, load perturbations, etc.) 
at the NPP-Grid interfaces depicted in Figure 4.3. The plant’s initial response to the event 
would depend on the manner in which it was first sensed: Which NPP-Grid interface detects 
the anomaly and the specific anomalous parameter that is detected (load or supply voltage, 
frequency, and phase angle perturbations; power factor and real/ reactive power 
perturbations; etc.) [4.14 – 4.16]. Note that in the case of a complete Grid de-energization, 
all three transient responses discussed below would progress to the so-called LOOP event: 
1. Partial load rejection: A load rejection is a sudden reduction in electric power 
demand at the NPP generator’s terminals (see Figure 4.3). Such events can be 
caused by faults in transmission lines or the opening of interconnections between 
parts of the Grid experiencing a load rejection. While some Generation II LWR 
plants designed by Combustion Engineering were designed to accommodate 85% 
or greater load rejection without tripping the reactor, U.S. NPPs typically can 
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manage load rejections of up to ~50% by reducing power (run-back) and dumping 
excess steam as necessary to the unit’s main condenser [assuming alternating-
current (ac) power is still available at that point to drive the pumps that supply water 
to the secondary side of the condenser]. 
2. Complete loss of load: In this case, the NPP might experience a momentary or 
short-term partial load rejection that quickly evolves to a complete (100%) load 
rejection, i.e., a loss of load event that is ultimately sensed by the NPP at its 
generator terminals (see Figure 4.3). This loss of load event could descend on the 
NPP with little advance warning. The NPP’s normal response to the loss of load 
would be to open breakers at the generator output, isolating the NPP’s main 
generator from the Grid. In such cases, it might be possible for the NPP to rapidly 
run back its power level to that required to supply its own housekeeping electrical 
loads, provided (once again) that AC power is available to drive the pumps that 
supply water to the secondary side of the condenser. (It is the author’s 
understanding that only a few U.S. NPPs were designed with main generator output 
breaker configurations that enable the unit to separate from the Grid while 
maintaining electrical feed to the unit’s auxiliary transformers (see Figure 4.3). Thus, 
most NPPs in the United States today are probably incapable of transitioning to 
Island Mode operations.) In any event, if the (rapid) power reduction and delicate 
balancing operation cannot be managed, the reactor will be tripped. 
3. Voltage and frequency perturbation-induced reactor trips: North American Grid 
AC frequency is typically controlled to within ±0.05 Hz [4.17]. The initial stage of a 
widespread Grid anomaly or blackout would involve large variations in system 
voltage and frequency as load shedding and real or reactive power supply-demand 
mismatches cascade throughout the Grid. NPPs have voltage limits that are more 
restrictive than the standard Grid voltage control limits employed by many regional 
transmission operators [4.18]. A NPP senses Grid AC voltage and frequency via 
several mechanisms. Changes in Grid AC voltage and frequency produce 
electromagnetic-induced stresses within the NPP’s turbine-generator system (Figure 
4.3) as it seeks to remain in synchronization with the Grid. These Grid voltage and 
frequency perturbations also directly impact the speed of AC motor-driven pumps 
used to circulate cooling water through the reactor, steam generators (if a PWR), 
feedwater to the reactor’s condenser, etc. The thermodynamic balance of the plant 
can be significantly impacted by Grid AC voltage and frequency perturbations. The 
core protection calculator (CPC) systems in U.S. NPPs (especially Westinghouse 
and Combustion Engineering designs) are very sensitive to and intolerant of reactor 
coolant pump (RCP) speed variations resulting from Grid frequency perturbations—
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more sensitive than typical European Generation II LWR designs. In addition, most 
AC motor-driven pumping systems are protected by breakers designed to open 
under unacceptable voltage and frequency perturbations that could cause motor 
overheating due to excessive current demands. (Though, as just described, the 
CPC system would almost certainly act to trip the reactor before the RCP protection 
systems would initiate a reactor trip.) The control band for these protection systems 
is relatively narrow. Given all of these design features, excessive Grid voltage and 
frequency perturbations would trigger the NPP’s protection systems to rapidly trip 
the reactor and transition it to onsite or offsite AC-powered shutdown cooling. 
4.5 Four Implications Of NPP Shutdown With Respect To Grid 
Resilience 
The implication of the three NPP transient response scenarios discussed in Section 4.4 is 
that the ultimate response of today’s NPPs to major Grid anomalies (those involving 
significant disruptions in the plant’s sensed transmission load or quality of offsite power) will 
most likely be to trip the reactors and shut down the plant. A reactor trip and plant shutdown 
in the event of a Grid anomaly introduces four concerns that are relevant to Grid resilience: 
1. Maintenance of safe shutdown cooling for the NPP (reactor and spent-fuel pool).  
2. Avoidance of cascading Grid collapse.  
3. Time delay intrinsic to NPP restart.  
4. Provision of the offsite power required to crank (start up) the NPP. 
4.5.1 Maintenance Of NPP Safe Shutdown Cooling Is A Burden On Grid 
Operators 
Once tripped, the NPP’s reactor(s) would be rapidly transitioned to the shutdown decay heat 
removal mode. Depending on the circumstances, safe shutdown cooling could be 
accomplished via several systems [4.19]: (1) AC-powered pumping systems if offsite power is 
available, (2) diesel generator/inverter–driven AC-powered pumping systems, (3) steam 
turbine–driven pumping systems (as long as the reactor remains pressurized), and (4) direct 
diesel-driven pumping systems. The period of time the plant can remain in a safe shutdown 
state obviously depends on the reliability of these pumping systems (and in the case of diesel-
driven systems, the inventory of diesel fuel available). Regardless of their onsite shutdown 
cooling capabilities, NPPs are considered to be among the highest-priority critical loads to 
which electric service must be restored in the event of a Grid blackout. Regional transmission 
system operators in the United States typically seek to restore offsite power to the NPPs within 
4 h of its loss [4.20]. Thus, once the Grid has gone dark, the NPP actually constitutes a burden 
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on Grid operators rather than an asset. It is a facility that demands immediate attention and 
draws power from the Grid rather than producing power and contributing in meaningful ways to 
early Grid recovery operations. 
4.5.2 Avoidance Of A NPP Shutdown-Induced Cascading Grid Collapse Is A 
Real Concern For Grid Operators 
For cases in which the NPP carries a significant portion of the Grid’s electric load, the loss 
of the plant’s generating capacity can result in additional Grid voltage and/or frequency 
perturbations. The abrupt removal of a large block of generating capacity from a (already) 
stressed Grid is not a recipe for Grid stability. If not quickly corrected by the addition of other 
generating capacity, NPP shutdown in the face of a Grid anomaly can lead to the shutdown of 
other generation and transmission assets and a cascading collapse of larger portions of the 
Grid [4.15]. Such was the case during the Northeast blackout in 2003, when nine NPPs in the 
United States, and seven in Canada, rapidly and automatically shut down or disconnected 
from the Grid, robbing the Grid of generating capacity and contributing to the cascading 
spread of the blackout [4.21]. (Such scenarios also plunge the NPP into a complete LOOP 
event if the plant is not already in such a state.) 
4.5.3 Post-Blackout NPP Restart Timeline For Current NPPs Undermines 
Their Value As Grid Recovery Assets 
Speaking strictly from the standpoint of internal (to the NPP) considerations, how quickly 
might an NPP that has shut down (either manually in anticipation of a Grid disruption or 
automatically in response to an unanticipated event) return to service? 
 
The startup of an NPP is a carefully choreographed exercise involving a series of diverse actions 
and activities including holds for tests and verification of required conditions, along with conditional 
gates beyond which the process cannot proceed unless required conditions are met [4.22]. 
Commercial NPPs have several operating modes and rules for transitioning between these 
modes. This operational framework determines the ability of and schedule for an NPP’s return to 
service if it shuts down in the event of a major Grid disruption. The definition of the NPP operating 
modes differs between reactor types and reactor vendors [4.23, 4.24]. Traditional Generation II 
PWRs have six operational modes, while BWRs have only five modes. However, in all cases, a 
particular mode is defined by a unique combination of reactor thermal power level, reactor 
average coolant temperature, and status (tension) of the reactor closure head bolts (for modes in 
which the reactor is shut down). 
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The relevance of reactor operating modes with respect to major Grid anomalies and 
blackouts is that the operating mode that the plant is in at the time of the Grid disruption (or 
the operating mode that is the terminal point of the plant’s response to the disruption) dictates 
the starting point for restart of the NPP and the time required to return the plant to service. 
This is true because the plant’s technical specifications dictate a diverse set of limiting 
conditions for operation (LCOs), surveillances, checks, tests, and conditions that must be 
executed or confirmed as prerequisites for evolving between operating modes. 
 
LCOs identify the lowest functional capability or performance level of equipment required for safe 
operation of the facility. In addition, the manner in which an NPP evolved to its present operating 
mode (e.g., whether the plant was automatically tripped or whether the plant was manually shut 
down in a controlled manner) and the reactor’s operating history (e.g., reactor fuel burnup) also 
impact the operating mode evolution protocol. It is clear an NPP’s operating modes, LCOs, and 
operating history are of great importance with respect to its ability to (and schedule for) return to 
service and thus its value as a Grid recovery asset in the wake of a major Grid disruption. 
Because of these considerations, current (Generation II) LWR plants would probably require a 
minimum of several hours to perhaps even a couple of days to return to service—even for cases 
in which the plant is not damaged by the Grid anomaly that precipitated the plant shutdown. 
4.5.4 Startup Cranking Power For Today’s NPPs Must Be Supplied By The 
Grid 
The cranking power requirements of commercial NPPs are largely a function of the size [MW 
(thermal)] of the power plant. This is an artifact of the power demands of electric-driven 
pumps that provide the motive force for cooling of the reactor core, generation of steam, 
power conversion, and rejection of waste heat to the environment. An LWR-based NPP’s 
total housekeeping and cranking power load is dominated by the power demand of its RCPs 
and the circulating water pumps (CWPs). The RCPs typically represent over 40% of the total 
fixed load, while the CWPs contribute ~20% of the total fixed load. Thus, these two systems 
are responsible for ~60% of the NPP’s total fixed load. The combined real and reactive power 
demand of electrically driven pumps is much larger while they are starting and accelerating to 
operating speed. 
 
While all of the plant’s systems and components do not simultaneously start and operate as the 
plant is being cranked, several systems do. Thus, cranking power requirements are reasonably 
approximated by fixed electrical housekeeping loads. Today’s large GW (electric)-class NPPs 
typically require ~30 to 40 MW (electric) of cranking power. The actual cranking power demand 
for a specific plant depends on plant size [MW (thermal) and MW (electric)], whether the plant is 
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a PWR (higher loads) or a BWR, and a variety of other plant-specific considerations. Cranking 
power demands of this magnitude are beyond that which can be supplied by emergency diesel 
generators (because the emergency diesel generators are sized primarily to power engineering 
safety features and shutdown cooling systems). The implication is that today’s plants require 
substantial offsite power to start up—power that often is not available in the earliest stages of the 
Grid recovery process. 
4.6 The Role Of Today’s NPPs In Grid Recovery And Restoration 
Rapid recovery of the Grid system and restoration of electricity service to customers is of 
paramount importance if significant social and economic consequences are to be avoided 
in the wake of a major Grid anomaly. Therefore, it is relevant to ask, “Do today’s NPPs 
contribute in meaningful ways to rapid restoration of a stable Grid?” The answer from 
decades of operational experience is clear. Adibi et al. [4.25] provided an analysis of NPP 
requirements during power system restoration as an activity of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Power System Restoration Working Group in 1995. Adibi and Fink 
[4.26] integrate some of the conclusions of Adibe et al. into a broader discussion of 
postblackout Grid restoration procedures. Sroka and Grzadzielski [4.27] echo many similar 
observations. The following major points are conveyed in References 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27: 
1. A NPP’s plant technical specifications detail the conditions that must exist before an 
NPP that has automatically tripped or has been manually taken off-line can restart. 
The optimal mode for NPP restart following a Grid disruption is hot standby. 
2. NPPs that have been manually taken off-line in a controlled manner might return to 
service within 24 to 48 h. Plants that automatically trip in response to external stimuli 
could take considerably longer to return to service. For these reasons, current Grid 
restoration plans focus on providing assured offsite power to the NPPs in order to 
maintain their safe shutdown condition while restoring as much of the service area 
load as possible without any assistance from the NPPs. Therefore, full customer 
restoration may not be achievable for an extended period in areas in which nuclear 
power constitutes a significant fraction of the generation mix. 
3. Grid restoration strategies involving NPPs must incorporate real-time knowledge about 
the NPP’s generation (mode) status and must facilitate intimate and continuous 
communications between the NPP operator and the Grid system operator. 
4. Grid restoration is typically a bottoms-up approach. NPPs interface with the Grid via extra 
high voltage transmission lines that are neither available nor stable early in the Grid 
restoration process. Given the power maneuvering limitations of large Generation II 
NPPs, the ability to rebuild a sufficient amount of stable load for the NPP is a crucial 
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constraint on the speed with which NPPs can return to service and contribute to the Grid 
restoration process. 
5. Premature attempts to reload large NPPs can result in system-wide voltage and 
frequency perturbations that can trigger automatic NPP and Grid system protection 
measures resulting in generating unit trips and Grid refragmentation (i.e., premature 
attempts to restart/reload large NPPs can make matters worse rather than better). 
 
It is clear today’s NPPs do not play a significant role in the early stages of Grid recovery 
and restoration in the wake of major Grid disruption. 
4.7 Conclusion: Current U.S. NPPs Are Not Significant Grid 
Resilience Assets 
Modern commercial NPPs are remarkable feats of engineering. They have (with a few 
notable exceptions) proven to be safe, reliable, and efficient means of producing massive 
amounts of emissions-free electricity. They are major Grid capacity, energy, and reliability 
assets. Indeed, they are substantial societal assets in an electricity-dependent world 
concerned with local air quality and global climate change. 
 
However, today’s Generation II LWR NPPs are intolerant of Grid disturbances. Once shut down, 
they are not typically capable of rapidly restarting. They have large cranking power requirements 
that must be supplied from off site. Their large size requires the Grid operator to rebuild large 
blocks of transmission capability and stable load to enable the NPP to power up and reload. 
Beyond these considerations, the Grid operator’s concern that a premature attempt to reload the 
NPP could trigger a shutdown of the NPP and a cascading Grid collapse inhibits the use of NPPs 
in the early stages of Grid recovery following a major Grid disruption. 
 
The analysis presented here supports the conclusion that although today’s NPPs are safe 
and reliable, the design and operational approaches adopted to achieve these safety and 
reliability objectives have resulted in plants that are not significant Grid resilience assets. For 
all of their virtues, today’s NPPs are not rNPPs. They are not plants that enable the Grid to 
absorb and adapt to major Grid disruptions nor do they enable the Grid to rapidly recover and 
restore electric service to its customers. 
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4.8 Nuclear Power’s Fuel Security Premium: A Motivation For 
Enhancing The Resilience Of Nuclear Power 
This paper begins with an observation that modern society is utterly dependent on the 
smooth functioning of several critical infrastructures, virtually all of which either depend on 
or are involved in the production of electricity. Thus, at the end of the day, Grid resilience is 
a matter of energy, economic, and homeland security. There are a number of natural 
hazards and man-made threats that have the potential to disrupt the Grid and other critical 
infrastructures [4.14]. The recovery and restoration phases of these disruptive events could 
last for months, or even years in some extreme scenarios. It is in precisely those “very bad 
day” scenarios that the nation might benefit most from one of nuclear power’s unique attributes: 
its fuel security. 
 
Unlike other steam cycle power plants that have only hours to days (natural gas-fired plants), 
days to weeks (oil-fired plants), or weeks to a few months (coal-fired plants) of fuel onsite, 
NPPs have many months to perhaps 2 years of fuel in the tank. Thus, NPPs have sufficient fuel 
reserves to operate for extended periods when the delivery of fuel to other steam cycle plants 
would be difficult or even impossible. NPPs must be capable of operating in harsh 
environments if their fuel security benefit is to be accessed. This capability was aptly 
demonstrated during the Southwest Cold Weather Event of February 2011 in Texas and New 
Mexico and the Polar Vortex Event of January 2014 (that impacted vast regions of the United 
States), when NPPs in the affected areas continued to operate while numerous oil-fired, gas-
fired, and coal-fired power plants were forced to shut down due to lack of fuel supply and/or a 
variety of other issues intrinsic to their use of fossil fuels [4.28, 4.29]. The 2011 and 2013–2014 
U.S. weather events clearly demonstrate nuclear power’s short-term or tactical Grid resilience 
benefit for such regional weather events. This short-term resilience benefit was delivered 
because the NPPs in the affected regions (1) had the fuel to operate through the event and (2) 
were capable of operating. The NPPs were not presented with Grid interface anomalies that 
they could not accommodate nor were they directly damaged in any significant way by the 
weather event itself. 
 
As previously noted [4.14], there are a variety of man-made and natural events that have 
the potential to create much greater challenges for the Grid and its NPP operators than the 
short-term weather events discussed above. It is precisely in such “very bad day” scenarios 
that the long-term strategic Grid resilience value of nuclear power would be of maximum 
benefit to society. But, this potential benefit can be accessed only if the NPPs and the Grid 
in which they are embedded are sufficiently resilient to operate in the challenging conditions 
that accompany such worst-case scenarios. 
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Unfortunately, the analysis presented in Sections 4.2 through 4.7 demonstrates that the fuel 
security benefit of today’s NPPs would be largely inaccessible precisely at the time society 
might benefit most from it. This reality should be a major motivation for enhancing the 
resilience of future commercial NPPs. 
4.9 The Future: rNPPs Enabling Resilient Electric Grids? 
Fortunately, there is nothing intrinsic to nuclear power that prevents it from becoming a 
major strategic Grid and societal resilience asset. It may not be feasible from the technical 
and economic standpoints to modify most existing NPPs to achieve the resilience 
capabilities discussed in this paper. It is possible to envision plant designs and technology 
bundles that could enable rNPPs in the future. Indeed, designers of future NPPs can and 
should explicitly incorporate Grid resilience considerations into the design of tomorrow’s 
plants. Tomorrow’s rNPPs would be NPPs that are intentionally designed, cited, interfaced, 
and operated in a manner to enhance the resilience of the Grid they serve. Given the 
dependence of life today on sustained access to electricity, the resilience of modern society 
in the 21st century may depend on such innovations. Who will take up the challenge? 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.7290/V78913SR 
 
The paper extends the generic analysis of the role current NPPs play in enabling and 
enhancing electric Grid resilience presented in Chapter 4, to investigate the role current 
NPPs play in enabling the Grid to rapidly recover from Black Sky Events – Grid failures of 
such geographic scope and duration they could threaten the very fabric of society. This 
paper was a product of Research Tasks 1–3, and provides additional insight to the answers 
to Research Question 2: 
 
Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets, 
and why or why not? 
 
The content of this article is presented here without revisions other than minor editorial 
changes required to conform to UTK dissertation format and style requirements. 
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Chapter 5 Abstract 
 
Modern life relies on ready access to abundant electricity. During the past decade, it has 
become apparent that the Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the U.S. are vulnerable to a 
variety of natural hazards and man-made threats. The electrical infrastructure (the “Grid”) is 
the foundation for all other critical civil infrastructures upon which our society depends. 
Therefore, protection of the Grid is an energy security, homeland security, and national 
security issue of highest importance. Geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) induced by solar 
coronal mass ejections (CMEs), electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, and cyber attacks 
are three events that have the potential to plunge the U.S. into partial or total Grid failure 
(de-energization) with subsequent blackouts so massive that they are referred to as “Black 
Sky Events” (BSEs). Embedded in the U.S. Grid are almost one hundred commercial 
nuclear power reactors in some sixty nuclear power plants (NPPs). This paper explores the 
nature of society’s coupled “system of systems” (i.e. the Grid, other Critical Infrastructure, 
human operators of these infrastructures, the Government, and the Public) that would be 
stressed by a Black Sky Event, and presents an analytical framework for probing the 
behavior of this system during Black Sky Events. The question of how a prolonged Black 
Sky Event might impact NPPs, and what role, if any, NPPs can play in enabling a rapid 
recovery from a Black Sky Event is examined. The likely behavior of an NPP during a Black 
Sky Event is discussed, and it is concluded that current NPPs are Black Sky liabilities. 
However, a unique characteristic of NPPs (the large fuel inventory maintained in the 
reactor) could make the NPPs extraordinarily valuable assets should a Black Sky Event 
occur. Their value in this regard, depends on whether or not it might be possible to affect a 
number of changes in the NPPs, the Grid, and other Critical Infrastructure in the U.S. to 
enable the NPPs to become Black Start Units – generating stations that would be the 
foundation of recovering the Grid during a Black Sky Event. This paper poses the question, 
“Can nuclear power plants be transformed from Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky Assets, 
and if so, how?” An integrated framework for addressing this question is proposed. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Modern life is enabled by reliable access to electricity. This electricity is generated and 
delivered by a massive and complex system – the electrical grid, or simply “the Grid”. The 
U. S. Grid, with rare exceptions, reliably delivers electricity to our nation’s homes, 
businesses, and factories twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. The Grid is the 
umbilical cord of modern civilization – the lynchpin that enables each of our society’s 
sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Figure 5.1) to function [5.1]. Our petrochemical 
production, communications, information technology, transportation, healthcare, finance, 
and water/wastewater infrastructures are all designed with the assumption that interruptions 
of electricity supply will be extremely rare and short-lived when they do occur. 
 
The Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the U.S. have become increasingly vulnerable to a 
variety of hazards and threats during the past decade [5.2, 5.3]. There are a number of 
natural and man-made events that have the potential to simultaneously compromise the 
functionality of multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors on a subcontinental or even 
continental scale [5.4]. Such natural hazards include intense geomagnetic disturbances 
triggered by coronal mass ejections from our sun, massive seismic events, and extreme 
weather events such as superstorms and hurricanes. Man-made threats include 
electromagnetic pulse weapons and cyber attacks. 
 
With respect to the Grid, two hazards of particular interest are naturally triggered GMDs and 
man-made EMP attacks. The GMD-induced collapse of the Quebec Hydro grid in 1989 
(which caused the entire Quebec power grid to collapse in ~ 90 seconds and affected some 
six million customers) is but one example of the potential impact of severe weather on the 
Grid [5.5]. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union conducted high-altitude nuclear detonation 
tests in 1962 that demonstrated the potential for EMP weapons to have massive impacts on 
electrical infrastructures [5.6]. These natural and man-made phenomena have the potential 
to trigger partial, or even complete, failure (de-energization) of the Grid for periods of time 
ranging from hours to perhaps years in extreme cases [5.7]. Such outages are termed 
“Black Sky Events”. 
 
While many people in the U.S. have experienced weather-driven power outages lasting a 
few hours to perhaps a few days, most of the population of the U.S. has never experienced 
power outages lasting for weeks or months. Indeed, most citizens of the western world 
rarely even consider how our lives would be impacted by long-term failure of the Grid. 
 
But we should. 
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Figure 5.1  All Critical Infrastructure is dependent on the availability of electricity 
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Today, some sixty nuclear power plants consisting of roughly 100 nuclear power reactors 
are embedded in the U.S. Grid. This “NPP fleet” supplies approximately 20% of our nation’s 
electrical production and some 63% of our low-carbon electricity generation [5.8]. It is 
prudent to ask, “How would nuclear power plants be impacted by a prolonged Black Sky 
Event, and what role, if any, can NPPs play in enabling a rapid recovery from a Black Sky 
Event?” Or to pose the question another way, “Are today’s nuclear power plants Black Sky 
Liabilities or Black Sky Assets?” And finally, if today’s NPPs are Black Sky Liabilities, “What 
can be done to transform nuclear power plants from Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky 
Assets?” 
 
This paper provides a preliminary description of the “system of systems” which hosts and 
surrounds the U.S. electrical infrastructure, defines the challenges and opportunities 
presented by nuclear power plants in Black Sky environments, and proposes high-level 
analytical frameworks for further investigation of these issues. 
5.2 The U.S. Grid In A System Of Systems 
Figure 5.2 is a highly simplified representation of the “system of systems” in which we live. 
This "system of systems" involves coupled physical infrastructure and human infrastructure. 
Each entity in Figure 5.2 can be depicted as an “intelligent agent” capable of sensing and 
interacting with its environment and other agents. The diagram depicts a causal event 
(“forcing function”) such as a CME, EMP attack, seismic event, etc., impacting the Grid and 
the other Critical Infrastructures agents of our society. The Grid and the other Critical 
Infrastructures have an inherent or engineered response to these forcing functions. In 
addition, the Grid and every other Critical Infrastructure agent has a command, control, 
maintenance, and repair element staffed by human beings who interact with the physical 
infrastructure, and the other human agents in the system to modulate the infrastructure’s 
behavior. In addition to laws, regulatory frameworks, etc., the Government agent also has a 
human element (not explicitly depicted in Figure 5.2) that plays a role in shaping the 
response of the Government to a BSE. Finally, there is the Public, who would be interacting 
in diverse ways with every other element of the system in the event of a BSE. During a 
BSE, all of the physical and human infrastructures (agents) would be compromised in some 
manner. Each would have varying and evolving degrees of situational awareness, be 
subject to competing and conflicting demands, and would interact with each other in real 
time to affect a plethora of evolving societal goals at the individual, family, community, 
regional, and national levels. 
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Figure 5.2  The Electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure and Society are a System of 
Systems 
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The granularity of the model depicted in Figure 5.2 could easily be expanded. For instance, 
the “Physical Critical Infrastructure” agent could be resolved into its sixteen Critical 
Infrastructure agents, and the “Government” agent could be expanded to depict various 
federal, state, and local governmental entities. Agents representing non-governmental 
organizations or “NGOs” (such as the Red Cross) could be added, and the “Public” agent 
could be expanded to depict diverse populations (such as infrastructure workers, first 
responders, etc.). Even without this extra level of granularity, the simple model depicted in 
Figure 5.2 could provide a useful framework for exploring a diverse set of technical, 
political, and behavioral questions relevant to Black Sky Events. Examples of such 
questions include: 
1. How do the separate Critical Infrastructure agents interact with and influence each 
other? 
2. How do various policies, regulations, laws, and operating procedures influence the 
course of events during a BSE? 
3. What are the best policies and regulations to deal with BSEs? 
4. What should the relative priorities be for restoring electrical power to various Critical 
Infrastructures and their functions? 
5. How do human actions or inactions influence the ability of society to endure a BSE 
and recover from it? 
 
Many important questions of this nature have not been probed in a rigorous scientific 
manner. A multi-agent model based on a simple architecture similar to that depicted in 
Figure 5.2 could provide a starting point for simulating the behavior of our society during 
Black Sky Events. This model could also inform regulatory and policy formulation,  
emergency preparedness and emergency response planning, and a myriad of other 
important Black Sky issues [5.9 – 5.14]. As is true in many simulation efforts, the results 
obtained from such analyses could prove to be more valuable for sharpening our questions 
than for answering them. The potential for such a model to yield useful insights into a 
diverse suite of Black Sky issues is discussed further in the following sections. 
5.3 Imagining A Black Sky Event 
The probability of natural events that might trigger a BSE depends on the specific triggering 
event. For example, based on available satellite heliophysics data and Earth geophysical 
forensic analysis, Riley [5.15] estimated the probability of a CME-induced GMD of the same 
magnitude as the famous 1859 “Carrington Event” [5.16] to be on the order of 12% per 
decade. The Carrington Event occurred at a time when the only “wired” network in the U.S. 
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and Europe was the telegraph system. Reliable reports from the event indicate widespread 
electrical arcing of telegraph lines, papers in telegraph offices (and even wooden telegraph 
poles) being set afire from arcing of nearby lines, shocking of telegraph operators, and 
telegraph systems continuing to run after being disconnected from their battery systems. 
Love [5.17] has predicted the probability of a similar event to be 6.3% per decade (roughly 
half of Riley’s estimate). If Riley and Love’s probability estimates are reasonably accurate, 
our world is overdue for a massive GMD. Indeed, the Earth has had very close encounters 
with a number of CMEs over the past few decades, narrowly missing an encounter with a 
Carrington-class CME as recently as July 2012 [5.18]. 
 
With regard to seismic hazards, the probability of massive earthquakes capable of 
triggering sub-continental Grid damage is location-dependent. Nevertheless, in the U.S. the 
potential exists for major seismic events in and around regions such as the San Andreas, 
the Pacific Northwest, and the New Madrid seismic zones [5.19]. 
 
Finally, it is difficult to quantitatively assess the “probability” of human-based threats that 
might trigger Black Sky Events. However, it is prudent to assume there are entities in the 
world that are actively seeking to develop EMP and cyber weapons capable of triggering 
Black Sky Events. 
 
As previously discussed, Black Sky environments, regardless of their cause, are 
characterized by the partial or complete de-energization of the Grid and would “...share a 
common attribute: outages would span very large regions, and utilities could require weeks 
or potentially months to restore power to even the highest priority customers” [5.20]. As has 
been demonstrated on numerous occasions, localized electricity outages can propagate 
through space and time to become much larger blackouts. The ultimate size of the blackout 
region would depend both on the original damage inflicted by the initiating event (e.g., GMD, 
seismic event, EMP, etc.), and the subsequent event cascade within the Grid, between the 
Grid and other Critical Infrastructure sectors, and within other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. 
 
Given the dependence of our Critical Infrastructure on the Grid, it is difficult to bound the 
ultimate Black Sky event cascade. The behavior of the complimentary physical and human 
system of systems (Figure 5.2) is exceedingly complex. For example, systems such as 
water supply, wastewater, fuel delivery (gasoline, natural gas, coal), ground and air 
transportation, communications, and finance would be severely degraded. The quest for 
information regarding the situation, and the competition for goods and services would 
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quickly intensify at local, regional, and national levels, with requests for resources 
overwhelming their availability at virtually every geographical scale. 
 
How would society endure, and then recover from such an event? Serious analysis of such 
situations must take into account the impact of the Black Sky environment on physical 
infrastructure, the people who must report to work to operate the physical infrastructure, and 
the Public who depend on the infrastructure and interact in complex ways with the people 
who operate it. Past experience with a limited number of major (but relatively short-term) 
blackouts in the U.S. gives reason for concern [5.21, 5.22]. In the 2013 report “Solar Storm 
Risk To The North American Electric Grid,” Lloyd estimated that a Carrington-like event is 
likely to directly impact some 20-40 million people in the U.S., with power outages lasting 
from sixteen days to “1-2 years,” inflicting $600 billion to $2.6 trillion in damage to the U.S. 
economy [5.23]. 
 
Our nation’s legal, regulatory, political, and social institutions are ill-equipped to deal with the 
overwhelmingly disruptive scenarios described above. However, efforts are underway at the 
federal level and in NGOs to bring together the expertise and resources needed to 
accurately characterize the nature of the challenge and to formulate plans and actions to 
enhance our preparedness for such events [5.2, 5.4, 5.24]. 
5.4 The U.S. Grid And Nuclear Power’s Place In It 
The U.S. Grid (Figure 5.3) is comprised of some 7,300 generating units, a growing 
number of energy storage facilities, over 257,000 km (160,000 mi) of high voltage 
transmission lines, and millions of low voltage lines and distribution transformers [5.25] . 
Some five hundred companies and sixty-six “balancing authorities” whose responsibility 
it is to ensure, in real time, that electricity demand and supply are balanced, operate 
these assets. 
 
According to the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, the North American Grid is 
considered the largest “machine” created by mankind and the foundation of the greatest 
engineering achievement of the 20th century [5.26]. The U.S. Grid in the lower forty-eight 
states is configured into three “interconnections” (Figure 5.4): the Eastern 
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas (ERCOT) Interconnection [5.27, 5.28]. The Eastern Interconnection covers the 
region from the Atlantic coast to the base of the Rocky Mountains. The Western 
Interconnection extends westward from its boundary with the Eastern Interconnection to 
the Pacific Coast. The ERCOT Interconnection covers most of Texas. 
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Source: FEMA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Electric_Reliability_Corpora 
ion#/media/File:UnitedStatesPowerGrid.jpg,) 
 
Figure 5.3  North American Electric Grid  
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Source: North American Electric Reliability Council 
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Documents/NERC_Interconnections_Color_0
72512.jpg  
 
Figure 5.4  North American Electric Reliability Council Interconnections  
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All of the electric utilities within an Interconnection are connected with each other (under 
normal operating conditions) and operate at a synchronized frequency of 60 Hz. 
Interconnections can be joined to each other via high voltage direct current power 
transmission lines (DC ties) or via variable frequency transformers (VFTs).  Variable 
frequency transformers permit a controlled flow of alternating current (AC) across the 
connection, while preventing the transmission of AC frequency perturbations between 
interconnections. The Eastern Interconnection is connected to the Western 
Interconnection via six DC ties, to the ERCOT Interconnection with two DC ties, and to 
the Quebec Interconnection with four DC ties and a single VFT [5.29]. In addition to 
being tied to the Eastern Interconnection, the Texas Interconnection has one DC tie and 
one VFT tie to systems in Mexico [5.30]. 
 
Approximately 100 of the 7,300 generating units mentioned above are nuclear power 
reactors (Figure 5.5). At the risk of over-simplification (and with recognition that details such 
as voltage levels and even the names of components can be plant-specific), it is helpful to 
view the interface between a nuclear power plant and the Grid in terms of four primary 
connections (Figure 5.6): 
1. The NPP unit’s Generator Step-up or “GSU” Transformer which steps up the ~ 
25KV output of the main generators to ≥ 345 KV – which is then fed to the Grid 
through the station switchyard. 
2. The NPP unit’s Startup Transformer or “SUT” (also called the Station Auxiliary 
Transformer), which steps down the 345 KV from the station switchyard to the ~ 6.6 
KV required to energize the NPP equipment for plant start-up. 
3. The NPP unit’s dedicated Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) Transformer, which 
provides electricity from the Grid to power the NPP’s Engineered Safety Features. 
4. A variety of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. 
 
Though not an interface to the Grid, the reactor’s Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) plays an 
important role in plant operations. This transformer taps a portion of the plant’s 25 KV Main 
Generator output to energize ~ 6.6 KV buses that provide for a variety of housekeeping or 
“auxiliary” plant loads during operation. Thus, once an NPP is started, it could run without 
being connected to the Grid. It would, however, need to be able to reduce its power level 
(“runback”) to a very low-power generation level just sufficient to meet the plant’s 
housekeeping loads while rejecting any unneeded power through the plant’s condenser and 
normal waste heat removal systems. Finally, it is important to emphasize that once shut  
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Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/map-
power-reactors.html 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5  Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Plants In U.S.  
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Figure 5.6  Simplified representation of NPP interfaces with the Grid and the world 
outside the plant boundary 
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down, the NPP cannot restart without AC power supplied from external sources through the 
NPP’s Startup Transformer. 
5.5 U.S. Grid Recovery During Black Sky Events 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) have put in place a series of System Restoration Reliability 
Standards designed to enhance the ability of the Grid operators to re-energize and recover 
the Grid following widespread Grid outages [5.31, 5.32]. These “Gray Sky” restoration 
procedures envision a Grid fractured into a large number of “islanded” entities. These 
recovery procedures are basically “bootstrapping” exercises in which each of these isolated 
entities initially restarts specially configured “Black Start Generating Units,” or simply “Black 
Start Units,” that are coupled through secure transmission lines to tightly controlled load 
centers. Once these initial islands are operational, and damage assessments and 
situational awareness permit, breakers are closed in a carefully choreographed manner to 
re-energize other parts of the system. This sequential approach allows other generating 
plants to restart, and larger portions of the Grid to be re-energized as the electrified islands 
expand, sync, and reconnect to each other. This process is easily envisioned as many 
random points of light on a dark map of the U.S. expanding until their boundaries merge 
and the entire map is illuminated. 
 
These emergency operating procedures (EOPs) require transmission operators, balancing 
authorities, and reliability coordinators to have Grid restoration plans, test protocols, and 
Black Start Resources (Black Start Units) in place to enable rapid recovery from large Grid 
failure events. Black Start Resources are defined as “generating unit(s) and its associated 
set of equipment which has the ability to be started without support from the System or is 
designed to remain energized without connection to the remainder of the System, with the 
ability to energize a bus, meeting the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for 
real and reactive power capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been 
included in the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan,” [5.31]. Where available, hydro 
plants (dams) are favored Black Start Resources. However, many regions of the country do 
not have direct access to hydro assets and must rely on other assets, such as gas turbines 
and oil-fired units, for meeting the Black Start Resource requirements. A practical 
consideration in the selection of Black Start Resources is that these generating units must 
have sufficient fuel available to attempt multiple system restarts and to be capable of 
performing their required Black Start functions for some duration of time following their initial 
start-up attempt. (History suggests extraordinary steps can be taken to secure Black Start 
and cranking power sources in extraordinary circumstances. For example, the United 
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States Army’s nuclear barge Sturgis was a refitted cargo ship containing a 10 MWe nuclear 
power plant that supplied electrical power for the locks of the Panama Canal between 1968 
and 1976. Some years later (in November 1982) the United States nuclear-powered attack 
submarine USS Indianapolis was ordered into Nawiliwili Harbor on the hurricane-ravaged 
Hawaiian island of Kauai for the purpose of interconnecting with and repowering the 
island’s electrical system. However, the planned interconnection between the submarine’s 
nuclear power plant and the island’s electrical grid was never completed because diesel 
generators supplied by the U.S. Navy succeeded in cranking the island’s main power plant. 
Thus a precedent exists for employing nuclear powered naval vessels as Black Start and 
cranking power supplies in coastal areas.) 
 
It is difficult, if not practically impossible, to thoroughly test Independent System Operator 
and Regional Transmission Organization Black Sky / Black Start Grid emergency operating 
procedures and system restoration plans in truly prototypic Black Sky environments. This is 
true because realistic Black Sky test environments cannot be created without impacting the 
public in an unacceptable manner. For this reason, testing of system restoration procedures 
typically employs some combination of computational simulation and synthesis of results 
from testing conducted at subsystem and component levels. 
 
The tendency to assume near-perfect execution of emergency response plans and 
operating procedures is a potential Achilles heel of validation approaches that rely on 
simulation and limited testing at subsystem levels. It is easy to overlook the inter- and intra-
dependencies of organizational functionalities and human frailties – realities that would 
present significant emergency procedure execution challenges during Black Sky Events. 
Given the difficulty of testing Black Sky recovery procedures at full scale and in prototypic 
environments, intelligent agent-based system models similar to that depicted in Figure 5.2 
might provide additional useful insights into relevant infrastructure and human interactions 
and interdependencies. Such models could be developed and applied at the individual 
power station, electric utility, regional transmission organization, NERC Region, 
Interconnection, or entire continental Grid levels. Depending on their focus and specific 
questions to be addressed, such models might incorporate elements such as the 
FERC/NERC emergency operating procedures into the “Grid Operators” agent shown in 
Figure 5.2, individual power plant emergency operating procedures (if individual power plant 
agents were incorporated into the simulation), the emergency recovery plans of other 
Critical Infrastructure sectors, and planned emergency actions of governmental entities 
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
etc.). Such simulations might offer insights useful for informing and optimizing Grid and 
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Critical Infrastructure Black Sky emergency operating and recovery procedures, power 
restoration priorities, regulatory structures, national Black Sky strategies, and a host of 
other related issues. 
5.6 The NPP’s Initial Response To A Black Sky Event 
This section examines the likely response of an NPP to Black Sky Events – both those for 
which advance warning is available and those that present themselves as unanticipated 
propagating Grid failures. It should be noted that the most likely response of a particular 
NPP would no doubt depend on plant-specific issues, including the manner in which the 
NPP is interfaced (Figure 5.6) to the Grid and the Grid architecture beyond this interface. 
There are circumstances in which an NPP operator might receive advance notice (either 
through federally-issued alerts from the space weather network, the plant’s SCADA system, 
or by other means) of an imminent threat of massive Grid disruptions. In such cases, the 
NPP operator would almost certainly take preemptive action to both protect the power plant 
and enhance the likelihood the Grid could be recovered rapidly in the wake of a Black Sky 
Event. Theoretically, plant operators might respond to such notices in two ways: 
1. Manual Shutdown – in which the NPP operators manually shut down the plant and 
transition it to normal shutdown decay heat removal, probably with early managed 
transition to onsite diesel-driven power systems to avoid the possibility of 
unnecessarily harsh transitions if the anticipated loss of offsite power (LOOP) 
event actually occurs. 
2. Manual Runback or “cutback” – in which the NPP isolates from the Grid and 
reduces its power level to only that required to supply internal housekeeping loads 
(typically several percent of full power). 
 
Assuming a plant is capable of shifting to the runback mode, the relative desirability of 
these two actions could depend on a variety of factors – such as the potential for direct 
damage to NPP plant and equipment from the Black Sky initiating event, the period of time 
offsite power might be unavailable to the NPP, etc. 
 
An unanticipated Black Sky Event would initially be “sensed” by an NPP as an anomaly in 
one or more Grid interface characteristics (frequency perturbations, power factor anomalies, 
load perturbations, etc.). The plant’s initial response to the event would depend on how it 
was first sensed [5.33, 5.34].  However, each of the three plant response scenarios would 
be transitory phases, all ultimately evolving into LOOP events: 
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1. Partial Load Rejection – a load rejection is a sudden reduction in electric power 
demand at some point in the Grid. Such events could result in the opening of 
interconnections between the parts of the Grid experiencing the load rejection, 
eventually propagating to the region of the Grid to which the NPP is tied. While 
some power reactors designed by Combustion Engineering were designed for 85% 
or greater load rejection capability, NPP’s typically can manage load rejections of up 
to ~ 50% by reducing power (runback) and dumping excess steam as necessary to 
the unit’s main condenser (assuming AC power is still available at that point to drive 
the pumps that supply water to the secondary side of the condenser). 
2. Complete Loss of Load – for the case of an unmitigated BSE, the NPP might 
experience a momentary or short-term partial load rejection that quickly evolves to a 
complete (100%) load rejection – a “loss of load” event. This loss of load event 
could descend on the NPP with little advance warning. The NPP’s normal response 
to the loss of load would be to open breakers at the generator output, “islanding” the 
NPP from the Grid, and (today) “tripping” the reactor. In such cases, it might be 
possible for the NPP to runback its power level to that required to supply its own 
housekeeping electrical loads – provided (once again) that AC power is available to 
drive the pumps that supply water to the secondary side of the condenser. If this 
delicate operation cannot be achieved and maintained, the reactor will be tripped. It 
would then transition to the shutdown decay heat removal mode powered by AC 
provided from the Grid. This offsite power would not be available in a Black Sky 
Event; so diesel-driven systems would supply the needed backup power to maintain 
safe shutdown cooling. 
3. Voltage and Frequency Perturbation-Induced Reactor Trips – North American 
Grid AC frequency is typically controlled to within (an amazing) ± 0.05 Hz. The initial 
stage of a BSE would no doubt involve large variations in system voltage and 
frequency as load shedding and real or reactive power supply-demand mismatches 
cascade throughout the Grid. A NPP senses Grid AC voltage and frequency via 
several mechanisms. Changes in Grid AC voltage and frequency produce forcing 
functions within the NPP’s turbo generator as it seeks to remain in synchronization 
with the Grid. These Grid voltage and frequency perturbations also directly impact 
the speed of AC pumps used to circulate cooling water through the reactor, steam 
generators (if a pressurized water reactor), secondary and containment cooling 
systems, feedwater to the reactor’s condenser, etc. Thus, the thermodynamic 
balance of the plant can be significantly impacted by Grid AC voltage and frequency 
perturbations. In addition, most AC pumping systems are protected by breakers 
designed to open under unacceptable voltage and frequency perturbations to 
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protect the systems from overheating due to excessive currents. The control band 
for these protection systems is relatively narrow. Given these design features, 
excessive Grid voltage and frequency perturbations would trigger the NPP’s 
protection systems to rapidly trip the reactor and transition it to onsite or offsite AC-
powered shutdown cooling. 
 
Even if the NPP initially senses the BSE as a load rejection, loss-of-load, or voltage/frequency 
perturbation event, it will ultimately (perhaps quickly) sense it as a LOOP event. In response 
to the loss of power to NPP systems, the plant protection system shuts down (trips) the 
reactor (if it was not already tripped by one of the transients discussed above) and transitions 
the plant to shutdown cooling. These cooling systems are controlled and powered by station 
batteries, diesel generator-powered AC-driven cooling systems, and/or direct diesel-driven 
pumping systems [5.35]. The period of time an NPP can remain safely in this shutdown 
cooling mode depends on plant design features (such as the capacity of the station batteries 
and control air systems and the design and performance of its diesel generator and diesel-
driven pumping systems, etc.), and the ability of the world outside the plant to provide 
meaningful assistance such as resupplying diesel fuel, additional diesel generators and 
diesel-driven pumps, etc., if/as required. 
 
Thus, the likely response of today’s NPPs to a BSE would be to shut down (either manually 
in response to event warnings or automatically in response to sensed Grid anomalies) and 
transition in a normal fashion to dependency on shutdown decay heat removal systems 
controlled and powered by station batteries and diesel generator-driven or diesel-driven 
pumps. The NPP (reactor, primary containment, spent fuel pool) would be in a “safe 
shutdown mode” as long as the required cooling is available. The NPP operators would 
have no way of knowing the extent of damage to the Grid, nor how long offsite AC power 
would be unavailable at the outset of the event. They would be relying strictly on onsite 
diesel generators and/or diesel-driven pumping systems to supply the necessary power. 
Thus they would be dependent on the inventory of diesel fuel stored on, or very near their 
site to maintain cooling to the reactor, the reactor’s primary containment, and the spent fuel 
pool. 
 
It is likely that the transfer of materials, equipment, and personnel between the NPP and the 
outside world, along with communications with the outside world, would be greatly 
compromised during the Black Sky Event, with the situation worsening as the event 
persists. The situational awareness of all entities involved would be compromised, 
complicating damage assessment and response planning both within and outside the NPP. 
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5.7 The NPP’s Long-term Black Sky Response 
For all their benefits, the NPP fleet poses a unique Black Sky challenge. Nuclear power 
plants can’t simply be “turned off” like other forms of electrical power generation. The 
nuclear fuel in commercial power reactors continues to produce significant “decay heat” 
long after their electrical power production has ceased. (For example, nuclear fuel still 
produces ~ 1% of it’s original operating power two hours after shutdown. The decay power 
level drops to ~ 0.4% three days after shutdown, ~0.3% seven days after shutdown, and 
~0.04-0.05% six months after shutdown. The exact power level produced depends on 
several factors such as the original operating power level, time at power, reactor fuel 
composition, fuel burnup, etc.) By way of example, the core of a 1000 MWe / 3000 MWt) 
commercial nuclear reactor might still be producing ~2-3 MWt of power three months after 
the reactor has shut down. Thus, in the absence of forced cooling, a reactor of this size, 
depressurized to 1 atm pressure, would boil off 3200-5000 kg/h or ~830-1320 gallons/h of 
water to remove this much energy. This decay heat is produced whether the fuel is in the 
reactor or in the plant’s spent fuel pool, and must be removed (in current reactors) by 
pumping cooling water through the core of the reactor (and/or spent fuel pool) with 
electrically driven pumps. Under normal circumstances the power for these cooling systems 
is supplied from the Grid. In the event offsite electrical feed isn’t available, the NPPs rely on 
onsite diesel-driven pumping systems to supply the necessary power. 
 
The potential impacts of long-term loss of offsite power events in NPPs have been 
extensively studied [5.35]. The accident that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 in the 
wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake evolved to a multi-reactor LOOP event – albeit 
one that was greatly complicated by the physical damage inflicted on the plant by the 
earthquake and the tsunami. From the safety standpoint, the events at Fukushima Daiichi 
had a galvanizing impact on the commercial nuclear power industry, not unlike that which 
occurred in the wake of the accident at Three Mile Island in the U.S. in 1979. Among other 
things, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a detailed “lessons 
learned” analysis of the implications of the Fukushima accident [5.36]. The NRC 
subsequently implemented a structured activity (still ongoing) to address the insights 
identified therein. The U.S. National Academy of Science also conducted a detailed 
evaluation of Fukushima with an eye toward identifying key lessons learned [5.37]. 
 
One of the key focus areas of the NRC and U.S. nuclear power industry in the wake of the 
accident at Fukushima Daiichi has been to enhance U.S. NPPs’ ability to cope with 
extreme external events, including sustained loss of offsite power. The nuclear industry’s 
FLEX Program was one result of this effort [5.38]. Under the FLEX program, NPP owners 
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have invested heavily in additional onsite diesel generators and diesel-driven pumping 
systems. Efforts have been made to expand onsite diesel fuel storage capabilities. (For 
example, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s 3-unit Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant has the 
capacity to store at least 282,240 gallons of diesel fuel onsite for its FLEX diesel generators 
[5.39].) Beyond this, the FLEX program has pre-staged additional emergency response 
equipment at two regional response centers – one in Memphis, Tennessee and the other in 
Phoenix, Arizona. Their goal is to enable delivery of critical equipment by ground and air 
transport to NPPs anywhere in their region within 24 hours [5.40]. 
 
The FLEX program illustrates an aggressive and innovative response of the nuclear power 
industry to the Fukushima Daiichi accident – one that should significantly reduce the risk 
imposed by a spectrum of traditional external events. This said, the FLEX program is not 
designed to mitigate Black Sky Events:  
 
“Solar-Geomagnetic disturbances could also lead to extended loss of off-site power due to 
geomagnetically-induced currents in electrical power transmission systems. However, this 
hazard was not included in Reference B-1 so it is not explicitly listed here. Nevertheless, 
while such disturbances could cause an extended loss of off-site power, they are not 
expected to impact the on-site safety-related equipment (e.g., diesel generators and 
internal distribution equipment) due to their being housed in reinforced concrete structures 
and would not change the approach to devising FLEX strategies.” [5.38] . 
 
Three observations about the FLEX Program are relevant to the present discussion: 
1. First, existing FLEX strategies are clearly based on the assumption civil 
infrastructure outside the plant boundary is not so degraded by triggering events as 
to prevent delivery of equipment and diesel fuel to the plant for as long as necessary 
to keep the plant in a safe shutdown state. The same assumption (that regardless of 
the initiating event, the outside world can render meaningful assistance to the plant) 
has been incorporated in virtually every NPP risk assessment performed prior to the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident [5.35]. This assumption is at least questionable, if not 
clearly invalid for prolonged Black Sky Events. Indeed, Black Sky Events are among 
the ultimate “common cause” events with the potential to both damage the NPP and 
prevent the world outside the NPP from rendering meaningful assistance to it in a 
timely manner. 
2. Second, the question of whether NPP equipment could withstand a major GMD 
such as the 1859 Carrington Event, or a major EMP attack, is somewhat uncertain. 
An analysis conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in 1983 [5.41] concluded, 
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“... the likelihood that individual components examined will fail is small; therefore, it 
is unlikely that an EMP event would fail sufficient equipment so as to prevent safe 
shutdown.” This analysis focused on EMP events rather than GMDs triggered by 
CMEs, and technologies and systems in place in the early 1980s before the digital 
era. It is not entirely clear how differences between the CME-induced GMD and 
EMP events, and the transition to digital instrumentation and control technologies 
within the NPP impact the conclusions of the 1983 analysis. 
3. Lastly, a Black Sky Event in the Eastern U.S. would likely place several NPPs in 
jeopardy simultaneously. The FLEX regional response centers are not designed for 
situations in which several NPPs are simultaneously in need of FLEX equipment and 
resources – even if transport of equipment from the regional response centers to the 
affected NPP sites in not an issue. 
 
One must also consider the human side of the NPP’s Black Sky endurance challenge. The 
likelihood that transportation fuels will rapidly become scarce or unavailable in an extended 
BSE, and that ground transportation pathways will become clogged and dysfunctional, is a 
serious issue with respect to maintaining adequate NPP staffing during the event. The 
longer the BSE persists, the more difficult it would become for the NPP’s workforce to 
commute from offsite to the plant, and the more likely it is that NPP staff will feel compelled 
to place the immediate safety and security of their families above the needs of the NPP. 
This same issue applies to the workforce of electrical utilities and all Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
 
Decades of disaster recovery experience and current disaster planning practices suggest 
that the first 72 hours of a disaster event are especially critical. During this period, disaster 
management is almost completely a local and individual responsibility [5.42, 5.43] and the 
reality and uncertainties of one’s situation begin to crystalize. The more complex and labor-
intensive the required BSE coping actions, and the longer the need for activity persists, the 
greater the risk that pre-established emergency coping procedures will not be executed as 
planned. Therefore, rapid recovery of the Grid and the NPP’s normal shutdown 
configuration is imperative. 
 
Nuclear power plant operators in the U.S. employ a framework of carefully-crafted 
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Severe Accident Management Guidelines 
(SAMGs), FLEX procedures, and Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) to 
guide their actions during unlikely extreme events involving progressive deterioration of 
plant functionalities. These procedural frameworks have evolved over several decades, and 
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incorporate lessons-learned from major federal and industry safety analysis programs and 
thousands of accumulated years of plant operating experience. The nuclear power industry 
has indeed done a laudable job in preparing for “the unthinkable”. Nevertheless, Black Sky 
Events would pose unprecedented challenges to the effective real-time integration and 
execution of these procedures. Tabletop exercises in which these procedures are “tested” 
in Black Sky environments can offer initial insight with respect to areas in which existing 
procedures and guidelines can be improved for Black Sky applications. Additionally, the 
intelligent agent-based simulation approach discussed in Section II above, coupled with 
appropriate NPP simulation tools, might provide useful insights into the integration and 
optimization of these EOP/SAMG/FLEX/EDMG frameworks in Black Sky environments. 
 
Two key questions emerge from this discussion of current NPP’s ability to endure a Black 
Sky Event: 
1. Under current industry operating procedures, and with sufficient forewarning, NPPs 
would almost certainly shut down in advance of a BSE and isolate themselves from 
the Grid. Shutting down the reactor is presumed to be the safest response to an 
event in which the anticipated damage to the Grid and potential risk to the NPP is 
difficult to predict. However, shutting down the NPP places  its continued safety at 
the mercy of its diesel generators and its diesel fuel supply at a time when neither 
the duration of the offsite power outage nor the continuing availability of diesel fuel 
from offsite sources can be known. One can reasonably ask, “Would a safer 
response be to runback and run through the BSE with the reactor still operating but 
safely isolated from the Grid for as long as necessary to ride through the Black Sky 
Event?” 
2. If it is neither feasible nor advisable to attempt to runback and run through the Black 
Sky Event, the question then becomes: What can be done to extend and enhance 
the NPP’s shutdown heat removal capability for Black Sky Events? This line of 
inquiry would involve investigating: (a) “beyond-FLEX” improvements to the NPP’s 
onsite diesel generator, diesel pump, and diesel fuel supplies; (b) “beyond-FLEX” 
improvements in the civil infrastructure outside the plant to provide assistance (at 
least diesel fuel) to the NPP despite widespread infrastructure damage and 
competition for available resources; (c) establishment of a secure offsite electrical 
power feed to the NPP that is not vulnerable to the Black Sky Event; and (d) addition 
of alternative onsite emergency electrical power supplies (such as solar photovoltaic 
systems or even small nuclear reactors) capable of powering all essential shutdown 
cooling functions during the Black Sky Event. 
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5.8 Today’s NPPs Are Black Sky Liabilities 
In the years since the first U.S. NPP became operational in 1957, the U.S. commercial 
nuclear power fleet has proven to be a safe, reliable, around-the-clock source of electricity. 
Through time, and in response to lessons learned from a handful of accidents in NPPs 
around the world, the nuclear power industry and its regulators have continued to improve 
the ability of NPPs to safely respond to and cope with a variety of external events and 
natural hazards. The industry’s response to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi is a notable 
example. Nevertheless, today’s generation of NPPs has a combination of design and 
performance attributes that present operational and safety challenges during, and after, 
Black Sky Events. Chief attributes include: 
1. While they can easily be “shut down,” NPPs cannot simply be “turned off” in the 
normal manner of speaking. NPPs continued to produce “decay power” at non-trivial 
levels for many months after they are shut down. This decay power must be 
removed on a continuous basis if damage to the reactor’s core is to be avoided. 
Today’s NPPs are not designed to remove this decay power (without outside 
assistance) in Black Sky (i.e. total loss of offsite power) conditions that persist for a 
several weeks or longer. 
2. Once shut down, today’s NPPs require electrical power from the Grid to restart. 
3. If today’s NPPs could be rapidly restarted (or powered-up from a runback status), it 
is unclear if they can perform the frequency matching and (possibly extreme) load-
following maneuvers likely required to service the Grid during the early stages of the 
Black Sky recovery effort. 
 
Given the three characteristics discussed above, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that today’s NPPs are indeed Black Sky Liabilities – generating assets 
that require ongoing attention and “tending” during a BSE, and are of little help in 
recovering from the Black Sky Event. 
5.9 The Potential Value Of NPPs Under Black Skies 
Despite the concerns raised in the previous section, it is noteworthy that NPPs have one 
unique advantage with respect to other steam cycle generating assets – an advantage that 
could make them an extremely attractive Black Start Resource. Nuclear power plants are 
typically refueled every eighteen to twenty-four months. Thus on average, an NPP can be 
assumed to have one year of fuel “in the tank”. The NPP’s fuel storage advantage 
dramatically surpasses that of coal-fired, gas-fired, and oil-fired plants (Table 5.1). Fuel 
supply pipelines would be inoperable or at least unreliable in Black Sky environments.  
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Table 5.1  NPP’s fuel supply is unique asset in Black Sky Environment 
 
Steam Plant 
Type 
Typical Onsite Fuel 
Supply 
 (Days) 
Fuel 
Replenishment 
Mechanism 
Gas-Fired < 1 Pipeline 
Oil-Fired < 7 Pipeline & Truck 
Coal-Fired 30-90 Truck, Rail, Barge 
Nuclear ~ 365* Truck 
 
 
*Assumes mid-point of 2-year refueling cycle 
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Therefore, if an NPP can somehow endure the initial stages of the BSE without being 
damaged, restart (if necessary), synchronize with and connect to the Grid, and load-follow 
as required, the plant would become a Black Start Resource of extraordinary value. This  
could be a game-changing asset during a time when transportation systems and other 
essential Critical Infrastructures are degraded or inoperable. 
5.10 Current Nuclear Industry And NRC Posture With Respect To 
Black Sky Events 
Neither the U.S. Nuclear Industry nor the U.S. NRC have taken a formal position on Black 
Sky issues per se. Rather, the Nuclear Industry and the NRC have been focused on 
implementing the lessons evolving out of the Fukushima Daiichi accident with respect to 
mitigation of hazards posed by external events. 
 
 (The aforementioned FLEX Program is one such example.) The relevant dialog to date 
within the Nuclear Industry, between the Nuclear Industry and the NRC, between the NRC 
and the U.S. Congress, and between the NRC and the Public has primarily focused on the 
ability of the NPPs to achieve and sustain safe shutdown and long-term spent fuel pool 
cooling following GMDs or EMP attacks. The NRC announced in November 2015 a 
proposed rule requiring NPPs to establish an integrated response capability for mitigation 
of Beyond-Design-Basis events with a special focus on mitigation of external hazards 
[5.44]. The NRC does not consider GMDs an “immediate safety concern” [5.45]. It is 
continuing to evaluate whether specific regulatory actions are required via the 
aforementioned rule-making process and is participating in an interagency task force 
developing a National Space Weather Strategy and an associated action plan [5.45]. 
5.11 Formulating “The Question” 
Given the conclusion that today’s NPPs are Black Sky Liabilities, and in consideration of the 
potential value of having NPPs capable of serving as Black Start Units, there is a 
compelling reason to investigate what might be required to achieve such operability. Thus 
“The Question” with regard to commercial nuclear power plants and Black Sky Events is: 
“Can today’s nuclear power plants be transformed from Black Sky Liabilities to Black 
Sky Assets, and if so, how?”  The Question can be deconstructed into sub-questions, 
namely: 
1. What can be done to extend an NPP’s ability to cope with Black Sky Events 
(complete loss-of-offsite power events in which the surrounding civil and social 
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infrastructures are so degraded that deliveries of diesel fuel, equipment and 
commodities to the plant are not possible)? 
2. Assuming the NPPs shut down prior to or during the Black Sky Event, and is not 
damaged during the event, what might be done to enable the NPPs to restart under 
Black Sky conditions? 
3. Assuming the NPPs have run through or can restart during Black Sky conditions, 
what might be done to enable the plants to synchronize with, reconnect to, and feed 
the Grid as necessary to energize it and bootstrap the Grid out of the Black Sky 
condition? 
 
These sub-questions will be explored further in the next section. 
5.12 A Framework For Addressing NPP – Black Sky Issues 
Figure 5.7 presents a highly simplified event/capability tree that provides further insight into 
the nature of the questions that must be answered and capabilities that must be enabled if 
today’s NPPs are to become Black Sky Assets. The responses and capabilities combine to 
produce eight basic NPP Black Sky Response pathways. 
 
The event tree begins on the extreme left of Figure 5.7 at the moment NPP operators 
become aware of an impending BSE or the plant senses the effects of the BSE. Immediately 
upon becoming aware of an impending loss-of-offsite-power event, the NPP can 
preemptively respond by running back power or completely shutting down. If advance 
warning is not received, the plant will sense the Black Sky Event via one or more of the 
mechanisms discussed in Section 5.6, and automatically trip (shut down). Response 1 in 
Figure 5.7 is the approach in which the NPP shuts down, is successfully cooled for as long 
as necessary, and then successfully restarts, synchronizes with and reconnects to the Grid, 
and load-follows as necessary to bootstrap the Grid. Response 6 achieves the same 
outcome as Response 1, but it does so by allowing the NPP to runback and run through the 
BSE, reconnect, synchronize, and load-follow. (As indicated in Figure 5.7, it is also possible 
the plant might initially attempt to runback and run through the event, only to find it 
necessary to shut down later. This sequence is not presented in Figure 5.7 as a distinct 
response path. Rather, it can be envisioned as an early transition from Response 6 to 
Response 1. 
  
Response 5 is the response to be avoided because it would almost certainly result in 
severe damage to the NPP due to loss of heat removal function after the reactor has 
runback and/or shutdown. The timing and rate of progression of the damage in Response 5 
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Figure 5.7  NPP Black Sky Evaluation Framework 
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will depend on a number of factors, including whether the reactor tripped from full power or 
from reduced (runback) power, how long cooling was maintained after the reactor was 
shutdown, etc. Assuming all equipment functions as designed (including emergency diesel-
driven backup systems), the timing of core damage in Response 5 is tied directly to when 
the NPP’s diesel fuel supply is exhausted [5.35]. 
 
All other Responses (Responses 2 – 4 and 7 – 8) in Figure 5.7 place the NPP in various 
intermediate states of readiness for repowering the Grid. Response 4 is one in which the 
previously shut down NPP cannot restart. Responses 3 and 8 are cases in which a plant 
that has either restarted or runback/run through an event cannot synchronize with the Grid 
and reattach to it. Responses 2 and 7 are cases in which the NPP has successfully 
reconnected to the Grid, but cannot load follow as necessary to handle the real and reactive 
power swings present on the (compromised) Grid. 
 
The event/capability tree presented in Figure 5.7 mirrors a decision tree based on four key 
questions: 
1. Should the NPP attempt to “runback and run through” the Black Sky Event (and if 
so, what changes in the NPP and the NPP-Grid interface are necessary to enable 
this), or should the NPP shutdown and transition to shutdown decay heat removal 
operations? 
2. What changes to the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, the Grid, and other Critical 
Infrastructures might enable the NPP to restart under Black Sky conditions? 
3. What changes to the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, and the Grid are necessary to 
enable the running NPP to synchronize with a (possibly unstable) Grid, and reattach 
to the Grid under Black Sky conditions? 
4. What changes to the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, and the Grid are necessary to 
enable the NPP, once reattached to the Grid, to remain attached and to maneuver as 
necessary to match the load placed upon it by a Grid whose health is unknown, and 
whose functionality is impaired? 
 
The answers to these questions will yield the information needed to construct a set of 
candidate options for translating NPPs from Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky Assets. Once 
these options are defined, a second tier of questions must be addressed: 
1. Which options provide the highest benefit with regard to enabling rapid recovery of 
the Grid and minimizing societal impacts of the BSE? 
2. What are the probable impacts of each option on the NPP’s availability, reliability, 
safety, and cost of normal operations?  
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3. What are the costs (relative and absolute) of implementing each option? 
4. How testable and maintainable are the hardware and procedures required to 
implement each option? 
 
The answers to these questions will be somewhat plant-specific due both to the features of 
the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, and the features of the NPP’s “hosting” Grid entity. 
However, useful insights could be gained by a methodical evaluation of these questions for 
one, or a few, actual “reference plant/Grid” examples chosen from today’s U.S. Grid. 
 
Finally, while the focus of this discussion has been on issues related to existing NPPs and 
Black Sky Events, the opportunity exists to optimize future reactors to avoid the Black Sky 
challenges presented by current NPPs, and present real Black Sky / Black Start benefits to 
their owner/operators. Two potential types of future reactors are of particular interest. First, 
small modular reactors (SMRs) could be designed for assured Black Start capability, and 
optimized to enable their placement in and interface to the Grid at locations that maximize 
their value in terms of Grid resiliency and Black Start recovery. Second, the possibility 
exists that “micro reactors or “megawatt class reactors” could be co-located onsite with 
existing large power reactors to serve as assured onsite auxiliary power sources and 
assured cranking power sources for their larger companion. Such small reactors might be 
configured to operated continuously at very low power and configured in a manner in which 
they are completely isolated from the offsite Grid and Grid disturbances. Designers of these 
future reactors and their potential customers are encouraged to factor these considerations 
into their decisions. 
5.13 A Word About Risk 
During the past three decades, the NRC and the U.S. Nuclear Industry have evolved a 
“risk-informed” regulatory regime that illuminates virtually every aspect of the nuclear power 
enterprise. Current reactor designs, NPP licensing, NPP operations and maintenance, 
emergency response planning, and the implementation of NPP backfits and modifications 
are all informed by risk management considerations. This process has unquestionably 
improved safety and reduced the risk to the public of nuclear power operations. It is useful 
to reflect on how the consideration of Black Sky Events might fit into such a risk-informed 
regulatory regime. 
 
From the practical standpoint, the “risk” associated with a undesirable event is defined to 
be the product of the probability of the event and the consequences of that event, summed 
over all relevant events [5.37]. There are two generic categories of events. “Internal 
	
80 
events” include phenomena such as valve failures, relay failures, etc. “External events” are 
considered to be events resulting from natural phenomena such as fires, floods, seismic 
events, GMDs triggered by coronal mass ejections, etc. [5.46]. Overt or intentional actions 
taken by humans – such as EMP and cyber attacks – are external events of a special type. 
The assignment of a “probability” for premeditated human actions can rapidly become 
tangled in philosophical argument. 
 
The application of risk-informed paradigms and traditional “cost/benefit” analyses such as 
application of the NRC Backfit Rule [5.47] to evaluate the efficacy of potential Black Sky-
motivated modifications to NPPs and the Grid is particularly challenging.  This is due to the 
fact that external events of the type that might trigger a Black Sky Event are considered, 
“high-impact, low-frequency” events [5.48].  The challenge presented by such events is that 
there is (or there is believed to be) an “insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the 
probabilities and consequences of their occurrence” [5.48].  While it may be possible to 
estimate the cost of implementing a Black Sky-motivated backfit to an NPP or the Grid, 
estimation of the risk benefit (reduction) of doing so can be extraordinarily difficult.  What is 
the true probability of a Carrington Event-class CME/GMD?  What is the “probability” of an 
EMP attack?  Quantification of the consequences of such events is perhaps even more 
difficult. 
 
There are those who would argue that if a true Black Sky Event actually occurred, the 
devastation to and impact on our society would be so overwhelming it is not reasonable to 
be concerned with questions such as those posed in this paper. It is tempting to consider 
Black Sky issues as the same class as, say, those related to the impact of a massive 
meteorite impact on Earth – extraordinarily low frequency incidents of such devastating scale 
and effect, there is no value in attempting to mitigate the risk they pose to society. 
 
It is worth noting that if Riley’s and Love’s estimates of the probability / frequency of 
Carrington-class GMDs are correct [5.15, 5.17], these events represent a class of hazards 
far more probable than the proverbial “dinosaur-killing” meteorite. In fact, if Riley and Love 
are remotely correct in their estimation of the probability of such events (say an event 
frequency of 1 in 100 to 1 in 1000 years), the probability of such events is significantly 
higher than that of many events included within the design basis of current generation 
NPPs. Indeed, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards require 
NPP designers and licensing authorities to ensure “Postulated Initiating Events” (PIEs) with 
probabilities exceeding 1 in 10,000 years result in “no radiological impact at all, or no 
radiological impact outside the exclusion area” of the plant [5.49]. The key question, and 
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perhaps the largest uncertainty is how the probability of a CME or other natural or man-
made initiating event translates to the probability of the “ultimate loss of off-site power” 
event to which the NPP might be exposed. And then, of course, there’s the additional 
initiating event “probability” contribution from EMP and cyber threats. 
 
Given current uncertainties regarding the probability of Black Sky initiating events and how 
they translate to NPP accident initiator events, and the response of Critical Infrastructure 
(including the Grid and NPPs) to them, “How can and when will society make decisions 
regarding issues surrounding NPPs and Black Sky Events?” Analyses of the type discussed 
in this paper can inform that process. 
5.14 Summary  
5.14.1 Summary Observations 
Reliable access to electricity is a key enabler of modern life and the foundation of all other 
Critical Infrastructures. The Grid is the “machine” which generates, stores, and delivers this 
electricity. The U.S. Grid is vulnerable to a number of natural hazards and man-made 
threats that have the potential to cause Black Sky Events – blackouts of extraordinary 
geographical scale lasting for weeks, months, or even longer. Embedded within the U.S. 
Grid are almost 100 commercial nuclear power reactors. 
 
This paper has addressed two levels of relevant NPP Black Sky issues: 
1. The behavior of the interconnected “system of systems” that is the coupled physical 
infrastructure-human infrastructure world in which Black Sky Events would evolve. 
2. The role of nuclear power plants in Black Sky Events.  
 
The role of NPPs in Black Sky scenarios is largely unexplored territory. 
 
A Black Sky Event will ultimately present itself to an NPP as a sustained loss of offsite 
power (LOOP) event. Both from the regulatory and technical standpoint, the response of 
NPPs to a Black Sky event in today’s environment would be to isolate from the Grid and 
“cocoon” until offsite power is restored or available diesel fuel supplies are exhausted. Thus 
the safety of the NPPs during a continuing Black Sky Event will ultimately depend on the 
ability of world outside the plant to resupply diesel fuel, other consumables, and perhaps 
additional equipment to the plant at a time when all Critical Infrastructures are 
compromised, transportation systems are dysfunctional, and there is keen competition for 
available resources. Once shutdown, today’s NPPs cannot restart without an external 
	
82 
source of AC power. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that for all their many benefits to 
society, today’s NPPs are Black Sky Liabilities. 
 
Today’s NPPs employ an operational framework of EOPs, SAMGs, FLEX, and EDMG 
procedures designed to cope with a wide variety of beyond design basis events. However, 
these procedures were not designed for sustained Black Sky environments. 
 
Internal to the NPP lies an asset that would be of extraordinary value during Black Sky 
Events if the NPP and the Grid could be modified to access it. A NPP might have as much 
as 24 (full power) months of fuel in the reactor at the start of a Black Sky Event. When 
compared to the onsite fuel inventory at a coal-fired electrical generating plant (typically 30-
60 days), or gas-turbine plants (hours to perhaps a few days), the NPP’s nuclear fuel 
inventory could enable the NPP to become the foundation of a robust U.S. Grid restoration 
strategy. This benefit can only be realized if the plant could endure the Black Sky Event 
without damage, run through the event or restart in the midst of Black Sky conditions, 
synchronize with the Grid, reconnect to the Grid, and run as required to match voltage, 
frequency, and (real and reactive) power demands. This could be an enormous societal 
benefit during a time when all Critical Infrastructures are compromised and virtually all 
resources are over-subscribed. NPPs could become nearly ideal Black Start Resources 
(“Units”) and an enabler of Grid resiliency – if these functionalities could be achieved. 
5.14.2 Recommendations 
In light of these observations, the following recommendations are offered as a catalyst for 
generating further dialog with respect to NPP-Black Sky issues: 
• Recommendation 1 – the utility of agent-based simulation (ABS) approaches for 
probing several issues relevant to the role of nuclear power in Black Sky Events 
should be explored. Agent-based simulation approaches employing model 
topologies similar to that depicted in Figure 5.2, could provide useful insights to 
inform a host of Black Sky questions and issues. The range of issues worthy of 
consideration include understanding; (a) interdependences between the electric 
power infrastructure and other Critical Infrastructure Sectors; (b) optimal extension of 
existing NPP EOP/SAMG/FLEX/EDMG procedures in Black Sky environments; (c) 
NPP operational decision making in situations involving degraded situation 
awareness and quality of information; (d) the development of federal, state, and local 
emergency response plans; and (e) the development of relevant policy and 
regulatory frameworks. The model “level” (e.g., individual generating plant, Regional 
Transmission Organization, NERC Region, Interconnection, etc.), type of intelligent 
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agents employed, and phenomenological models and rules implemented in ABS 
approaches would necessarily be tailored to the specific questions targeted for 
exploration. One intriguing pathway for exploration would focus on evaluating the 
efficacy of existing FERC / NERC emergency operating procedures within a single 
nuclear generation and transmission entity in the U.S. Grid. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a very high-level multi-agent model might be useful for probing questions 
such as who/what should receive priority for power restoration in the event of a major 
Black Sky Event. 
• Recommendation 2 – This paper has defined a preliminary framework for 
addressing the question, “Can today’s nuclear power plants be transformed from 
Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky Assets, and if so, how?” This framework is built 
upon a simplified NPP Black Sky event / functionality tree (Figure 5.7) that identifies 
the key actions required (and therefore the key capabilities needed) if an NPP is to 
become a Black Start Resource. The simple event/functionality tree defined in 
Figure 5.7 should be expanded to provide a useful analytical framework, and 
applied to individual NPPs to provide a better understanding of the challenges, 
implications, and intricacies of achieving Black Start functionality. 
• Recommendation 3 – Todays NPPs are operated and regulated in a manner that 
assumes diesel-dependent safe shutdown mode is the safest response to all loss of 
offsite power events. The risk implications of this assumption in an “all hazards / all 
threats” environment including Black Skies should be revisited. Given recent 
developments regarding our understanding of the probability of naturally induced 
GMDs, it is quite possible (perhaps even likely) the safest mode for NPPs would be 
to runback/run through a loss of offsite power event rather than to shutdown and 
simply hope offsite power is restored before the diesel fuel is exhausted. 
• Recommendation 4 – The feasibility of enabling existing NPPs to runback / run 
through a BSE in a low power, “islanded” mode should be explored. Most NPPs 
were designed for significant runback capability, but it is rarely employed. Why? It is 
likely to be difficult to discriminate in real-time between events in which a reactor trip 
is appropriate, and those in which runback is advised. Achieving this capability 
would be one challenging aspect of this approach to BSE response – especially 
because restart of the reactor once it has tripped is not possible absent offsite AC 
power feed. 
• Recommendation 5 – The possibility of providing sustained NPP safe shutdown 
cooling during prolonged Black Sky Events by harnessing the capabilities of 
collocated micro-reactors as auxiliary power sources should be examined. Such a 
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capability would free the NPP from dependence on diesel fuel supplies for sustained 
shutdown decay heat removal during Black Sky Events. 
• Recommendation 6 – The efficacy of configuring NPPs, dedicated offsite cranking 
transmission lines, and Black Start resources into “Secure Enclaves” should be 
examined; and the extent to which this approach has been / is being deployed in the 
electric power industry should be understood. 
• Recommendation 7 – The possibility of enhancing an NPP’s ability to remain 
connected to an unstable Grid (both in terms of the NPPs power transmission 
interties and is offsite power feed) should be investigated. Two aspects of the 
challenge are evident. The first involves enhancing the NPPs load-following 
capabilities. The second involves buffering (to the extent possible) the NPP from 
Grid anomalies via use of DC-DC and VFT connections, rather than standard AC-
AC connections for both power transmission from the NPP and offsite power feed to 
the NPP. Such connections might buffer the plant from Grid voltage, frequency, and 
power angle anomalies that currently trigger plant trips and inhibit reattachment of 
the NPP to the Grid during Black Sky recovery operations. Opportunities may also 
exist to enhance relay and switching technologies, and fault detection and 
management technologies in the NPP’s switchyard and on the Grid. Such actions 
could result in an NPP-Grid interface that is more robust, more reliable, and more 
resilient for both normal operations and Black Sky Events – and NPPs that are more 
capable of aiding in Grid recovery during Black Sky Events. 
• Recommendation 8 – The possibility of enabling existing NPPs to become Black 
Start Units by providing assured onsite cranking power supplies and enhancing 
their ability to match a dynamic load of the type expected in the initial states of a 
Black Sky recovery should be explored. Innovative approaches such as providing 
small onsite megawatt class reactors for cranking power (see Recommendation 5) 
and changes such as those described In Recommendation 7 could enable existing 
NPPs to become true Black Start Units capable of cranking other power plants and 
“boot-strapping” the Grid during an ongoing Black Sky Event. 
• Recommendation 9 – The opportunity exists to optimize future reactors (megawatt 
class reactors and Small Modular Reactors) to both avoid the Black Sky challenges 
presented by current NPPs and offer Black Start capabilities not afforded by today’s 
nuclear power fleet. Studies should be conducted to understand (a) the functional 
requirements of a megawatt class reactor and its interface to an NPP that would 
enable it to perform as an assured onsite auxiliary power supply or cranking power 
supply for the NPP in the case of loss of offsite power; (b) the SMR design features 
that would enable it to function as a Black Start Resource; and (c) the SMR siting 
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considerations and SMR–Grid integration considerations that would maximize the 
SMR’s contribution to Grid resiliency during routine and Black Sky conditions. 
 
Every day, as we go about our lives, the nation’s nuclear power fleet quietly provides 
enormous benefits to society. A Black Sky Event has the potential to disrupt life as we know 
it. Can nuclear power be the key to protecting society from the ravages of Black Sky 
Events? 
 
We can and should move promptly to address this question. 
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This chapter is based on the Accepted Manuscript of an article accepted for publication as 
an Open Access document by Taylor & Francis in the American Nuclear Society’s journal, 
Nuclear Technology. The Version of Record will be available online at  
 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2018.1480213 . 
 
This article focuses on future U.S. NPPs and Grid resilience, contains the product of 
research Tasks 4 and 5, and presents the answers to Research Questions 3 and 4: 
 
3. Concerning future resilient nuclear power plants (rNPPs): What performance 
attributes and functional requirements might maximize their value as Grid resilience 
assets? 
4. Concerning future rNPPs: What design features might enable the identified rNPP 
functional requirements? 
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Chapter 6 Abstract 
 
This paper builds on previous work that characterized the nature of the nuclear power 
plant–electric Grid system, the concept of Grid resilience, and the potential of current U.S. 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) to enhance U.S. Grid, integrated Critical Infrastructure, and 
societal resilience. The concept of a “resilient nuclear power plant” or “rNPP” is defined.  
Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP Functional Requirements are presented. A 
preliminary discussion of some rNPP design features that could enable a nuclear power 
plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional Requirements is presented, along with a 
preliminary discussion of some rNPP regulatory, siting, and economic considerations. 
Taken as a package, the Six rNPP Functional Requirements define an NPP performance 
envelope that extends the societal value proposition of nuclear energy well beyond that of 
traditional baseload electricity generation. The paper lays the foundation for exploration of 
high-value rNPP applications and for future rNPP conceptual design studies. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Previous analyses of the response of current U.S. Generation II and II+ nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) to major Grid anomalies [6.1–6.3], concluded that current U.S. NPPs do not 
deliver the Grid resilience benefits nuclear power can and should provide. In those 
analyses, the author introduced the concept of a “resilient nuclear power plant,” or “rNPP” – 
a nuclear power plant intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a manner to 
enhance the resilience of the U.S. national electricity supply system, or “Grid” – along with 
Six rNPP Functional Requirements.  This paper moves beyond the previous analyses to 
provide a more detailed description of the Six rNPP Functional Requirements and a 
preliminary assessment of rNPP design features that would enhance a plant’s ability to 
achieve the Six rNPP Functional Requirements. Both the previous analyses and those 
discussed in this paper are products of the multi-phase research effort depicted in Figure 
6.1. This paper discusses the results of Tasks 4 and 5 in Figure 6.1. 
 
Section 6.2 briefly reviews the definition of Grid resilience adopted by the author and 
employed as the context for the analyses discussed here. Section 6.3 defines the concept 
of an rNPP in terms of its purpose, and the two key attributes of rNPPs. Section 6.4 
provides an in-depth discussion of the Six rNPP Functional Requirements – the 
performance attributes that distinguish rNPPs from current U.S. nuclear power plants 
(NPPs). Having defined the concept of an rNPP, Two rNPP Key Attributes, and the Six 
rNPP Functional Requirements, Section 6.5 provides a preliminary characterization of some 
the design features future rNPP designers might consider as avenues to achieving the Six 
rNPP Functional Requirements. Section 6.6 briefly discusses three additional issues related 
to rNPP development and deployment:  potential regulatory barriers, rNPP siting 
considerations, and rNPP cost and economic considerations. The main points of the paper 
are summarized in Section 6.7. 
6.2 Grid Resilience – A Working Definition 
The Grid is the integrated network of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution 
assets required to produce and deliver electricity to the end user. The Grid is arguably the 
most critical of all U.S. physical infrastructures, because it is the infrastructure upon which 
virtually every other civil infrastructure depends for the energy required to execute their 
functions. Thus, Grid resilience is a matter of great importance from the energy security, 
economic prosperity, homeland security, and national security perspectives [6.4].   
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Figure 6.1  Grid Resilience and rNPP Conceptualization Process 
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Despite its ubiquitous usage, the term “resilience,” as applied to the Grid, is one that is not 
easily defined [6.4]. System resilience has been generically defined [6.5] as “the ability of a 
system to withstand a change or a disruptive event by reducing the initial negative impacts 
(absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them (adaptive capability), and by recovering 
from them (restorative capability).”   
 
The practical challenges of applying this definition to the Grid and to the analysis, operation, 
and planning of Grid architectures have been previously discussed [6.3]. The author has 
offered the following working definition of Grid resilience: “Electric Grid resilience is the 
system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers given a specific 
load prioritization hierarchy” [6.2, 6.3].  
6.3 Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs) Defined 
Given the challenges associated with quantification of Grid resilience, it is useful to consider 
qualitative approaches to understanding and enhancing Grid resilience – approaches that 
focus on individual elements (generation, transmission, and distribution) of the Grid, and the 
characteristics of generic resilience systems. With this in mind, a resilient nuclear power 
plant has been defined as follows [6.2, 6.3]: “A resilient nuclear power plant (rNPP) is one 
whose performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance electric Grid 
resilience – the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers 
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.”   
 
When combined with the generic definition of system resilience cited in Section 6.2, it is 
clear rNPPs (and resilient power plants, or “rPPs” in general) must possess two rNPP Key 
Attributes: 
1. rNPP Key Attribute 1 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to absorb and adapt to a 
broad spectrum of Grid anomalies and upsets.  
2. rNPP Key Attribute 2 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to recover from upsets, and 
to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s load 
prioritization hierarchy. 
 
rNPPs would be nuclear power plants that are intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and 
operated in a manner to enhance electric Grid resilience.   
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6.4 The Six Functional Requirements Of rNPPs 
Given the foregoing discussion, what are the key functional requirements an rNPP must 
meet in order to maximize its Grid resilience benefit – i.e., maximize the Grid’s ability to 
absorb and adapt to major disruptions, and accelerate Grid recovery and restoration in the 
wake of major Grid disruptions? The Six Functional Requirements of rNPPs are 
summarized in Table 6.1 and discussed below. An NPP does not have to possess all six of 
the rNPP Functional Requirements listed in Table 6.1 in order to provide Grid resilience 
benefits. It is not an “all or nothing” proposition. But the degree to which an NPP does 
provide Grid resilience benefits is directly related to the number of (and which specific) 
rNPP Functional Requirements it exhibits, as well as the attributes of the Grid into which it 
is interfaced. The Six rNPP Functional Requirements are currently articulated in qualitative 
terms consistent with the immaturity of the rNPP concept.  Quantification of the qualitative 
descriptors employed here (e.g., “robust,” “flexible,” and “immunity”) will be a focus of future 
work. 
6.4.1 rNPP Functional Requirement 1 – Robust Real/Reactive Load-Following 
And Flexible Operation Capability 
The ability to meet widely varying and dynamic load (real and reactive power) demands 
(e.g., from 100% power down to housekeeping loads) is a critical rNPP functionality. 
 
Modern U.S. nuclear power plants were designed with some load-following and flexible 
operation capability. However, they have traditionally operated in baseload mode. The 
nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) of a typical Gen II Westinghouse pressurized water 
reactor (PWR) was designed to provide the following operational capabilities: 
1. 15 – 100% of rated power consistent with the cyclic nature of the utility system load 
demand. 
2. 10% of rated power and ramp changes of 5% of rated power per minute. 
3. A daily load cycle of 12 hours at 100% power, decrease to 50% power over 3 hours, 
6 hours at 50% power, and return to 100% power over three hours [6.6]. 
 
Load rejection capabilities of up to 100% load were available as a design option for many 
U.S. plants at the time they were ordered. However, the absence of a compelling need at 
the time, and the increased capital costs of providing such functionality, dissuaded most 
plant purchasers from availing themselves of the option. The reality was that the provision 
of load-following and flexible operating capability for both nuclear and non-nuclear 
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Table 6.1  Six rNPP Functional Requirements 
 
rNPP Functional Requirement 
Relevant 
Resilience 
Characteristics 
1.  Robust real/reactive load-following and flexible 
operation capability 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
2.  Immunity to damage from external events (including 
Grid anomalies) 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
3.  Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in 
response to Grid anomalies 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
4.  Ability to operate in Island Mode (i.e., without 
connection to offsite transmission load and electric 
power supply) 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
5.  Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling 
capability (i.e., requiring no offsite power or resupply 
of diesel fuel from offsite) 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
6.  Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e., 
the ability to start with no offsite power supply from 
the Grid) 
Restorative 
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generating units was primarily a financial question given the technical approaches required 
to achieve it, as well as the potential plant and component lifetime degradation issues 
associated with it.  
 
While only a few U.S. NPPs operate in a load-following mode (due to their electricity market 
conditions), many European NPPs maneuver between 100% and 30% power over short 
periods of time [6.7]. NPPs in Europe (where the share of nuclear power generation in 
some countries’ electric Grids is higher than in the U.S.) do operate in more dynamic power 
maneuvering regimes than do their U.S. counterparts. As is evident from Figure 6.2, nuclear 
power plants in France frequently maneuver between 100 % and ~ 30% power over short 
periods of time. German plants (Figure 6.3) routinely maneuver between 100% and ~ 50% 
power over several-hour periods.  In both cases, this operational flexibility is necessitated 
by regional Grid and electricity market demands. 
 
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), in its 2014 study of the options for 
transitioning nuclear power plants to “flexible operation” [6.8], identified four key operational 
characteristics of “flexible nuclear power plants”: 
1. Rate – the rate at which a plant can change power levels over time. 
2. Depth – the extent (% of full power) of a power reduction a plant can make while still 
having the capability to return to the initial power level. 
3. Duration – the length of time that a plant can maintain a given power level. 
4. Frequency – the frequency of significant changes to a plant’s power levels. 
 
While these four parameters may be a sufficiently complete set of flexible operational 
characteristics for “normal” flexible operations, these four operational parameters (or rather 
the values established for their required ranges) are almost certainly not sufficient to 
characterize rNPP load-following operations during plant black start and Grid recovery 
operations. For instance, during the early stages of Grid recovery operations, the potential 
exists for real and reactive load swings at the terminals of the NPP’s generator that exceed 
those deemed acceptable during normal plant operations. This is particularly the case if the 
rNPP were being employed to crank another generating plant – an operation current U.S. 
NPPs are not allowed to conduct. Thus, there is a need to distinguish between the real and 
reactive power maneuvering capability for normal conditions and those an NPP would 
encounter during early Grid recovery operations. 
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Figure 6.2  Typical Électricité de France (EDF) NPP power maneuvering operations  
(% of rated power vs. time) [6.7] 
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Figure 6.3  Typical German NPP power maneuvering operations [6.7] 
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6.4.2 rNPP Functional Requirement 2 – Immunity To Damage From External 
Events 
The rNPP must be capable of withstanding credible external (natural or man-made) events 
that disrupt the electric Grid, without incurring significant damage itself, and the rNPP must 
be capable of operating as required in the wake of such events to aid in Grid recovery and 
restoration. There must be no credible “common mode” Grid–rNPP failure mechanisms. 
 
A fundamental functional requirement of a resilient nuclear power plant is that it must be 
available when the Grid needs it most. The rNPP cannot be vulnerable to being damaged 
or rendered inoperable by the same external events that could damage the Grid and trigger 
the need for the rNPP to power Grid recovery and restoration efforts. This calls for rNPPs to 
be designed, sited, constructed, and operated in such a way that they are effectively 
immune to credible natural hazards and malevolent human threats to the Grid and their 
induced Grid anomalies – including external events of a type and/or magnitude outside the 
design basis of current U.S. NPPs: 
1. Seismic events (earthquakes and tsunamis). 
2. Terrestrial weather events (including flooding). 
3. Electromagnetic disturbances (both geomagnetic disturbances induced by space 
weather and electromagnetic pulse attacks). 
4. Cyber attacks. 
 
This functional requirement might seem to be self-evident. However, from the practical 
engineering standpoint, this functional requirement could well be the one that is most 
difficult to achieve and/or to confirm that it has been achieved. The definition of “credible” 
should be informed by lessons from decades of probabilistic safety and risk assessment 
(PSA/PRA), and by realistic evaluation of the changing (or changed understanding of) 
external risk and threat environments. For instance, evolving knowledge from ongoing solar 
heliophysics studies indicates the probability of a coronal mass ejection and associated 
geomagnetic disturbance of the magnitude of the 1859 “Carrington Event” is actually 
greater than that of some external events commonly considered in the design basis of 
existing commercial nuclear power plants [6.1]. The Carrington Event set telegraph 
equipment afire across northern North America and Europe. 
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6.4.3 rNPP Functional Requirement 3 – Ability To Avoid Plant Shutdown In 
Response To Grid Anomalies 
Avoidance of reactor trips and plant shutdowns triggered by external events is a key 
functional capability of future rNPPs.  
 
This functional requirement is closely related to rNPP Functional Requirements 1 and 2.  
Nuclear power plants prefer to serve “high-quality” (stable real/reactive power) electric 
loads, and to be served by “high-quality” (tightly controlled voltage and frequency) offsite 
power supplies. Rapid and/or significant variations in either electric load served by the 
plant, or offsite power supply quality to the plant, can result in reactor trips and plant 
shutdowns in current nuclear power plants. Indeed, the typical U.S. NPP’s response to 
major Grid anomalies is to “shut down and wait“ until the Grid is energized and real/reactive 
power flows (loads) are stabilized [6.3]. Only then are efforts made to restart the NPP.   
 
The “shutdown and wait” response has potentially negative consequences both for Grid 
resilience and for NPP safety. If the plant shutdown is an artifact of load variations, isolating 
the plant from the Grid may actually exacerbate the problem at the Grid level by removing 
generating capacity precisely at the time it is needed to stabilize and restore the Grid. This 
concern over the potential for an NPP shutdown to worsen an already difficult situation is 
one reason system operators are reluctant to place NPPs back in service until late in the 
Grid restoration process. This concern is heightened in systems where nuclear generating 
capacity makes up a significant fraction of overall system generating capacity.  In addition, 
shutting down the NPP in response to Grid anomalies transitions the plant to shutdown 
cooling at a time when no one can know how long the Grid will be compromised and how 
long shutdown cooling must be maintained without the aid of offsite power. Finally, the need 
to maneuver through a series of “Limiting Conditions for Operation” or “LCOs” [6.1, 6.3] 
would almost certainly undermine the ability to rapidly restart NPPs that have tripped due to 
Grid anomalies – thus further undermining their ability to serve as Grid recovery assets. 
6.4.4 rNPP Functional Requirement 4 – Ability To Operate In Island Mode 
The ability to operate for extended periods in an “Island Mode” is a key functional capability 
of future rNPPs.   
 
Island Mode operation is an operating mode in which the nuclear power plant is isolated 
from the Grid (both load and offsite power supply), and operating at a power level sufficient 
to meet all of its housekeeping loads. It is essentially in a “hot spinning reserve” state, ready 
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to reconnect to the Grid. An rNPP could theoretically enter Island Mode by either of two 
paths (1) automatic or manual transition to Island Mode directly from its normal power 
generation mode; or (2) by restarting into Island Mode following plant shutdown:  
1. Transition To Island Mode From Normal Power Operations – In the absence of 
advance warning of the need to transition to Island Mode operations from normal 
power operations, the rNPP must be capable of detecting anomalies in the load it is 
serving and its offsite power supply, and distinguishing between those it can tolerate 
(with its enhanced load-following capability) and those it cannot tolerate. This 
detection and discrimination would have to occur extremely quickly if the transition is 
to be performed automatically. Conversely, manual transition to Island Mode 
operations would likely require that the system operators and rNPP operators have 
advance warning of the need to transition to Island Mode. In either case, the first 
step in the process is to isolate the rNPP from the Grid (load and offsite power 
supply) coincident with a power cutback.   
2. Transition To Island Mode From Shutdown Configuration – The rNPP’s reactor must 
be capable of restarting (cranking) in order to achieve Island Mode operation if the 
reactor trips in response to the Grid anomaly. Offsite power would be available to 
crank the plant if the transition to Island Mode is executed in advance of an 
anticipated Grid anomaly. However, it is likely offsite power would not be available 
to crank the plant if the transition is occurring in direct response to a real-time Grid 
anomaly. The ability to restart the plant and achieve Island Mode operations in such 
cases would depend on whether the plant had its own self-cranking capability (rNPP 
Functional Requirement 6). 
 
Conventional large NPPs comprised of GWe-class reactors would probably have difficulty 
achieving and sustaining Island Mode operation since such operations require the reactor 
to idle at power levels only a few-to-several percent of its rated power level. On the other 
hand, large NPPs comprised of multiple “small” (e.g., < 300 MWe) reactors, and MWe-class 
reactors would probably have less difficulty providing this functionality because their NPP 
housekeeping loads could be met by a single reactor module operating within its normal 
power generation levels, feeding power to the other modules. It is also technically possible 
(though unlikely from the economic perspective) that MWe-class reactors could be co-
located with the rNPP to operate in Island Mode as dedicated rNPP cranking and shutdown 
cooling power sources.  
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6.4.5 rNPP Functional Requirement 5 – Unlimited Independent Shutdown 
Cooling 
The ability to meet all shutdown cooling requirements indefinitely without reliance on offsite 
power or other assistance is an essential functional capability of rNPPs.  
 
Unlike other forms of electric generating plants, nuclear power plants cannot be completely 
“turned off”.  Subsequent to shutdown, nuclear reactors continue to produce decay heat and 
therefore continue to require some form of cooling to maintain adequate heat removal. For 
example, nuclear fuel still produces ~ 1% of its original operating power two hours after 
shutdown.  The decay power level drops to ~ 0.4% three days after shutdown, ~ 0.3% 
seven days after shutdown, and ~0.04-0.05% six months after shutdown. The time-
dependent shutdown decay power produced depends on factors such as the original 
operating power level, time at power, reactor fuel composition, fuel burnup, etc. Figure 6.4 
depicts a typical decay power curve for a nominal 1 GWe (~ 3000 MWt) nuclear power 
plant. The core of a 1 GWe commercial nuclear reactor still produces ~ 2-3 MWt of power 
three months after the reactor has shut down. Thus, in the absence of forced cooling, a 
reactor of this size, depressurized to 1 atm pressure, would boil off (and would need a 
supply of) 3200-5000 kg/h or ~830-1320 gallons/h of water to remove this much energy. 
This decay heat is produced whether the fuel is in the reactor or in the plant’s spent fuel 
pool, and must be removed (in current reactors) by pumping cooling water through the core 
of the reactor and/or spent fuel pool. This function is provided in current plants by 
electrically-driven, direct diesel-driven, or steam-driven pumps – the latter only functional so 
long as the reactor system is pressurized. The power for the electrically-driven cooling 
systems is supplied from the Grid under normal circumstances. NPPs typically rely on 
onsite diesel-driven generator systems to supply backup power in the event offsite AC 
power isn’t available. All diesel-driven approaches depend on the continued availability of 
diesel fuel. 
 
Nuclear power plants have made great strides in their ability to deal with a wide range of 
external events and maintain safe shutdown cooling for long periods of time.  Still, the 
industry’s current FLEX procedures ultimately depend upon the provision of offsite support 
(diesel fuel, equipment, power, etc.) to maintain safe shutdown cooling for events involving 
extended loss of AC power (ELAP) [6.9]. As a result, NPPs are priority or “critical” loads 
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Figure 6.4  Approximate shutdown cooling requirements for a 1 GWe/3000 MWt 
nuclear power plant. 
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Grid operators must meet during system restoration activities before other loads can be 
served. Thus, today’s NPPs actually present a burden on – rather than an asset to – Grid 
operators during system restoration activities. The development nuclear power plants that 
do not pose a burden on the electric Grid in the case of a major Grid disruption, would be a 
major step along the way to rNPPs.  rNPP Functional Requirement 5 addresses this need. 
6.4.6 rNPP Functional Requirement 6 – Self-Cranking Black Start Capability 
The ability to start without reliance on offsite power (e.g., the ability to self-crank) would be 
a transformational capability of future rNPPs.   
 
Many potential threats and hazards to Grid resilience could result in a Grid that is fractured 
into dark (de-energized) Grid “islands” [6.10]. The electric power industry has prepared for 
such circumstances through its provision of “Black Start Resources” (generating plants) that 
have the ability to start/restart with no offsite power support.   
 
The normal electric Grid recovery scenario (Figure 6.5) is a classic “bootstrap” procedure in 
which small (typically < 50 MWe) gas turbine and hydro black start plants crank larger 
plants. Once started, these larger plants crank even larger steam cycle plants in a carefully 
choreographed procedure designed to rebuild and synchronize blocks of stable load and 
electrical generation until normal Grid operation is restored.   
 
Today’s nuclear power plants play no supportive role in the early stages of Grid recovery.  
NPPs are typically among the first plants to drop off the Grid, and the last plants to return to 
service in response to major Grid disruptions. This behavior is an artifact of several plant 
and Grid characteristics:  
1. The NPP size and its resultant need for large blocks of stable load and transmission 
line capacity.  
2. The plant’s limited load-following capability.  
3. The plant’s Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and associated time required 
for plant restart.  
4. The plant’s need for high-quality offsite power. 
5. The large cranking power requirements (typically a few tens of MWe) for GWe-class 
NPPs. 
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Figure 6.5  Current Grid Black Start Recovery Approach 
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rNPP Functional Requirement 6 would be enabled by (1) achieving very small cranking 
power requirements and (2) providing those cranking power requirements from secure and 
reliable onsite power sources that have no common-cause failure modes with offsite power 
sources. The smaller the cranking power requirements, the more options exist for providing 
that cranking power. Both traditional cranking power sources, such as onsite diesel 
generators and gas/oil fired turbines, and non-traditional renewable energy sources are 
viable candidates if the NPP’s cranking power requirements are sufficiently small. Non-
traditional cranking power sources could include co-located utility-scale battery storage 
systems, compressed air energy storage systems, solar photovoltaic systems, and fuel 
cells – and as noted, even dedicated MWe-class reactors. 
6.5 Potentially Enabling rNPP Design Features 
The design of a nuclear power plant is, like that of any complex system, an exercise in 
multi-parameter optimization (trade-offs and compromises) in an environment rich in 
requirements, desires, and constraints. Each design feature must be assessed in terms of 
its impact on plant safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, lifetime, cost/economics, 
and a host of other factors. The expansion of the NPP design exercise to encompass new 
rNPP and electric Grid resilience goals adds another dimension to this endeavor.  
The rNPP functional requirements defined in Section 6.4 are technology-neutral.  Designers 
of future rNPPs would logically evaluate every system architecture and technology selection 
decision in terms of its impact on the ability of the plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional 
Requirements while still meeting the plant’s traditional functional requirements. 
 
Table 6.2 presents a preliminary list of some NPP design features that impact the NPP’s 
ability to achieve the six rNPP functionalities. Many of these design features summarized in 
Table 6.2 are relevant to rNPP’s that are employed strictly for electricity generation, as well 
as rNPPs that are employed for combined heat and power generation. Plant architecture 
and technology decisions are obviously interdependent rNPP design issues.  Each design 
“trade” decision would be accompanied by its own plant performance and cost implications. 
The intent of this section is simply to demonstrate there is a design “trade space” available 
to rNPP plant designers. Detailed definition and examination of each of these options is a 
topic for future work. The rNPP design features are discussed from the “outside-in” or “Grid-
to-fission” perspective, consistent with the use-inspired philosophy that underpins the rNPP 
concept. 
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Table 6.2  Potential enabling rNPP design features 
 
Potentially Enabling 
rNPP Design 
Features 
 
Impact 
*Enables 
rNPP 
Functional 
Requirement 
# 
1.   DC-DC or VFT NPP 
interface with Grid 
• Buffers rNPP from Grid 
transmission load and offsite 
power quality anomalies 
1–3 
2.   High-capacity load 
switching and heat 
rejection 
• Substitutes alternate thermal or 
electrical load in case of Grid-
based loss of load events 
1–4 
3.   Multi-module 
(reactor) NPP 
architecture 
• Enables one operating reactor 
module to supply shutdown 
cooling and housekeeping 
electrical loads to other rNPP 
reactor modules 
• Enables one reactor module to 
crank other reactor modules in 
rNPP 
4–6 
4.   Small reactor 
(module) size 
• Reduces cranking power 
requirements of individual 
reactor modules in rNPP 
• Enables non-traditional cranking 
power supplies for rNPP 
• Reduces individual reactor 
module shutdown heat removal 
and housekeeping electrical 
loads. 
1, 3–6 
5.   Adaptive turbine-
generator systems 
• Enhances rNPPs load-following 
and flexible operation capability 
1–3 
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Table 6.2  Potential enabling rNPP design features (continued) 
 
Potentially Enabling 
rNPP Design Features 
 
Impact 
*Enables 
rNPP 
Functional 
Requirement # 
6.   Passive shutdown 
cooling 
• Eliminates dependence of rNPP 
on consumable onsite resources 
and offsite assistance to 
maintain safe shutdown state 
5 
7.   Inherent reactor 
system energy 
storage capacity 
• Buffers rNPP and individual 
rNPP reactor modules from 
electrical (transmission system) 
load transients 
1–4 
8.   Optimized reactor 
core physics design 
• Enables rapid rNPP reactor 
module power maneuvering and 
restart across entire fuel cycle 
1–4, 6 
9.   Robust nuclear fuels • Increases rNPP reactor 
module’s power maneuvering 
capability 
1–5 
10. Plant electrical, 
instrumentation and 
control (I&C), and 
computer 
technologies that 
are resilient in face 
of GMD, EMP and 
cyber attack 
• Enables rNPP to avoid damage 
and continue to function in event 
of GMD, EMP, or cyber attack 
2 
 
*1 –  Flexible Operation/Robust Load-Following Capability 
  2 –  Immunity To Damage From External Events 
  3 –  Ability To Avoid Plant Shutdown In Response To Grid Anomalies 
  4 –  Ability To Operate In Island Mode 
  5 –  Unlimited Independent Shutdown Cooling 
  6 –  Self-Cranking Black Start Capability 
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6.5.1 DC-DC NPP–Grid Interfaces 
The resilience value of an rNPP is not only a function of the rNPP itself.  Its value as a Grid 
resilience asset is also a function of the manner in which the rNPP is sited and interfaced 
with the Grid and the world outside the plant boundary. rNPP Functionalities 1, 2, and 3 
would all be enabled by designing rNPPs with the capability to buffer the NPP from and 
moderate the coupling of Grid anomalies (transmission load and offsite power quality) into 
the NPP. How might this be accomplished?  
 
The U.S. Grid consists of three Interconnections (Eastern, Western, and the Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas) that are connected via direct current (DC-DC) interties and 
variable frequency transformer (VFT)-based interties. Among other things, this intertie 
technology decouples Grid frequency and voltage anomalies in one Grid Interconnection 
from the other. This same principle could be employed to accomplish similar goals for an 
rNPP and the Grid it serves.  DC-DC bridges or VFT bridges (rather than traditional AC-AC 
interfaces) could be employed in the plant’s switchyard. This approach would buffer the 
rNPP from offsite transmission system and offsite power system voltage and frequency 
transients the plant might not otherwise be capable of tolerating. Depending on the manner 
in which they are implemented, the use of DC-DC and VFT rNPP-Grid interfaces could 
require or enable extensive redesign of many of the plant’s electrical systems. While there 
is a natural tendency to view this as a negative factor, it could also be viewed as an 
opportunity to rethink and improve some aspects of the nuclear power plant’s overall 
electrical design. Thus, it is difficult to assess the impact of this plant interface approach on 
overall performance and cost until (at least) preconceptual rNPP electrical system designs 
are developed.  
 
6.5.2 Substitution/Switching Of High-Capacity Load And Heat Rejection 
The ability of a power plant to substitute an alternate thermal or electrical load when 
confronted with a loss of load event would reduce the severity of reactor power maneuvers 
required to cope with such events. This concept is, of course, the basis for the incorporation 
of robust turbine bypass and high-capacity main steam condenser systems in existing 
commercial PWRs. Current PWRs also dump steam directly to the atmosphere via special 
main steam relief values during reactor startup and plant trips. However, neither of these 
systems is designed for sustained continuous operation at high power [6.8]. rNPP  
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designers could expand the use of this load switching concept to enable rNPPs to avoid 
reactor scram and continue to operate at relatively high power levels (whether connected to 
the Grid or in Island Mode) in the face of extreme load anomalies.   
 
One approach to achieve this functionality would be to utilize high-capacity turbine 
bypass/condenser systems and main steam dump systems designed for high-capacity, 
sustained, and continuous operation. While the use of large steam bypass/condenser 
systems moderate the reactor power ramp rate and cutback power levels required to cope 
with load rejections, the use of large condensers can actually complicate the attainment of 
stable (low reactor power) Island Mode operation. Large condenser systems are subject to 
unstable condenser behavior when operated at low powers, along with the accompanying 
thermomechanical stresses and associated risk of accelerated equipment aging. This issue 
would be a design consideration both for large reactors coupled to large condensers, and 
clusters of small reactors coupled to a common large condenser. However, multiple 
reactor/condenser configurations are possible:  
1. Several reactors coupled to a single large condenser. 
2. One reactor coupled to one condenser.  
3. Hybrid configurations in which one housekeeping reactor module is coupled to its 
own condenser while the remaining reactor modules share common (large) 
condensers.   
 
Detailed design studies would, of course, be required in order to understand the 
performance (real time and life time) tradeoffs of different reactor/condenser configurations. 
Any realized performance benefits would come with the cost implications of foregoing the 
economies of scale associated with large condensers. 
 
Another option would be to incorporate some form of electric load dump for some portion of 
the load. This concept of course underlies the use of pumped storage hydroelectricity, 
electric-driven flywheel storage systems, etc. However, it is difficult to envision how such 
systems could be acceptably interfaced to the rNPP from both the technical and economic 
perspectives.  
 
rNPPs that are employed for combined electricity and process heat production or as 
elements of “hybrid energy systems” could be designed with the ability to dynamically 
allocate electricity and process heat loads (or thermal energy storage [6.11]) in the event of 
Grid load disruptions – presuming their process heat customers could tolerate such  
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operations. The insertion of shared multi-reactor thermal energy storage reservoirs between 
the reactors and their power conversion systems, or between an rNPP employed for 
process heat generation and its process heat transmission/distribution system, would buffer 
the reactor system from variations in process heat demand, and serve as a process heat 
collection point for multi-reactor plant configurations. Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s 
incorporation of a shared thermal energy reservoir for collection and storage of the thermal 
output in its multi-unit SmAHTR plant concept is an example of the later approach [6.12].   
6.5.3 Multi-Module (Reactor) NPP System Architecture 
The use of multiple reactor modules to achieve the rNPP “nameplate” electrical generating 
capacity (rNPP Design Feature 3 in Table 6.2) is perhaps the single most enabling design 
feature of an rNPP. This approach is incorporated in NPP designs currently proposed by 
NuScale Power [6.13].  Modularity potentially enables attainment of several rNPP 
Functional Requirements. Individual reactor modules in an rNPP could conceivably be 
powered up and down to enhance the plant’s overall load-following capability (rNPP 
Functional Requirement 1). The multi-module plant design architecture would also enable 
one reactor module (when coupled with the necessary electrical system design features) to 
supply housekeeping and shutdown cooling power to other reactor modules in the rNPP – 
thus enabling Island Mode operations and enhancing shutdown decay heat removal 
functionality (rNPP Functional Requirements 4 and 5). Such a design would also enable 
one reactor module to supply cranking power to other reactor modules (rNPP Functional 
Requirement 6). Additionally, the use of multi-reactor modules reduces the size of the 
cranking power supply required to restart the entire rNPP by limiting it to that needed to 
crank one reactor module (also enabling attainment of rNPP Functional Requirement 6).  
Finally, the use of multiple (smaller) reactor modules potentially reduces the plant’s accident 
source term for certain types of accidents. NuScale Power has already sought (and been 
granted) some regulatory relief from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) based 
in part on this multi-reactor/multi-module design feature [6.13–6.15]. 
6.5.4 Small Reactor (Module) Size 
The use of small (less than ~ 1 GWt) reactors in each rNPP reactor module (rNPP Enabling 
Design Feature 4 in Table 6.2) enables attainment of multiple rNPP Functional 
Requirements. Small reactor size would enable a single reactor module in a multi-module 
rNPP to operate at near-normal power levels while supplying housekeeping loads for the 
other reactor modules – potentially enabling Island Mode operations (rNPP Functional 
Requirement 4). rNPP Functional Requirement 5 is enabled by reducing the shutdown 
	
116 
decay heat removal demands of individual modules – preferably to levels achievable with 
inherently passive cooling approaches. The cranking power requirement for a small (~ 200 
MWt) light water-cooled reactor concept could be as low as 1-3 MWe [6.16]. As previously 
discussed, such low cranking power requirements would enable the rNPP to utilize both 
large diesel generators and non-traditional cranking and shutdown cooling power supplies. 
6.5.5 Adaptive Turbine-Generator Systems  
Despite not being located in the plant’s switchyard, the terminals of the rNPP’s generator 
are in many respects the plant’s principle interface to the Grid. The use of “adaptive” 
turbine-generator systems (rNPP Enabling Design Feature 5 in Table 6.2) having a robust 
ability to tolerate Grid voltage, frequency, and reactive power anomalies would enhance a 
plant’s ability to load follow, avoid damage in response to Grid anomalies, avoid reactor 
scram (rNPP Functional Requirements 1–3), and enable the use of the rNPP as a black 
start resource presuming rNPP Functional Requirement 6 is met. This approach would 
require a rethinking of NPP turbine-generator system design – the physical and electrical 
design of turbines and generators, Turbine-Governor Control (TGC) schemes, Grid 
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) schemes, etc. Such systems would require enhanced 
MVAR flexibility to deal with real/reactive power swings, and to reduce their susceptibility to 
self-excitation – a particular risk should plants be employed as black start units or energy 
resources during the early stages of Grid recovery and restoration in the wake of major Grid 
anomalies. 
6.5.6 Passive Shutdown Cooling 
Passive shutdown cooling (rNPP Design Feature 6 in Table 6.2) reduces individual reactor 
and overall NPP shutdown cooling power requirements. This directly impacts the plant’s 
ability to achieve rNPP Functional Requirement 5 (Unlimited Independent Shutdown 
Cooling Capability). As noted in Section 6.4, NPPs are currently considered priority loads 
during the early stages of Grid recovery operations. The incorporation of reliable passive 
shutdown cooling would reduce the urgency with which offsite power must be restored to 
the NPPs in Grid de-energization events. This would, in turn, enable Grid operators to focus 
more attention and resources on gaining situational awareness and damage assessment 
during the earliest stage of Grid recovery operations. 
6.5.7 Inherent Reactor System Energy Storage Capacity 
The inherent energy storage capacity (i.e. bulk heat capacity) of the reactor’s primary 
coolant system (nuclear steam supply system in traditional Rankine cycle power NPPs) and 
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the associated system thermal inertia have a significant influence on the reactor system’s 
dynamic response to load transients. Higher bulk heat capacity and thermal inertial buffers 
the reactor from load variations by slowing the thermodynamic response of the primary 
coolant system to load changes. These features enhance the dynamic stability of a reactor 
system and reduce the severity of the safety challenge posed by operating transients and 
accidents. These features, coupled with the reactor’s intrinsic reactivity feedback 
characteristics and the actions of the reactor power control system, have a dominant impact 
on the reactor’s rapid power maneuvering capability. Thus, the thermal design and the 
neutronic/core physics design of the reactor system are tightly coupled.  Many of the 
attractive behavioral attributes of graphite reactors, liquid-metal cooled reactors, and liquid 
salt/molten salt reactors are artifacts of their high primary cooling system heat capacity and 
thermal inertia. 
 
The inherent heat capacity and thermal inertia of the reactor’s primary coolant system are 
(for a single phase system) functions of the specific heat and thermal conductivity of the 
materials of construction and the mass of the system. These factors are, in turn, dictated by 
several related primary coolant system design features:  
1. System architecture (volume in particular). 
2. Choice of reactor fuel, coolant/working fluid and structural materials. 
3. The reactor’s thermodynamic operating state (temperature/pressure/phase). 
 
These design choices also drive pumping power requirements (and therefore cranking and 
housekeeping loads), system heatup and cool down rate capabilities (plant startup 
behavior), and other plant operational characteristics. All of these design choices impact the 
plant’s ability to achieve rNPP Functional Requirements 1–4.  Of course high system heat 
capacity and thermal inertia generally translate to higher system cost because the attributes 
are a function of the size and mass of the primary coolant and reactor system. 
6.5.8 Optimized Reactor Core Physics Design 
An rNPP should have robust flexible operation and load-following capability, Island Mode 
Operation capability, and start/restart capability throughout its entire fuel cycle from reload 
to reload in order to achieve rNPP Functional Requirements 1–4 and 6. Provision of these 
functionalities near the end of a fuel reload cycle (when core excess reactivity is low) would 
be a design challenge. These functionalities could be enabled by reactivity control 
strategies involving various combinations of fission spectrum, physical dimensions, lattice 
pitch (in solid fuel designs), fuel enrichment, reactivity feedback coefficients, and fixed 
burnable and soluble neutron absorbers (neutron poisons). As previously stated, these 
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design decisions must be made in concert with decisions that impact the reactor systems 
inherent energy storage capacity and thermal inertia. 
6.5.9 Robust Nuclear Fuels 
Robust nuclear fuels (from the thermomechanical and chemical perspectives) would 
enhance the rNPPs load-following capability during normal operation, enable rapid power 
ramping and transition into Island Mode operations, and facilitate prompt reactor restart in 
the event of plant shutdowns. Nuclear fuels with these characteristics would directly enable 
rNPP Functional Requirements 1–5. Much of the work currently underway in the federal and 
private sectors to develop “Accident Tolerant Fuels” for light water reactors [6.17, 6.18] is 
directly applicable to this requirement.  
6.5.10 Plant Electric, Instrumentation And Control (I&C), And Computer 
Technologies That Are Resilient In Face of GMD, EMP, And Cyber Attack 
Extreme naturally occurring GMDs (such as the 1859 Carrington Event), along with EMP 
attacks and cyber attacks, would present special challenges to all U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure – especially the Grid. The ability of an rNPP to survive and continue to 
function in the wake of such events would enable the plant to serve as the foundation for 
recovery and restoration of regional Grid and Critical Infrastructure functionality during 
circumstances the nation has never before confronted.  Thus the adoption of rNPP and 
rNPP–Grid interface technologies that are resilient in the face of extreme GMD events, 
EMP attacks, and cyber attacks would greatly magnify the rNPP’s value to society. 
6.6 Realization Of rNPPs – Other Critical Considerations 
Work to date on the rNPP concept has focused on identification and characterization of 
rNPP Key Attributes; high level rNPP functional requirements; and identification of relevant 
and enabling rNPP system architectures, components, and technologies. Other critical 
issues such as rNPP regulatory barriers, siting considerations, and economics are also 
important determinants of overall rNPP viability.  Although detailed evaluations of these 
issues cannot proceed until (at least preconceptual) rNPP designs are available, a few 
initial observations are evident.   
6.6.1 rNPPs And The U.S. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework 
The development and deployment of rNPPs will take place in the context of evolving 
nuclear safety regulatory frameworks. One immediate question that arises is, “How 
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compatible are the rNPP Functional Requirements proposed in Section 6.4 with the existing 
U.S. NRC regulatory framework?”   
 
The Six rNPP Functional Requirements and the enabling rNPP design features discussed 
earlier present some obvious points of tension/conflict with the sixty-four General Design 
Criteria (GDCs) in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A [6.19] and the manner in which these GDCs are 
currently implemented via various regulatory guidelines and standards. It is clear departures 
from traditional design approaches for executing various rNPP safety functions will be both 
required and justified in some instances.   
 
One obvious area of regulatory tension will stem from GDC-17, entitled “Electric Power 
Systems”. GDC-17 defines the high-level functional requirements and the system 
architecture all U.S. NPP’s electrical power systems must meet. The requirements of GDC-
17 are implemented via U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.32 [6.20], IEEE Standard 308-2012, 
“Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” [6.21], and 
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93 [6.22]. Briefly summarized, GDC-17 mandates that each NPP 
must have both an onsite and offsite power supply to permit functioning of all structures, 
systems, and components required to assure (1) acceptable fuel design limits and design 
conditions for the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of 
anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) the core is adequately cooled and containment 
integrity along with other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.   
 
Island Mode operations, shutdown cooling, and self-cranking during a “dark-Grid” condition 
would all require the rNPP to operate in the absence of any offsite power supply. However, 
an rNPP possessing independent shutdown cooling capability, Island Mode operation 
capability, and self-cranking capability could not operate in those modes in the U.S. today 
because such operation would violate current offsite power mandates stemming from GDC-
17. Thus, achievement of rNPP Functional Requirements 4 (Island Mode Capability), 5 
(Unlimited Independent Shutdown Cooling Capability), and 6 (Self-Cranking Capability) 
would all be impeded by the current wording of GDC-17 and its associated implementation 
practices.    
 
It is anticipated that rNPPs would not require offsite power in order to successfully execute 
any required safety function, so an exemption from offsite power requirements stemming 
from GDC-17 would be justified. Indeed, the U.S. NRC recently granted NuScale Power’s 
request for exemption from the Class 1E electrical system requirements emanating from 
GDC-17 [6.23–6.25]. That waiver is specific to NuScale Power and not a general 
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modification of the regulatory requirements arising from GDC-17. However, the NRC’s 
willingness to grant NuScale’s request demonstrates their willingness to depart from 
traditional interpretations of GDC requirements when plant design and performance 
features justify such actions.  
 
The operating characteristics of future rNPPs would probably also justify either exemptions 
from, or modification of regulatory requirements originating from other GDCs – or at least 
the traditional interpretation and implementation of the GDCs. In any case, it is evident the 
operational characteristics and functional capabilities of rNPPs should enable some 
simplification of the current U.S. nuclear power plant General Design Criteria and the 
associated U.S. commercial nuclear power regulatory framework. 
6.6.2 rNPP Siting Considerations 
Siting flexibility is an important consideration for rNPPs because much of their potential 
utility and value depends on the ability to site them at optimal locations within the Grid (i.e., 
in close proximity to existing transmission line corridors and/or other Critical Infrastructure). 
An rNPP that could meet the Six rNPP Functional Requirements discussed in Section 6.4 
would differ from current NPPs in ways that should expand rNPP siting options.   
 
rNPPs will not require offsite power to maintain fuel integrity and safe shutdown status 
(reactor and spent fuel pool cooling), thereby reducing or eliminating the requirement for 
offsite power supplies and, at least theoretically, reducing the contribution to overall core 
damage probability from such accidents. As noted above, by granting NuScale Power’s 
recent request for exemption from normal Class 1E electrical power system requirements, 
the NRC has signaled its willingness to eliminate this requirement when the plant’s design 
merits such action. Thus, all else being equal, risk-based siting practices should broaden 
the siting opportunities for rNPPs. 
 
rNPPs that employ multiple small reactor modules might benefit from three siting 
advantages: 
1. Smaller emergency planning zones (EPZs) – The accident source term for any 
individual reactor is reduced due to its smaller unit size. The manner in which this 
impacts overall accident source terms and plant safety risk profiles will be a design-
specific factor related to reactor size, operational interdependence/independence of 
the reactor units, containment design, and a number of other detailed design 
considerations. Here again, NuScale Power’s request to reduce the emergency 
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planning zone (EPZ) for their multi-module SMR plant is a pathfinder activity directly 
relevant to rNPPs [6.13–6.15]. 
2. Reduced need for cooling water for rNPPs that employ “dry” or other non-traditional 
heat rejection techniques. Geographic proximity to major estuaries and reservoirs 
would be a less dominant siting criterion in such cases. 
3. Decreased vulnerability to some natural hazards and man-made malevolent threats 
as a result of below-grade and underground siting enabled by the smaller physical 
size of individual rNPP reactor modules. 
6.6.3 rNPP Economics 
Many will assume the rNPP functionalities in Section 6.4 and the design approaches 
identified in Section 6.5 will render the plants too expensive to build and uneconomical to 
operate. This may indeed be the case.  But economics of rNPPs will be a function of both 
their cost (capital, operating, etc.) and the monetized value (energy, capacity, reliability, 
resilience) they provide. rNPPs are envisioned as elements of a “Future Grid” in which a 
power plant’s Grid resilience contribution is monetized and compensated in some manner.   
 
Expansion of nuclear power’s value proposition – from simply supplying baseload electricity 
to enhancing Grid resilience – is a significant expansion in nuclear power plant 
performance. History suggests that system performance and system capital costs are not 
independent parameters. Whether it’s home appliances, automobiles, aerospace vehicles, 
or nuclear power plants – higher performance systems are often accompanied by higher 
system complexity and higher capital cost. Offsetting this reality is the possibility the Six 
rNPP Functional Requirements and their resultant performance attributes, combined with 
creative rNPP design approaches, may enable rNPP designers to simplify or eliminate 
some current systems and components. The elimination of Class 1E electrical systems is 
one example. Additionally, the likely use of multiple small reactor modules should facilitate 
factory fabrication of some components and systems.  Some cost savings could also 
accrue via innovative rNPP field construction techniques.    
 
With regard to operating expenses, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), published an analysis of impacts of load-following on existing 
nuclear power plants [6.7] which concluded: “Generally speaking… the operation in the 
load-following mode does not lead to any large additional costs attributable to it… 
especially for recent power plants.  However, there is some influence of the load-following 
on the ageing of some operational components (e.g., valves), and one can expect a slight 
increase of the maintenance costs.”  
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This OECD conclusion relates primarily to rNPP Functional Requirement 1 (Robust 
Real/Reactive Load-Following and Flexible Operation Capability) and conceivably to rNPP 
Functional Requirement 4 (Island Mode Operations) for “evolutionary” rNPP concepts 
employing incremental changes in the current commercial light water reactor technology 
suite. The OECD analysis is limited in that it addresses only one element of overall plant 
operating and maintenance costs.  It is unclear how the OECD’s observations might apply 
to future rNPPs.   
 
Today’s commercial power reactors and future rNPPs must perform in demanding real-time 
economic environments in which plant costs are tangible, while the benefits and value 
stream produced by the plants is only partially monetized. The revenue stream of current 
U.S. nuclear power plants is derived from their baseload electricity generation.  Recent 
activities within and between the Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and the private sector [6.26–6.28] have heightened awareness of NPPs’ 
capacity, reliability, and Grid resilience contributions – as well as catalyzed a dialog 
regarding the societal value of and appropriate mechanisms for monetizing these 
contributions. Thus, resolution of rNPP economic viability questions ultimately rests on the 
characteristics of the future electricity markets served by the rNPPs. 
6.7 Summary 
The nature of the NPP–electric Grid system; the concept of Grid resilience; and the 
potential of current U.S. nuclear power plants to enhance U.S. Grid, integrated Critical 
Infrastructure, and societal resilience have been explored in previous analyses [6.1–6.3]. 
This paper builds upon that foundation to provide a preliminary technical definition of rNPPs 
– nuclear power plants that are intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a 
manner to enhance Grid resilience.   
 
rNPPs would possess two essential attributes: (1) they would enable the Grid to absorb and 
adapt to a broad spectrum of Grid anomalies and upsets; and (2) they would enhance the 
Grid’s ability to quickly recover from upsets to restore electric service in a manner 
consistent with the system operator’s load prioritization hierarchy. Six qualitative rNPP 
Functional Requirements have been defined. The integrated package of Six rNPP 
Functional Requirements would enable a future plant to provide value to the Grid and to 
society well beyond that associated with today’s baseload electricity production. However, 
the package of Six rNPP Functional Requirements are not an “all or nothing” prospect.  
Future NPPs do not have to achieve all six of the functional requirements in order to deliver 
significant Grid resilience benefits. The Grid resilience value of a specific NPP would 
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depend both upon which of the Six rNPP Functional Requirements it achieves, and the 
characteristics of the Grid into which it is embedded.   
 
rNPPs are not technically out of reach in the first half of the 21st century. Several rNPP 
plant, system, and component design features with the potential to enable plants to achieve 
the Six rNPP Functional Requirements have been identified and characterized in a 
preliminary manner. While issues related to rNPP regulatory barriers, siting, and economics 
have been addressed in a superficial manner, detailed evaluation of these issues can only 
proceed in concert with rNPP conceptual design activities. 
 
Admiral Hyman Rickover famously contrasted “Academic Reactors” and “Practical 
Reactors” in his 1953 memorandum [6.29]. Advocates of new reactor concepts such as 
rNPPs ignore Rickover’s analysis to their own peril. On the other hand, skeptics unwisely 
persist in employing Rickover’s analysis as an antidote to innovation in the face of changing 
realities.  The last quarter of the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st century have 
hosted a number of events and developments that ended two “nuclear renaissances”. 
Deregulation of electricity markets, fracking and inexpensive natural gas, the accident at 
Fukushima, the wind and solar energy revolution, and cost overruns at the latest U.S. 
commercial nuclear power plant construction projects are among the factors that have led 
many to question the future of nuclear power and its value to society. These developments 
suggest the value proposition of nuclear energy must improve in the 21st century if it is to 
remain a major source of electricity throughout the world. rNPPs would enhance electric 
Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience in a world inhabited by a plethora of 
natural hazards and malevolent human threats. That is a value proposition worthy of 
consideration.  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The work described in this paper has been conducted by the author in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the PhD in Energy Science and Engineering at the University of 
Tennessee Knoxville (UTK). The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and 
support of Howard L. Hall, Director, Institute for Nuclear Security, and Governor’s Chair 
Professor of Nuclear Engineering at UTK—with whom the author is working to explore the 
nexus of Grid resilience, nuclear power, and national and homeland security. 
 
 
	
124 
ORCID 
Sherrell R. Greene http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4661-4705 
  
	
125 
Chapter 6 References 
 
6.1. S. R. GREENE, “Nuclear Power: Black Sky Liability or Black Sky Asset?” Int. J. 
Nucl. Security, 2, 3 (2016); https://doi.org/10.7290/V78913SR  
 
6.2. S. R. GREENE, “Enhancing Electric Grid and Critical Infrastructure Resilience with 
Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs),” Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc., 117 (2017). 
 
6.3. S. R. GREENE, “Are Current U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Grid Resilience 
Assets?,” NuclearTechnology, 202, 1 (2018); 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2018.1432966  
 
6.4. “Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System,” The National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017); 
https://doi.org/10.17226/24836  
 
6.5. G. SANSAVINI, “Engineering Resilience in Critical Infrastructures,” SET-NAV 
Project (Apr. 2017); http://www.set-nav.eu/content/set-nav-discussion-paper 
 
6.6. The Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plant, Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation Water Reactor Division (1984). 
 
6.7. Technical and Economic Aspects of Load-following with Nuclear Power Plants, 
OECD-NEA (June 2011); https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/reports/2011/load-
following-npp.pdf  
 
6.8. Program on Technology Innovation: Approach to Transition Nuclear Power Plants to 
Flexible Power Operations, Final Report 3002002612, Electric Power Research 
Institute. (January 2014); 
https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002002612/  
 
6.9. “Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, NEI-12-06, 
Rev. 3, Nuclear Energy Institute (2016). 
 
6.10. Severe Impact Resilience: Consideration and Recommendations, Severe Impact 
Resilience Task Force Report, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (9 
May 2012). 
	
126 
6.11. Charles FORSBERG, Stephen BRICK, and Geoffrey HARATYK, Coupling heat 
storage to nuclear reactors for variable electricity output with baseload reactor 
operation,” The Electricity Journal 31 (2018) 23-31 (2018); 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2018.03.008  
 
6.12. S. R. GREENE, J. C. GEHIN, D. H. HOLCOMB, et. al., Pre-Conceptual Design of a 
Fluoride-Salt-Cooled Small Modular Advanced High-Temperature Reactor 
(SmAHTR), ORNL/TM-2010/199, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (December 2010);  
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1008830/  
 
6.13. NuScale Standard Plant Design Certification Application, Chapter Twenty One, 
Multi-Module Design Considerations, Part 2 – Tier 2, Revision 0, NuScale Power 
(December 2016); https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1701/ML17013A292.pdf (current as 
of 2 April 2018). 
 
6.14. Methodology for Establishing the Technical Basis for Plume Exposure Emergency 
Planning Zones at NuScale Small Modular Reactor Plant Sites, Licensing topical 
Report TR-0915-17772-NP, Rev. 0, NuScale Power, LLC (December 2015); 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1535/ML15356A842.pdf  
 
6.15. Methodology for Establishing the Technical Basis for Plume Exposure Emergency 
Planning Zones at NuScale Small Modular Reactor Plant Sites, Licensing topical 
Report TR-0915-17772-NP, Rev. 1, NuScale Power, LLC (March 2018); 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1807/ML18071A354.pdf  
 
6.16. Sherrell R. GREENE, Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs) – Potential Building 
Blocks of U.S. Electric Grid and Critical Infrastructure Resilience, ATI-TR-2017-14, 
Advanced Technology Insights, LLC (2 April 2018). 
 
6.17. Kristopher CUMMINGS and Jack GROBE, “Accident Tolerant Fuel – Developing an 
Efficient Approval Process,” Nuclear Energy Institute briefing to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (7 September 2017); 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1725/ML17255A004.pdf  
 
6.18. Bill MCCAUGHEY, “Status of DOE’s Accident Tolerant Fuel Program,” Department 
of Energy briefing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (27 February 2018); 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1805/ML18057A187.pdf  
	
127 
6.19. U.S. Federal Code of Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design 
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants; http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/cfr/part050/part050-appa.html  
 
6.20.   Regulatory Guideline 1.32, Criteria For Safety-Related Electric Power Systems For 
Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (2004); 
http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0406/ML040680488.pdf  
 
6.21. IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating 
Stations, IEEE-308-2012, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, (2012). 
 
6.22. Regulatory Guideline 1.93, Availability of Electrical Power Supplies, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (2012); 
http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0905/ML090550661.pdf  
 
6.23. NuScale Standard Plant Design Certification Application, Chapter Eight, Electric 
Power, Part 2 – Tier 2, Revision 0, NuScale Power (December 2016); 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1701/ML17013A279.pdf (current as of 27 April 
2018). 
 
6.24. SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE NUSCALE POWER, LLC TOPICAL REPORT TR-
0815-16497-0, “SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF PASSIVE NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTSEMS,” REVISION 1, United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards memo to Mr. Victor M. 
McCree, Executive Director for Operations, (26 July 2017); 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1720/ML17205A380.pdf  
 
6.25. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approves Key Safety Aspect to NuScale 
Power’s Advanced Reactor Design, NuScale Power, LLC (9 January 2018); 
http://www.nuscalepower.com/pdf/key-safety-approved.pdf (current as of 27 
April 2018). 
 
 
 
 
	
128 
6.26. Rick PERRY memo to Neil CHATTERJEE, et. al, Secretary of Energy’s Direction 
that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Issue Grid Resilience Rules 
Pursuant to the Secretary’s Authority Under Section 403 of the Department of 
Energy Organization Act (28 September 2017); 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f37/Secretary%20Rick%20P
erry%27s%20Letter%20to%20the%20Federal%20Energy%20Regulatory%2
0Commission.pdf  
 
6.27. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and 
Establishing Additional Procedures, RM18-1-000, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (8 January 2018); 
https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/OpenNat.asp?fileID=14792904  
 
6.28. Christopher SMITH (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) on behalf of FirstEnergy 
Solutions Corp., Request for Emergency Order Pursuant to Federal Power Act 
Section 202(c) (29 March 2018); 
https://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/fes-202c-
application.pdf (current as of 30 April 2018) 
 
6.29. H. G. RICKOVER, Untitled Memo (5 June 1953) 
http://ecolo.org/documents/documents_in_english/Rickover.pdf (current as of 
30 April 2018). 
 
  
	
129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 ENHANCING ELECTRIC GRID, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 
AND SOCIETAL RESILIENCE WITH RESILIENT NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANTS (rNPPs)               
 
 
  
	
130 
This chapter is based on the Author’s Original Manuscript of a paper that has been 
submitted to the American Nuclear Society’s journal Nuclear Technology and is currently 
under peer review. 
 
This paper describes four resilience-enhancing applications of future U.S. rNPPs, contains 
the product of research Task 6, and presents the answers to Research Question 5: 
 
Concerning future rNPPs and the Grid they will serve: What specific applications of 
rNPPs might enhance their overall contribution to electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, 
and societal resilience? 
 
The paper is presented here without revisions to the author’s manuscript other than those 
required to conform to UTK dissertation format and style requirements. 
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Chapter 7 Abstract 
 
This paper is the fourth in a series detailing the results of a study conducted to explore the 
role current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants play, and the role a new type of nuclear 
power plant – a resilient nuclear power plant or “rNPP” – could play, in enhancing U.S. 
electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience. An rNPP is a nuclear power 
plant intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a manner to enhance Grid 
resilience. Four specific rNPP applications are discussed: (1) rNPPs as “flexible operations” 
electricity generation assets, (2) rNPPs as anchors of nuclear hybrid energy systems, (3) 
rNPPs as Grid Black Start Resources, and (4) rNPPs as anchors of Resilient Critical 
Infrastructure Islands. These four applications, individually and collectively, could enhance 
U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience during normal day-to-day 
operations, and in the wake of major national disasters stemming from natural phenomena 
and/or malevolent human actions. rNPPs would be both tactical and strategic resilience 
assets – thereby extending the value proposition of nuclear energy well beyond that 
associated with nuclear power’s traditional baseload electricity generation. These are 
important topics as society grows increasingly dependent on electricity and the natural 
hazard–malevolent human threat portfolio to the Grid continues to evolve. Thus the value of 
and need for nuclear energy in the 21st century may depend in part on the whether rNPPs 
can be successfully developed. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Electric Grid resilience is a subject of growing importance in the U.S. and abroad as modern 
societies continue to expand their dependence on electric power and the infrastructure that 
generates and delivers it [7.1]. (The term “Grid,” with or without the “electric” modifier, is 
employed in this paper to refer to the integrated system of electricity generation, storage, 
transmission, and distribution assets required to deliver electricity to the end-user.) Issues 
such as the basic definition of “Grid resilience,” how Grid resilience can be measured and 
estimated, the value of Grid resilience to society, how Grid resilience can be monetized, 
and how Grid resilience can be achieved and secured, have recently attracted significant 
attention in the U.S. [7.2–7.4]. 
 
This paper is the last in a series of four papers presenting the results of a study conducted 
to examine key issues related to electric Grid resilience and nuclear power’s current and 
potential future role in enabling Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience. The 
study was structured to address four specific questions: 
1. What role do current U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) play in enabling Grid 
recovery and restoration in the wake of major Grid anomalies and blackouts [7.5]? 
2. What is electric Grid resilience and to what extent are current U.S. NPPs Grid 
resilience assets – electric generating plants that enable and enhance Grid 
resilience [7.6]?  
3. What type of future NPP (its attributes, functional requirements, and design 
features) would be a significant Grid resilience asset – a resilient nuclear power 
plant or “rNPP” [7.7]? 
4. What future rNPP applications could contribute in meaningful ways to enhancing 
U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience?  
 
Previous papers [7.5–7.7] have addressed Questions 1–3.  This paper presents the study’s 
results with regard to Question 4. 
 
Section 7.2 briefly summarizes the point of departure for consideration of rNPP applications 
– the demonstrated performance of today’s U.S. commercial nuclear power fleet, and one 
key strategic attribute of all nuclear power plants. Section 7.3 provides the context for 
examination of Question 4 by summarizing the working definition of Grid resilience 
developed in the study, the definition and key performance attributes of rNPPs, and the Six 
rNPP Functional Requirements.  
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Sections 7.4–7.7 discuss four potential rNPP applications that would significantly enhance 
Grid and societal resilience while transforming the value proposition of nuclear energy in the 
21st century. These applications are:  
1. rNPP “flexible operations” (Section 7.4). 
2. rNPP-based “hybrid nuclear energy systems” (Section 7.5). 
3. rNPPs serving as Grid Black Start Resources (Section 7.6).  
4. rNPP-based Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCIIs) (Section 7.7). 
 
Though not the focus of the study, Section 7.8 discusses a few important economic 
challenges related to monetization of Grid resilience and realization of rNPPs.  Section 7.9 
summarizes the main points of the paper. 
7.2 Nuclear Power’s Demonstrated Performance And Promise 
This section briefly summarizes the demonstrated performance of current commercial 
nuclear power plants and one key attribute of nuclear power that is of strategic significance 
with respect to future Grid resilience applications of rNPPs. These, and other, intrinsic 
features of today’s NPPs are a foundation upon which rNPP functionalities can be built. 
7.2.1 Nuclear Power’s Demonstrated Performance 
Today’s commercial nuclear power plants exhibit a suite of operational and performance 
characteristics which are the basis for nuclear power’s current role in Grid operations.  
From a tactical day-to-day perspective, nuclear power plants are low carbon energy 
sources capable of continuous “24x7” operation day and night. NPPs exhibit high-capacity 
factors (~92% in 2017, compared to 37% for Grid-scale wind generation systems and 27% 
for Grid-scale solar photovoltaic systems) [7.8]. Transitioning from the tactical to the 
strategic perspective, NPPs have on multiple occasions demonstrated their ability to 
operate during extreme weather events that either degraded or completely shutdown 
operations at fossil-fired generating plants in the same geographical region [7.9–7.10].  
7.2.2 NPP Fuel Security And Secure Fuel Power Sources  
The potential value of rNPPs as Grid and societal resilience assets stems not only from the 
discriminating performance attributes of rNPPs, but also from a fundamental attribute of all 
nuclear power plants.  Nuclear power plants are unique from all other steam-cycle electric 
power plants in one respect – their “fuel security”. Table 7.1 summarizes typical steam 
cycle power plants’ onsite fuel inventory in terms of the plant operating (electrical power  
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Table 7.1  Typical Steam Cycle Power Plant Fuel Inventories [7.1] 
 
Steam Plant 
Type 
Typical Onsite Fuel 
Supply 
 (Days) 
Fuel 
Replenishment 
Mechanism 
Gas-Fired < 1 Pipeline 
Oil-Fired < 7 Pipeline & Truck 
Coal-Fired 30-90 Truck, Rail, Barge 
Nuclear ~ 365* Truck 
 
 
*Assumes mid-point of 2-year refueling cycle 
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generation) time the onsite fuel inventory enables. Nuclear power plants’ onsite (“in-
reactor”) fuel inventories far exceed that of other steam cycle plants.  Why is this fuel 
security attribute such an important feature with respect to societal, Critical Infrastructure, 
and Grid resilience? 
 
A Black Sky Event (a long-duration de-energization of the U.S. Grid’s Interconnections or 
other large geographic regions) would almost certainly challenge the ability of Grid 
operators to reliably resupply fuel (oil, natural gas, coal) to fossil-fueled power plants [7.5].  
Once restarted in the wake of a wide-spread failure, the ability of the Grid to stay energized 
will depend in part on the ability of Grid operators to refuel power generation facilities.  This 
is where the unique fuel security attribute of NPPs could become a differentiating Grid 
resilience asset. Hydroelectric dams and combustion turbine power plants would certainly 
have an important role to play in Black Sky Grid recovery. However, the onsite fuel 
inventory of a combustion turbine power plant is quite limited.  Hydroelectric generation is, 
at its limit, reduced to “run of river” generating capability.  Nuclear power plants are secure 
fuel power generation resources that could power the Grid and other major Critical 
Infrastructure functions in a sustained manner during prolonged post-Grid-disruption 
periods when fuel sources for other generating facilities might not be available. Thus the 
expanded functionality of rNPPs, combined with nuclear power’s intrinsic fuel security, 
could enable rNPPs to serve not only as Black Start Resources for the Grid, but as Black 
Start Resources for the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and society as a whole in the wake of 
national calamities.   
7.3 Context For Consideration Of Potential rNPP Applications 
7.3.1 Grid Resilience Definition 
There is currently no consensus definition of “Grid resilience” among various industry, 
regulatory, customer, and policymaker stakeholders [7.1]. The definition of Grid resilience 
utilized in this study is derived from the following generic definition of system resilience: 
“System resilience is the ability of a system to withstand a change or a disruptive event by 
reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them 
(adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative capability)” [7.11]. With 
this in mind, the definition of Grid resilience adopted in this study is, “Electric Grid 
resilience is the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers 
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.” [7.6] Thus Grid resilience is defined in 
consideration of the reality that all electric loads served by the Grid are not of equal 
priority/value, and the impacts of failure to serve various loads are dependent on the nature 
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of the loads (customer class, specific societal function associated with the load, etc.). 
Readers are referred to Reference 7.6 for a detailed discussion to the concepts of generic 
system and Grid resilience. 
7.3.2 rNPP Definition And Two Key rNPP Attributes 
The concept of rNPPs is “use-inspired” – one that evolves from a philosophy that NPPs can 
and should serve the Grid and society in ways that transcend traditional baseload electric 
power generation. Indeed, “rNPPs are nuclear power plants intentionally designed, sited, 
interfaced, and operated to enhance Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience.” 
[7.7]  In light of the definitions of generic system and Grid resilience articulated in Section 
7.3.1, two basic attributes of rNPPs have been defined [7.7]: 
1. rNPP Key Attribute 1 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to absorb and adapt to a 
broad spectrum of Grid anomalies and upsets.  
2. rNPP Key Attribute 2 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to recover from upsets, and 
to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s load 
prioritization hierarchy. 
7.3.3 Six rNPP Functional Requirements  
The Six rNPP Functional Requirements are defined in a preliminary qualitative manner in 
Table 7.2 [7.7]. This package of Six rNPP Functional Requirements define a plant 
performance envelope that substantially exceeds that of existing commercial nuclear power 
plants. While considerable work remains to be done to quantify terms such as “robust,” 
“flexible,” and “immunity” as employed in Table 7.2, it is evident an rNPP possessing all, or 
even some of these functional capabilities would be capable of operating in modes and 
roles beyond that of baseload electricity generation.   
7.3.4 rNPP Enabling Design Features 
Given the Six rNPP Functional Requirements presented in Table 7.2, an obvious question 
is whether there is, from a technical perspective, a valid rNPP “design trade space”.  In 
other words, “Are there evident rNPP design features (system architectures and 
technologies) that should enable a plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional 
Requirements?” A preliminary analysis reveals there are indeed several design features 
that have the potential to enable rNPPs.  Table 7.3 summarizes some enabling rNPP 
design features together with an indication of which of the Six rNPP Functional  
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Table 7.2  Six rNPP Functional Requirements 
 
rNPP Functional Requirement 
Relevant 
Resilience 
Characteristics 
1.  Robust real/reactive load-following and flexible 
operation capability 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
2.  Immunity to damage from external events (including 
Grid anomalies) 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
3.  Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in 
response to Grid anomalies 
Absorptive 
Adaptive 
4.  Ability to operate in Island Mode (i.e., without 
connection to offsite transmission load and electric 
power supply) 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
5.  Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling 
capability (i.e., requiring no offsite power or resupply 
of diesel fuel from offsite) 
Adaptive 
Restorative 
6.  Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e., 
the ability to start with no offsite power supply from 
the Grid) 
Restorative 
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Table 7.3  Potential enabling rNPP design features 
 
Potentially Enabling 
rNPP Design 
Features 
 
Impact 
*Enables 
rNPP 
Functional 
Requirement 
# 
1.   DC-DC or VFT NPP 
interface with Grid 
• Buffers rNPP from Grid 
transmission load and offsite 
power quality anomalies 
1–3 
2.   High-capacity load 
switching and heat 
rejection 
• Substitutes alternate thermal or 
electrical load in case of Grid-
based loss of load events 
1–4 
3.   Multi-module 
(reactor) NPP 
architecture 
• Enables one operating reactor 
module to supply shutdown 
cooling and housekeeping 
electrical loads to other rNPP 
reactor modules 
• Enables one reactor module to 
crank other reactor modules in 
rNPP 
4–6 
4.   Small reactor 
(module) size 
• Reduces cranking power 
requirements of individual 
reactor modules in rNPP 
• Enables non-traditional cranking 
power supplies for rNPP 
• Reduces individual reactor 
module shutdown heat removal 
and housekeeping electrical 
loads. 
1, 3–6 
5.   Adaptive turbine-
generator systems 
• Enhances rNPPs load-following 
and flexible operation capability 
1–3 
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Table 7.3  Potential enabling rNPP design features (continued) 
 
Potentially Enabling 
rNPP Design Features 
 
Impact 
*Enables 
rNPP 
Functional 
Requirement # 
6.   Passive shutdown 
cooling 
• Eliminates dependence of rNPP 
on consumable onsite resources 
and offsite assistance to 
maintain safe shutdown state 
5 
7.   Inherent reactor 
system energy 
storage capacity 
• Buffers rNPP and individual 
rNPP reactor modules from 
electrical (transmission system) 
load transients 
1–4 
8.   Optimized reactor 
core physics design 
• Enables rapid rNPP reactor 
module power maneuvering and 
restart across entire fuel cycle 
1–4, 6 
9.   Robust nuclear fuels • Increases rNPP reactor 
module’s power maneuvering 
capability 
1–5 
10. Plant electrical, 
instrumentation and 
control (I&C), and 
computational 
technologies that 
are resilient in face 
of GMD, EMP and 
cyber attack 
• Enables rNPP to avoid damage 
and continue to function in event 
of GMD, EMP, or cyber attack 
2 
 
*1 –  Flexible Operation/Robust Load-Following Capability 
  2 –  Immunity To Damage From External Events 
  3 –  Ability To Avoid Plant Shutdown In Response To Grid Anomalies 
  4 –  Ability To Operate In Island Mode 
  5 –  Unlimited Independent Shutdown Cooling 
  6 –  Self-Cranking Black Start Capability 
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Requirements they should enable. Reference 7.7 provides an in-depth discussion of 
potential rNPP design features summarized in Table 7.2.   
 
Finally, it is noted that the immaturity of the rNPP concept, together with the current 
absence of rNPP conceptual designs, precludes evaluation of the capital, operating, and 
maintenance cost implications of various rNPP design features and approaches. Even if 
this were possible, the current lack of consensus regarding the value of Grid resilience and 
market mechanisms for monetizing Grid resilience (see Section 7.8) constrain credible 
evaluation of overall rNPP economic viability. Nevertheless, the technical options defined 
here provide a starting point for future cost and economic analyses.   
7.4 rNPPs And Flexible Nuclear Power Operations 
rNPP Functional Requirement 1 requires rNPPs to be capable of load-following operations 
well beyond traditional baseload operations – in terms of both real and reactive power 
maneuvering capability [7.7].  The IAEA [7.12] and the Electric Power Research Institute 
[7.13] have evaluated the ability of current NPPs to operate outside of the baseload 
generation envelope and the technical implications of doing so. The conclusion of work 
conducted to date is that existing NPPs do generally have load-following capabilities 
beyond stable baseload operation. However, their use in such a manner is constrained 
primarily by electricity market and regulatory considerations. rNPPs with load-following 
capabilities beyond those of current generation plants would have the ability to reduce 
power output when electricity market prices are low, and shift their capacity to ancillary 
markets.  
 
Analysis of the potential economic impact of rNPP flexible operations is a complex 
undertaking, heavily laden with assumptions regarding electricity market mechanics.  
Competitive merchant electricity markets are actually comprised of distinct submarkets for 
energy, capacity, and ancillary services. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) defines several ancillary services in Order No. 888: scheduling, system control and 
dispatch; reactive supply and voltage control from generation service; regulation and 
frequency response service; energy imbalance service; operating reserve–synchronized 
reserve service; and operating reserve–supplemental reserve service [7.14]. Similar 
competitive market mechanisms are utilized by Grid operators to access black start 
services in merchant markets [7.15].   
 
Recent investigations of the economic implications of flexible NPP operations (including 
roles such as Grid frequency regulation and as spinning reserve capacity in a mixed-fuel 
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generation environment) indicate “…flexible operation of NPPs can increase the revenue of 
the nuclear units while at the same time lowering the total electric system operating costs, 
thus providing a win-win for the nuclear owners and rate payers.” [7.16] Companion studies 
[7.17] also indicate that flexible operation of NPPs would enable deeper penetration and 
more efficient utilization of renewable energy resources. Thus the enhanced flexible 
operations capability of rNPPs would enable them to provide functions beyond baseload 
operations and benefit from the revenue streams associated with such operations, while 
providing a low-carbon option for enabling deeper penetration of renewable energy sources.  
The competitive nature of these markets would dictate whether a unit that is capable of 
providing an ancillary service is actually employed in that manner. 
7.5 rNPPs As Elements Of Hybrid Nuclear Energy Systems 
Numerous investigations of so-called “hybrid nuclear energy systems” have been 
conducted during the past decade [7.18–7.26]. Hybrid nuclear energy system concepts 
would integrate the electrical and thermal energy production of an NPP with energy from 
other sources, along with energy storage technologies, to reduce reactor power 
maneuvering requirements and produce secondary energy products such as hydrogen, 
synthetic fuels, etc. 
 
Hybrid nuclear energy systems can employ reactors operating in two very different modes.  
The first type of application involves modulating the combined electrical output of, and the 
thermal load on, the nuclear reactor in a manner that reduces the need for reactor power 
maneuvers. This type of hybrid nuclear energy system employs “load switching” (rNPP 
Design Feature #2 in Table II) to divert the reactor’s thermal energy production from 
electricity generation to either (a) energy storage or (b) the production of some alternate 
energy product such as hydrogen or synthetic fuels.   
 
The second type of hybrid energy system requires the reactor to perform in a flexible 
operations mode (rNPP Functional Requirement 1) in response to intermittent electricity 
generation by other (typically renewable) energy sources coupled to the same Grid. Thus in 
their purest forms, these two systems impose very different power maneuvering demands 
on the NPP. Schemes that employ a combination of the two approaches are of course 
possible.   
 
The topic of hybrid nuclear energy systems has become a specialized field of study that 
continues to attract global attention. The use of rNPPs as anchors of hybrid energy systems 
is an obvious application given the synergism between the functional requirements of 
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rNPPs and the functional capabilities required of NPPs that operate as elements of hybrid 
nuclear energy systems. 
7.6 rNPPs As Black Start Resources 
The author has previously described current U.S. Grid operators’ approach to system 
recovery following major Grid disruptions [7.5]. As explained in that analysis, current NPPs 
are incapable of contributing in any meaningful way to early Grid restoration efforts and, in 
fact, place additional burdens on the Grid and Grid operators during system recovery and 
restoration efforts. Today’s “bootstrapping” Grid recovery process typically begins with the 
startup of one or more small (few MVA – 200 MVA) gas-fired, coal-fired, or hydroelectric 
“Black Start Resource” (hereafter “Black Start Unit” or “BSU”) generating facilities (Figure 
7.1) [7.27–7.29]. Once started, these Black Start Units “crank” larger steam cycle plants 
that are typically a few hundred MWe in size.  The larger steam cycle plants, in turn, crank 
still larger steam cycle power plants and re-power larger and larger segments of the Grid.  
NPPs are typically among the last plants to be restarted [7.5]. This serial method of Grid 
black start, recovery, and restoration is the backbone of Grid recovery procedures 
employed around the world.  This section explores how rNPPs that achieve the Six rNPP 
Functional Requirements outlined in Section 7.2 would enable improvements in traditional 
Grid recovery and restoration operations in the wake of major Grid disruptions. 
7.6.1 Derived Black Start Unit Functional Requirements 
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defines a “Blackstart” Resource” as  
 
“A generating unit(s) and its associated set of equipment which has the ability to be 
started without support from the System or is designed to remain energized without 
connection to the remainder of the System, with the ability to energize a bus, meeting 
the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for Real and Reactive Power 
capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been included in the 
Transmission Operator’s restoration plan.” [7.30]   
 
NERC’s Black Start Resource definition, along with the manner in which it is typically 
implemented by generating and transmission system operators, can be deconvolved into 
five basic derived Black Start Unit functional requirements” that are useful aids for 
examining the ability of a future rNPP to serve as a Black Start Unit. These five BSU Black 
Start Requirements are discussed in Sections 7.6.1.1–7.6.1.5. 
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Figure 7.1  Current Grid Black Start Recovery Approach 
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7.6.1.1  BSU Functional Requirement 1 – Self-Cranking 
A Black Start Unit must have the ability to be started (“cranked”) multiple times [7.29] 
without support from the electric Grid (i.e. without offsite power), or it must be designed to 
operate at power without being connected to and loaded by the Grid (the “Island Mode” of 
operation). Current (non-nuclear) U.S. Black Start Units are typically required to be capable 
of startup in less than 4 hours [7.28], with a preference for BSUs that can successfully 
startup within one hour of receiving a request to supply black start services [7.29]. This 
BSU Functional Requirement implies the possibility of three different “Black Start Unit 
Ready States” as discussed Section 7.6.2. The practical implication of NERC’s Black Start 
Resource definition is that the startup cranking power demands for today’s BSUs must be 
supplied by dedicated onsite power supplies – typically diesel or auxiliary generators that 
are, in turn, cranked from batteries. rNPP Functional Requirements 4–6 would enable an 
rNPP to meet this Black Start Unit functional requirement. 
7.6.1.2  BSU Functional Requirement 2 – Islanding/Island Mode Operation 
NERC’s Black Start Resource definition states that as an alternative to self-cranking 
capability, a Black Start Resource must be capable of “islanding”. “Island Mode” is state in 
which the plant is operating at some power level, but is not connected to and loaded by the 
Grid. U.S. Black Start Units are typically required to be capable of operating in Island Mode 
for only 10-30 minutes after self-cranking [7.28]. However, some fossil-fired generating 
units have the capability to manually island themselves by cutting back power and isolating 
from the Grid in advance of predicted threats to Grid integrity, or even to do so in real-time 
response to a Grid anomaly. rNPP Functional Requirements 2–4 would provide rNPPs the 
same capability to achieve and operate in Island Mode. 
7.6.1.3  BSU Functional Requirement 3 – Grid Integration 
A Black Start Unit must have the ability to energize a bus that, in turn, enables the cranking 
of other power plants. In practice, this means the Black Start Unit’s interface to the Grid 
must meet at least one of three configurations:  
1. The Black Start Unit’s switchyard is directly connected to the Grid via multiple 
transmission lines.  
2. If the Black Start Unit’s switchyard is served by a single transmission line, that 
transmission line is connect to a remote transmission node (bus) that serves 
multiple transmission lines.  
3. At least one transmission line that serves the BSU is a dedicated cranking line for 
another generating unit.   
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A BSU must, in practice, be capable of energizing its assigned bus for sixteen hours or 
longer [7.28, 7.31].  Among other things, this BSU Functional Requirement means that the 
cranking transmission lines between the BSU and the power plant(s) it will crank(s) must 
either be pre-configured during normal operations, or be configurable under blackout and 
emergency conditions. The ability of an rNPP to meet BSU Functional Requirement 3 would 
depend on the manner in which the rNPP is integrated into its host Grid. 
7.6.1.4  BSU Functional Requirement 4 – Real/Reactive Power Maneuvering  
A Black Start Unit must meet the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for real 
and reactive capacity, and frequency and voltage control. The capability of the Black Start 
Unit to fulfill this requirement is a function of its design, the manner in which it interfaces 
with the Grid, and the design of the Grid itself.  Black Start Units must be tolerant of larger 
than normal voltage and frequency variations on both the Grid load circuits (transmission 
lines and cranking lines) and the power that is supplied back to the Black Start Unit once 
the Grid is reenergized.   
 
Black Start Units must have the real and reactive load-following capability (Requirement 6.1 
in Reference 7.32) required to achieve and maintain system voltage and frequency 
standards. The real and reactive power load-following requirement stems from several 
sources intrinsic to Grid recovery operations [7.33]. First, the cranking of other generating 
units involves the startup of a multitude of large electric motor-driven auxiliary systems at 
the unit being cranked.  During the time these motors are accelerating to speed, they can 
draw many times their normal operating current and present very large reactive power 
demand swings as their capacitive and inductive fields are energized. Secondly, the 
energization of “cold” transmission lines is accompanied by significant transient reactive 
power demands and voltage swings due to the “Ferranti effect” as various capacitive and 
inductive fields are established. This effect can lead to Black Start Units absorbing reactive 
power and, in extreme cases, self-excitation of the Black Start Unit’s generator excitation 
system. The “cold load pickup” phenomenon is another source of real and reactive power 
load swings on a Black Start Unit. The re-energization of loads that have been de-energized 
for many hours can be accompanied by inrush currents ten times larger than normal steady 
state load currents [7.33]. Due to these factors and others, Grid operators may have limited 
control over the reactive power demands of the system at various points during the Grid 
recovery process. The Black Start Unit must be capable of handling all of these system 
issues while continuing to supply power to the Grid during black start and recovery 
operations. rNPP Functional Requirement 1 would enable the rNPP to meet BSU Functional 
Requirement 4. 
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7.6.1.5  BSU Functional Requirement 5 – Grid Restoration Plan Integration 
A BSU must be included in the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan as a Black Start 
Resource. That is, the transmission system operator must have a specific plan and 
functional capability for Grid recovery that enables use of the BSU in the Grid recovery 
process. The details for use of a specific Black Start Unit within the Transmission 
Operator’s restoration plan obviously relate both to the specific Black Start Unit’s 
characteristics and those of the Grid into which it is interfaced. One obvious impact of rNPP 
functionality (specifically rNPP Functional Requirement 5) is that unlike current NPPs, 
restoration of offsite power to rNPPs for shutdown cooling would no longer be among the 
Grid operator’s highest priorities during Grid recovery and restoration efforts.  
7.6.2 Three rNPP Black Start Unit Ready States 
Figure 7.2 depicts the three possible “Black Start Unit Ready States” for an rNPP (or any 
other BSU) that could function both as a normal power generation unit and as a Black Start 
Unit, along with the pathways for transition between the three ready states. Figure 7.3 is a 
more detailed version of Figure 7.2 that depicts the BSU Ready State logic embedded in 
the five BSU Functional Requirements, and the manner in which the Six rNPP Functional 
Requirements (“rNPPFR” in Figure 7.3) enable an rNPP to operate in all three BSU Ready 
States. The three Black Start Unit Ready States are discussed below.   
7.6.2.1  BSU Ready State 1  
The rNPP is operating in Ready State 1 (shutdown), but capable of rapid startup by “self-
cranking” (without the aid of offsite power) into Ready State 2 Island Mode (via P12 in 
Figure 7.2) until loading and re-powering the Grid (via P23 in Figure 7.2) from Ready State 
3.  Ready State 1 is the state in which conventional gas turbine Black Start Units function.  
The rNPP would presumably only be in Ready State 1 if it were forced to shutdown due to 
some internal or external issues associated with a Grid anomaly.  As previously stated, 
current U.S. Black Start Units are typically required to be capable of multiple black start 
cranking attempts, and to be capable of restarting in less than four hours when called upon 
to provide black start services.  rNPP Functional Requirements 5 and 6 would enable an 
rNPP to reside in this BSU Ready State and self-crank into BSU Ready State 2.   
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Figure 7.2  Three Black Start Unit Ready States 
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Figure 7.3  Black Start Unit Ready State Transition Logic   
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7.6.2.2  BSU Ready State 2 
An rNPP operating in this BSU Ready State is operating at or above housekeeping power 
level in an Island Mode in which the plant is completely isolated from the Grid until called 
upon to synchronize with, load, and repower the Grid from Ready State 3 (path P23 in 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3). Island Mode is similar in some respects to a “spinning reserve” state – 
albeit one in which the unit is not connected to the Grid and dispatched until called upon to 
function as a Black Start Resource.  In order to have a legitimate capability for Ready State 
2 operation, the plant must be capable of (a) achieving stable Island Mode operation by 
self-cranking from Ready State 1 (via path P12 in Figures 7.2 and 7.3) or (b) executing a 
load rejection/islanding maneuver from Ready State 3 (P32 in Figures 7.2 and 7.3). All units 
transition to Ready State 3 from Ready State 2.  Thus, all Black Start Units must be 
capable of operating in Ready State 2 (Island Mode). A BSU must also be capable of 
maintaining a stable Island Mode operation (stable power level, voltage and frequency) as 
long as required to function effectively as a Black Start Resource within the framework of 
system operators’ Grid Recovery Plan.  rNPP Functional Requirements 2–4 would enable 
an rNPP to achieve and reside in BSU Ready State 2 for much longer periods than is 
typically required of current U.S. Black Start Units (i.e. only 10–30 minutes). 
7.6.2.3  BSU Ready State 3 
An rNPP operating in Ready State 3 is supplying power to the Grid either in a normal power 
generation mode, or in Black Start operations mode. When operating as a normal power 
generation facility, the plant would ideally be capable of quickly isolating from the Grid and 
transitioning to BSU Ready State 2 Island Mode (via path P32 in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3).  
A variable-output rNPP that could accomplish this load rejection (P32) maneuver would be 
of great utility in a number of Grid operations scenarios. The achievement of this capability 
would require the unit to detect, evaluate, differentiate, and respond appropriately to Grid 
anomalies in real time. Some non-nuclear steam power plants in the U.S. that do not have 
self-cranking capability do have the ability to execute this load rejection-islanding maneuver 
[7.27]. 
 
Alternately, and as a last resort, an rNPP operating in Ready State 3 could transition to 
shutdown BSU Ready State 1 (via path P31 in Figure 7.2 and 7.3) if for some reason it 
could not execute an islanding maneuver. If an rNPP operating in Ready State 3 were 
forced to shutdown into Ready State 1, the rNPP would be capable of meeting its own 
shutdown cooling requirements without any offsite power or assistance (rNPP Functional 
Requirement 5) and would be capable of self-cranking restart into BSU Ready State 2 
(rNPP Functional Requirement 6). Assuming the plant were not damaged (rNPP Functional 
Requirement 2), the time required to restart or startup an rNPP would depend on the plant’s 
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Limiting Conditions for Operations and associated surveillance requirements. The time 
required to restart the rNPP from Ready State 1 might limit the unit’s utility as a Black Start 
Resource to scenarios in which advance warning of an impending Grid anomaly is available 
(as might be the case for extreme geomagnetic disturbances, or “GMDs” triggered by solar 
coronal mass ejections), or when rapid black start capability is not required. Thus, the ability 
of an rNPP to avoid plant shutdown (rNPP Functional Requirement 3) and to operate in 
Island Mode (rNPP Functional Requirement 4) would greatly expand its potential value as a 
Black Start Resource.  
7.6.3 rNPP Black Start Unit Grid Interface And Grid Recovery Operational 
Considerations 
The Six rNPP Functional Requirements assure that an rNPP would have the ability to 
function as a dual-purpose (normal power generation plus black start) unit, provided the 
plant is interfaced to and integrated with the Grid in the appropriate manner; and the 
surrounding Grid is, or can be, configured to enable the rNPP to crank other generating 
units and power critical loads during the Grid recovery and restoration process.  How might 
the necessary Grid interface and configuration conditions be achieved?   
 
The rNPP’s robust real and reactive power maneuvering capability (rNPP Functional 
Requirement 1) would free the Grid operator from the traditional serial generating fleet 
startup approach depicted in Figure 7.1. Figure 7.4 is a simplified depiction of an rNPP-Grid 
architecture that would enable such operations.  The configuration is one in which the rNPP 
forms the “hub” of a radial arrangement of cranking lines (to other power plants) and 
transmission lines (to load blocks and distribution centers). Switchgear, relays, circuit 
breakers, isolators are not shown in Figure 7.4, but various bus configurations can be 
envisioned both within the generating network, and the transmission/distribution network.  
 
Such rNPP-Grid architectures should enable larger plants to be cranked sooner and/or 
diverse load blocks to be recovered sooner – as soon as their local loads are sufficiently 
stable to enable plant operation.  Additionally, the rNPP hub, when accompanied by the 
appropriate Grid architecture, would provide the Grid operator more flexibility in terms of the 
order in which various transmission segments are energized and loads are recovered.  
Thus, a single rNPP Black Start Resource, properly sited within and interfaced with its 
surrounding Grid, would significantly enhance the ability of a system operator to employ a 
robust “multi-point, multi-island” approach to Grid restoration. 
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Figure 7.4  rNPP-based Grid Black Start Recovery Approach 
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7.7 rNPPs As Anchors Of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands 
(RCIIs)  
Section 7.6 discussed the potential for rNPPs to serve as versatile Black Start Resources 
for Grid recovery and restoration. But, an rNPP’s robust operational capabilities and black 
start Grid recovery value can be leveraged to provide still greater strategic societal benefits 
via the thoughtful integration of an rNPP with other national Critical Infrastructure elements 
in a Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCII). The RCII concept is developed further in 
this section. 
7.7.1 Critical Infrastructure And Societal Resilience 
U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21 [7.34] defined sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
upon which society depends (Figure 7.5). Each of these Critical Infrastructure Sectors is 
either involved in the generation and distribution of electricity, or requires electricity to 
perform its critical functions. Each Critical Infrastructure Sector has a distinct “grid” of its 
own – a geospatially distributed combination of “production facilities” and “product delivery 
networks” (along with the required human infrastructure) that uniquely defines the 
architecture of that specific Critical Infrastructure Sector. The physical architecture of each 
of these Critical Infrastructure Sectors has evolved over the past century in response to a 
complex set of geospatially-dependent supply and demand factors. Chief among these 
factors are natural resource location (closely related to siting of production centers), human 
population dynamics (closely related to demand center location), and topology/geography 
(a major driver for distribution and delivery network routing).   
 
The present-day geospatial topology of the integrated system of sixteen Critical 
Infrastructure grids can be viewed as a three-dimensional, sixteen-layer “stack” of two-
dimensional Critical Infrastructure Sector grids. Though beyond the scope of this paper, 
even a casual analysis of the sixteen individual U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sector grids 
reveals there are regions of the U.S. (and presumably other nations) where key elements of 
multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors are found in close proximity to each other (i.e. co-
located within relatively short distances of a few to a few tens of km). This close physical 
proximity of diverse electricity-dependent Critical Infrastructure Sector elements provides a 
great opportunity to enhance overall national Critical Infrastructure system resilience by 
leveraging the capabilities of rNPPs as anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands 
(RCIIs). 
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Figure 7.5  Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
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7.7.2 rNPPs – The Foundation of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands 
(RCIIs) 
Our focus now shifts to higher-level strategic national resilience considerations – the 
challenge of bootstrapping interdependent national Critical Infrastructure functionality in the 
wake of events that could deal crippling blows to a nation’s Critical Infrastructure and its 
social fabric. The types of catastrophes under consideration here are those “very bad day” 
scenarios such as severe geomagnetic disturbances induced by solar coronal mass 
ejections, electromagnetic pulse attacks, cyber attacks on the Grid. The rNPP’s unique 
coupling of performance capabilities (stemming from the Six rNPP Functional 
Requirements) together with its fuel security, could be harnessed to enable the national to 
better endure and recover more rapidly from such events. 
 
Imagine a future in which selected assets of different Critical Infrastructure networks were 
configured into a number of “Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands” or “RCIIs”.   
A Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island or “RCII” is an engineered network of 
multiple Critical Infrastructure Sector facilities and their interconnections (electric 
power, internet, pipelines, rail, etc.), powered by a fuel-secure rNPP, and “co-
located” within a small (a few to tens of km) geographical area.  RCIIs would be 
regional “hubs” of Critical Infrastructure functionality from which national Critical 
Infrastructure functionality could be restored and recovered in the event “very bad day” 
scenarios. 
 
An RCII is not simply an electric Grid or a “micro-Grid”. The electric Grid is but one of the 
“grids” that constitute the RCII.  From the topographic perspective, RCII’s are essentially 3-
dimensional overlays and interconnections of an electric Grid and multiple Critical 
Infrastructure Sector “grids” (internet, pipelines, railways, etc.) in a defined geographical 
region (Figure 7.6). While the architecture and functionality of each RCII would differ based 
on its assigned functions, the “backbone” of all RCIIs is a secure supply of electric power 
provided by an rNPP.  
 
Figure 7.7 is a notional depiction of an RCII anchored by an rNPP.  The RCII is configured 
in a “hub and spoke” topography in which the rNPP is the hub.  As depicted in Figure 7.7, 
elements of Critical Infrastructure within RCIIs might utilize both electricity and nuclear 
process heat. Thus rNPPs operating for combined electricity and process heat production 
would be desirable in some circumstances. The hub and spoke topology depicted in Figure 
7.7 envisions the use of a “ring bus” concept for distribution of electricity and thermal 
energy from the rNPP to its companion Critical Infrastructure facilities. Thermal energy  
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Figure 7.6  Siting of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands (RCIIs) 
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Figure 7.7  Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCII) Architecture 
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storage could be incorporated into the rNPP design to enhance its functionality as a 
process heat source and/or to reduce reactor power maneuvering requirements. 
 
The idea of employing nuclear power to enable critical national functionalities is, of course 
not a recent epiphany. However the emergence of multi-layered, interdependent, national 
Critical Infrastructure networks, along with continuing evolution of hazards and threats to 
the Grid, provide significant motivation for exploring the potential for rNPPs and Resilient 
Critical Infrastructure Islands to enhance societal resilience in the 21st century. 
 7.7.3 Siting RCIIs 
RCII’s could be hubs from which national multi-sector Critical Infrastructure functionality 
could be restored in the event of major Critical Infrastructure disruptions. But, where should 
RCII’s be sited to maximize their ability to accomplish this function?   
 
The design and performance attributes of rNPPs should enable some relaxation of current 
NPP siting constraints [7.7] – making it possible to site the rNPPs closer to their electricity 
and process heat “customers” than is the case with today’s commercial nuclear power 
plants. For instance, one version of an RCII might be comprised of co-located 
petroleum/petrochemcial refineries, petroleum pipeline/pumping stations, and rNPPs. Other 
examples might include co-located configurations of rNPPs, Internet, e-commerce/finance, 
and telecommunications hubs; rNPPs and water supply systems; rNPPs and military bases; 
etc. Each RCII would be strategically designed to retain its assigned critical functionalities in 
the event of a major national catastrophe. The RCII, having survived the initial event, could 
enable more rapid recovery and restoration of our nation’s Critical Infrastructure Sectors in 
a recovery protocol similar in many ways to the electric Grid black start recovery protocol 
discussed in previous sections of this paper. 
 
Intelligent siting of RCIIs would be essential to extracting maximum Critical Infrastructure 
and societal resilience value from them. There are many potential strategies for selecting 
high-priority sites for RCIIs. Most of these strategies are coupled closely to assumptions 
regarding the specific hazard or threat scenario adopted as the basis of the analysis. One 
general strategic RCII siting strategy would be to site one RCII in each the three U.S. Grid 
Interconnections. Other approaches would site RCII’s as closely as possible to human 
population centers or major military bases and defense installations. In any case, the next 
step would be to search for locations within that Grid Interconnection or near the chosen 
population center or client Critical Infrastructure facility that would enable high Critical 
Infrastructure interconnection density. This search would involve the construction of detailed 
	
158 
topographic overlays (similar to the notional overlays depicted in Figure 7.6) of the sixteen 
U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, with the goal of identifying regions in which key assets 
from multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors already exist. These locations would be prime 
candidates for development of the first RCIIs.  RCII’s might in the long-term, be developed 
at locations based on a rigorous analysis of national hazards and threats portfolios, along 
with scenario-specific societal recovery and restoration priorities. The ideas presented here 
are but the simplest and most obvious of many possible RCII siting strategies. 
7.8 rNPPs And Monetization Of Grid And Societal Resilience  
The dialog concerning the definition and value of Grid resilience is in its infancy. Beyond the 
question of what societal benefits rNPPs might deliver are the questions of (1) who benefits, 
(2) who pays for the benefit, and (3) how the benefit is monetized. These are challenging 
issues.  Critical Infrastructure resilience in general, and Grid resilience in particular, are 
currently “tragedy of the commons” issues – issues in which there are many stakeholders, 
little consensus, and no obvious means to secure desired outcomes for all those affected 
once such outcomes are articulated. Most of the Critical Infrastructure in the U.S. is owned 
and operated by the private sector. Deregulation of the electricity market in the U.S. has 
resulted in a fragmented patchwork of Grid asset owners and regulators focused on the 
day-to-day generation and regulation of electricity as a commodity – rather than as an 
essential strategic national asset.    
 
Electric generating facilities (and nuclear power plants in particular) in the U.S. today 
receive no economic compensation in exchange for their contribution to enhancing overall 
generation system reliability or to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The development of 
market and competitive mechanisms to guide private sector enterprises toward 
achievement of strategic national goals is a complex process. A market that doesn’t 
compensate current nuclear power plants for their reliability or carbon avoidance benefits is 
unlikely to compensate future plants for their resilience contribution.  Significant work will be 
required to develop appropriate market incentives and structures to enable the development 
and deployment of rNPPs. The development of mechanisms for monetizing the day-to-day 
Grid resilience contributions of rNPPs can only proceed as a better understanding of Grid 
resilience and its role in enabling Critical Infrastructure and societal resilience evolves. On 
the other hand, a good argument can be made that the strategic resilience contribution of 
rNPPs and RCIIs to homeland and national security in “very bad day” scenarios should 
stand apart from consideration of the day-to-day Grid resilience value of rNPPs. Thus it is 
not unreasonable to consider federal financing of RCII’s to be justified as an investment in 
U.S. strategic resilience and national security.  
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7.9 Summary 
This paper is the fourth in a series detailing the results of a study conducted to examine the 
role of nuclear power in achieving and sustaining U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and 
societal resilience. The definition and functional capabilities of rNPPs defined in those 
papers is the basis for identification and characterization of four potential rNPP applications 
discussed in this paper. Two applications – the use of rNPPs to enable flexible electricity 
generation operations of nuclear power plants and as anchors of of hybrid nuclear energy 
systems – leverage ideas and concepts currently under investigation in the nuclear power 
industry and academia. Two of these applications – the use of rNPPs as Grid Black Start 
Resources and as anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands – are new concepts 
introduced here for the first time.   
 
rNPPs could extend the value proposition of nuclear energy beyond baseload electricity 
generation in the 21st century. rNPPs could enhance Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and 
societal resilience in ways current electricity generation technologies cannot. The realization 
of rNPPs and the benefits they offer, will depend on the outcome of a dialog that is just 
beginning regarding the value of Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience; how 
resilience should be monetized; and who pays for each resilience benefit. The outcome of 
this debate is of great importance given modern society’s growing dependence on the Grid 
and the evolving portfolio of natural hazards and malevolent threats to the Grid. The 
conceptual work described in this paper is intended to catalyze and inform this forward-
looking dialog.  
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8 SUMMARY OF MAJOR RESEARCH RESULTS 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question, “What role do current U.S. commercial 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) play in enabling electric Grid resilience, and what type of 
future nuclear power plant might maximize nuclear power’s contribution to Grid resilience?”   
This question has, in turn, been deconvolved into Five Research Questions that form the 
core structure of this dissertation.  The major research outcomes and conclusions with 
respect to these five questions are summarized below. 
8.1 Current U.S. electricity markets and regulatory frameworks do not 
serve the strategic interests of the United States. 
Valuation of electricity is a “tragedy of the commons” issue in the U.S. Electricity market 
mechanisms and regulatory frameworks in the U.S. treat electricity as an everyday 
commodity, rather than the strategic asset it actually is. Market mechanisms place no 
explicit value on the unique strategic role electricity plays in enabling U.S. national security, 
economic prosperity, and societal wellbeing (i.e. U.S. national resilience). Electricity market 
deregulation, along with the ensuing fragmentation of both the electricity industry and its 
regulatory oversight framework have created a “race to the bottom” electricity pricing 
dynamic in which market signals provided to electricity producers have no effective 
strategic component.  
8.2 What is electric Grid resilience and why is it so important? 
Electric Grid resilience is the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to 
customers given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.  A Grid is resilient to the extent it 
has the ability to withstand a change or a disruptive event by reducing the initial negative 
impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them (adaptive capability), and by 
recovering from the event (restorative capability).  All Critical Infrastructure Sectors depend 
on an uninterrupted supply of electricity to accomplish their essential societal support 
functions.  Thus, while Grid resilience may be deconvolved into its constituent generation 
subsystem, transmission subsystem, and distribution subsystem components, it is the 
resilience of the Grid as an overall system that is of primary importance with respect to 
Critical Infrastructure and societal resilience. 
	
166 
8.3 Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid 
resilience assets, and why or why not? 
Current U.S. NPPs have an enviable record of safe and reliable operation. The plants have 
on multiple occasions demonstrated their ability to continuously operate during regional 
“cold weather” or “polar vortex” events that disabled fossil-fired power plants in the affected 
regions.  This experience demonstrates that NPPs do provide some important Grid 
resilience benefits for scenarios in which the Grid is not disrupted or damaged.  However, 
(as discussed in Chapter 4) the design and operational approaches adopted to achieve 
nuclear power’s demonstrated safety and reliability attributes have resulted in plants that are 
intolerant of Grid disruptions.  Today’s NPPs do little to enable the Grid to absorb and adapt 
to major disruptions or to rapidly recover and restore electric service to customers in the wake 
of Grid disruptions.  Thus, it is clear NPPs are not significant Grid resilience assets for 
scenarios involving major Grid disruptions or damage.  As discussed in Chapter 5, today’s 
NPPs are actually burdens on Grid operators during Grid recovery and restoration activities 
such as those required in the wake of major Grid disruptions or Black Sky Events.   
8.4 Concerning future resilient nuclear power plants (rNPPs): What 
performance attributes and functional requirements might 
maximize their value as Grid resilience assets? 
A resilient power plant (rPP) in general, and an rNPP in particular are power plants whose 
performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance Grid resilience—the 
system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers given a specific 
load prioritization hierarchy.  rNPPs would be intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and 
operated in a manner to enhance the resilience of their host Grid.  The two essential rNPP 
Key Attributes discussed in Chapter 6 are: 
1. rNPP Attribute 1: rNPPs enable the Grid to absorb and adapt to a broad spectrum of 
Grid anomalies and upsets. 
2. rNPP Attribute 2: rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to quickly recover from upsets 
and to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s 
load prioritization hierarchy. 
 
These two attributes are equally applicable to nuclear and non-nuclear rPPs. 
 
The Six Functional Requirements of rNPPs are: 
1. Robust real/reactive load-following and flexible operation capability. 
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2. Immunity to damage from external events (including Grid anomalies). 
3. Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in response to Grid anomalies.  
4. Ability to operate in Island Mode (i.e., without connection to offsite transmission load 
and electric power supply). 
5. Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling capability (i.e., requiring no offsite 
power or resupply of diesel fuel from offsite). 
6. Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e., the ability to start with no offsite 
power supply from the Grid). 
 
Considered as a package, these six functional requirements define an rNPP performance 
capability that significantly exceeds the traditional baseload electricity generation role of 
current U.S. NPPs. 
8.5 Concerning future rNPPs: What design features might enable the 
identified rNPP functional requirements? 
Several promising rNPP design features (system architecture and technology suite 
considerations) were identified during the course of the study.  These design features 
(discussed in Chapter 6) include: 
1. Direct current–direct current (DC-DC) or variable frequency transformer (VFT) NPP 
interface with the Grid (rather than the traditional AC-AC interface) to reduce the 
coupling of Grid voltage, frequency, and phase angle anomalies into the rNPP’s 
electric system. 
2. High-capacity load switching and heat rejection capability to enable the plant to 
rapidly and seamlessly substitute alternate thermal or electrical loads in the event of 
loss of Grid (transmission system) load. 
3. Multi-module (reactor) rNPP architectures that can enable a single reactor module 
to meet the startup and housekeeping loads of companion reactor modules within 
the rNPP. 
4. Small reactor (module) size (probably no larger than 200-300 MWe) that reduce 
overall rNPP cranking power requirements, enable the use of a broader suite of 
onsite black start cranking power supplies, and eliminate the need for offsite 
cranking power. 
5. Adaptive turbine-generator systems capable of meeting large and very dynamic real 
and reactive load transients. 
6. Passive shutdown cooling to eliminate the need for offsite power and diesel fuel 
resupply in the event of long-term Grid disruptions. 
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7. Large inherent/intrinsic reactor system energy storage capacity to reduce the need 
for rapid reactor power maneuvers in the event of loss of Grid (transmission system) 
load. 
8. Optimized reactor core physics designs that enable robust reactor power 
maneuvering and restart over the plant’s entire fuel (refueling) cycle. 
9. Robust nuclear fuels that enable aggressive power maneuvering without the 
concerns imposed by the thermal-mechanical limitations of current LWR nuclear 
fuels. 
10. rNPP electric, instrumentation and control (I&C), computer, and rNPP-Grid interface 
technologies and systems that are resilient in the face of extreme GMDs as well as 
EMP and cyber attacks. 
8.6 Concerning future rNPPs and the Grid they will serve: What 
specific applications of rNPPs might enhance their overall 
contribution to electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal 
resilience? 
Four specific rNPP applications have been identified and discussed in Chapter 7.  These 
applications have the potential to expand the value proposition of nuclear energy well 
beyond that of baseload electricity generation while enhancing Grid, Critical Infrastructure, 
and societal resilience.  The four applications are: 
1. Flexible Electricity Generation – the Six Functional Requirements of rNPPs 
assure they would have the ability to meet “flexible operations” requirements as 
currently defined by EPRI and the OECD. 
2. rNPPs As Anchors of Hybrid Nuclear Energy Systems – the Six Functional 
Requirements of rNPPs assure these plants could meet the performance 
capabilities previously identified by developers of hybrid nuclear energy system 
concepts.  
3. rNPPs As Grid Black Start Resources – rNPPs would present transformational 
Black Start Resource capabilities (and would, at a minimum, remove the burden 
posed by current U.S. NPPs in the event of a major Grid de-energization or Black 
Sky Event. 
4. rNPPs As Anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands – the performance 
attributes of rNPPs, coupled with their use as anchors of Resilient Critical 
Infrastructure Islands, could provide the U.S. a transformational strategic Critical 
Infrastructure and societal resilience asset. 
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9 UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
This dissertation focuses sharply on The Five Research Questions defined in Chapter 3. 
Several other important insights and impressions regarding U.S. national resilience and 
nuclear power’s potential role in enhancing societal, Critical Infrastructure, and Grid 
resilience surfaced during the course of this research.  These results provide both a 
foundation for and a (partial) roadmap to a more resilient U.S. Grid. A few of the most 
evident and most important observations and recommendations for future research are 
discussed in this chapter. 
9.1 Need For Inclusive Fact-Based Grid and Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience Dialog  
Every resident of the U.S. is a stakeholder in the electric Grid and Critical Infrastructure 
resilience dialog. The presence of many diverse stakeholders and the perspectives they 
bring to the table create an environment that can be hostile to useful dialog.   
 
All stakeholders in societal, Grid, and Critical Infrastructure resilience must be willing to 
engage in fact-based dialog about Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience – one that is 
informed by sound science and Grid operations experience. Participants in this dialog must 
not seek to inflate or minimize the challenges such threats pose, nor should they seek to 
advance their own special interests.  The achievement of this dynamic is, in the author’s 
view, the first obstacle to progress in the Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience arena. 
9.2 Establishment Of A Forum For Science-Based Stakeholder Dialog 
On Grid and Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
No effective forum for dialog among the many stakeholders in U.S. Grid and Critical 
Infrastructure vulnerability and resilience currently exists.  No obvious venue for such a 
forum exists given the sensitive, multi-disciplinary nature of the challenges, and the 
diversity of stakeholders.  This is a classic “tragedy of the commons”.  Such a forum is 
needed. The academic sector seems well positioned to host such a forum.  One or more 
universities should partner to establish a continuing Grid resilience forum (or forums).  
These forums would be ongoing activities, punctuated with events in which Grid resilience 
stakeholders from the electric power industry, nuclear power industry, elected officials, 
policymakers, regulators, researchers, national defense and homeland security officials, 
and the public come together for meaningful and honest dialog about Grid and Critical 
Infrastructure vulnerabilities, resilience, and pathways to enhance resilience. While much 
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more can be said about the preferred structure, dynamics, and process of such forums, it is 
evident modest first steps involving only a few of the stakeholders can catalyze useful 
progress. 
9.3 Need For Consideration of Extended Hazards and Threats Portfolio 
U.S. society in the early 21st century is so dependent on electricity for our vital functions that 
any natural event or human action capable of disabling the Grid for extended periods of 
time must be viewed as a threat to U.S. existence (e.g., “an existential threat”). U.S. Grid 
operators have dealt with anticipated, but infrequent regional events such as hurricanes, 
floods, superstorms, etc., since the inception of the Grid.  The U.S. Grid has evolved a 
certain level of operational resilience for this traditional portfolio of hazards and threats.   
 
Today there are three known hazards and threats that stand apart from the traditional Grid 
hazards and threats portfolio in terms of the risk they pose to the Grid: (1) geomagnetic 
disturbances, or “GMDs” induced by solar coronal mass ejections (2) nuclear 
electromagnetic pulse, or “EMP” attacks, and (3) cyber attacks. These threats are not 
inventions of over-zealous science fiction writers, nor should those who call attention to 
such threats be considered “Chicken Littles”. These three hazards and threats are 
inconvenient realities in the 21st century. 
 
Geomagnetic disturbances on the scale of the 1859 Carrington Event are expected to occur 
roughly every 100-to-150 years. The potential consequences of a Carrington-class GMD in 
today’s environment are almost impossible to bound.  Both the U.S. and Russia conducted 
tests of nuclear EMP weapons in the 1960s. Such attacks (at least theoretically) require 
only one nuclear weapon and one launch vehicle. Given the proliferation of nuclear weapon 
and ballistic missile technologies over the past few decades, the number of nation-states 
capable of executing such attacks is growing. The U.S. Grid is under virtually continuous 
cyber “probes” or “mini-attacks” today. Cyber “warfare” is an asymmetric threat in that 
small, modestly resourced groups have the ability to inflict major damage on target nations 
and their infrastructures. Cyber attacks have (on at least one occasion) already inflicted 
crippling damage on a national Grid. Finally, climatologists today tell us the frequency of 
superstorms, hurricanes, cyclones, and tsunamis is likely to increase over the coming 
decades. 
 
Terms such as “high-impact, low-frequency event” and  “low-frequency, high-consequence 
event” are being employed by some to characterize the types of events under consideration 
here.  This is a misleading application of the term “low frequency”. While it is difficult to 
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quantify probabilities and expected frequencies of malevolent human actions (such as EMP 
and cyber attacks), there can be little debate at this point that the probability (expected 
frequency) of a major GMD is not “low” given the normal use of the term in day-to-day 
engineering risk management practice. Based on the best available heliophysics data, the 
Earth is actually overdue for a Carrington-class GMD. The likelihood of a massive GMD is 
well within the range of events that nations, industries (such as nuclear power, 
telecommunications, transportation, health care, etc.) and individuals routinely and 
aggressively seek to avoid, mitigate, and survive.  
 
The Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience dialog should include consideration of an 
Extended Hazards and Threats Portfolio (relative to “normal” operations) – and that 
includes Carrington-class GMDs, EMP attacks, and coordinated cyber and physical attacks 
on the Grid. 
9.4 Defining and Characterizing Grid Resilience For Normal and 
Extended Hazard and Threat Portfolios 
There is no current consensus on the definition of Grid resilience or the metrics of Grid 
resilience.  The reality that Grid resilience metrics must ultimately capture the “last mile” 
implications of electricity delivery to the end-user, and that U.S. electric distribution systems 
are not designed to provide high granularity (selectively) between loads, is an enormously 
challenging consideration.  Most Grid resilience metrics that have been suggested to date 
are forensic in nature; they can only be estimated after an event has occurred.  Truly useful 
Grid resilience metrics are those which:  
1. Encompass both routine Grid operations in the face of traditional hazards and 
threats portfolios, and Grid operations under extended hazards and threats 
portfolios that include GMDs, EMP attacks, and cyber attacks.  
2. Are relatable in a transparent manner to the impacts of Grid resilience on the 
performance of other Critical Infrastructure, and electricity end-users (ultimately on 
societal health and welfare). 
3. Can be numerically quantified 
4. Can, for a defined Grid architecture and event, be predicted/estimated in advance of 
the event. 
5. Can be measured in situ in real-time during an event. 
6. Can be utilized for comparison of the response and performance of different Grid 
system compositions and architectures (at the generating, transmission, and 
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distribution levels) to relevant natural hazards and human malevolent threats – and 
therefore be useful for informing Grid design and investment decisions. 
7. Are useful for development and implementation of Grid regulatory regimes that 
enable monetization of resilience. 
 
With regard to the electric generation system and individual generating units, useful Grid 
resilience metrics must be able to reflect the Grid resilience impacts of: 
1. Generating unit fuel diversity 
2. Generating unit fuel security 
3. Functional capabilities of different types of generating units and the manner in which 
they are interfaced to the Grid (ability to be dispatched, Black Start capability, etc.)  
 
The cognizant federal agencies (energy, homeland security, defense, commerce) should 
partner with industry and academia to develop practical, science-based Grid and Critical 
Infrastructure resilience metrics for both tactical and strategic Grid resilience.  This will be a 
long-term endeavor – one that requires a dialog as described in Section 9.1–9.2. 
9.5 Quantification Of Grid Resilience: Toolbox Development 
Once useful Grid metrics are selected, the computational simulation and real-time 
measurement methods required to quantify (estimate and measure) the relevant 
parameters must be created.  Given the limitations of current Grid simulation tools and 
computational platforms, the development of the credible Grid resilience simulation 
capabilities is likely to be a decadal quest on par with other computational “Grand 
Challenges” recently undertaken by various scientific and technical communities. However, 
the development of predictive tools that require the power of the world’s most powerful 
computing platforms would be of little practical day-to-day value to the typical Grid operator.  
Progress can and should be made in the near-term by separately considering the Grid’s 
three primary subsystems (generation, transmission, and distribution). The development of 
qualitative heuristics for evaluation of Grid subsystem resilience should be a near-term 
priority. 
 
Cognizant federal agencies and the electric power industry, working in conjunction with 
state and local governments, should mount an effort to address the Grid resilience 
quantification issues discussed here.  This effort will necessarily be paced by progress in 
the areas discussed in Sections 9.2–9.3. 
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9.6 Development Of Market Mechanisms For Monetizing Grid 
Resilience 
Most of the Grid infrastructure in the U.S. is privately owned.  Deregulation of the U.S. 
electricity market has resulted in fragmentation of the industry, and the demise of the 
traditional vertically-integrated electricity company.  The Grid is now comprised of 
thousands of specialized business entities who own and/or operate only generation, 
transmission, or distribution assets, or some combination of the three.  These entities 
operate both in regulated and deregulated (merchant) electricity markets.  Grid resilience in 
such an environment is almost inevitably a “tragedy of the commons” issue. Grid resilience 
has become an essential, but invisible commodity – one that is not easily measured and is 
therefore not valued. Nevertheless, mechanisms for incentivizing investments in Grid 
resilience must be developed if U.S. Grid resilience is to be assured in the 21st century.  
Federal and state governments should take leadership roles in the development of such 
market mechanisms. This activity, like those discussed in Section 9.4, will be paced by 
progress in the activities described in Section 9.3.  
9.7 Development Of rNPP Conceptual Designs 
A key contribution of the research described in this dissertation is the concept of a resilient 
nuclear power plant or rNPP.  Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP Functional 
Requirements have been defined in a qualitative manner.  Though useful as defined, terms 
such as “robust” and “immunity” used in the current high-level rNPP functional requirements 
must be quantified to facilitate responsive rNPP design. 
 
A valid rNPP “design trade space” has been identified.  Several NPP design features 
(system architecture and technology options) that show promise for enabling rNPPs have 
been discussed in a preliminary manner.  The next logical step is to draw upon this 
foundation to develop one or more specific rNPP preconceptual and conceptual designs.  
Some SMR concepts currently under development appear to achieve one or more of the 
Six rNPP Functional Requirements.  Some of these concepts might be adapted/modified to 
achieve more complete rNPP functionality. 
9.8 Development Of rNPP Applications And Grid Integration 
Approaches  
The value of an rNPP will depend not only on the plant’s functionality, but the manner in 
which the rNPP is integrated into its host Grid.  This is particularly true in the case of rNPPs 
	
174 
serving as Black Start Resources.  Once preconceptual and conceptual rNPP designs are 
available, the next step would be to investigate how existing and future Grids 
(Interconnections, regional Grids, etc.) could/should be configured to maximize the benefits 
the Grid can extract from an rNPP employed in one of more of the four applications defined 
in Chapter 7.  A next step would be for an existing Grid operator to perform such a study for 
their system. 
9.9 Evaluation Of rNPP Costs And Economic Viability 
The capital, operating, and maintenance costs of rNPPs can be estimated once rNPP 
conceptual designs are available. But this is only half of the information required to assess 
rNPP economic viability.  The other component of the rNPP value proposition is the 
economic value of rNPPs’ Grid resilience contributions and the ancillary services rNPPs 
could provide.  (In this case, the definition of “ancillary service” could/should be extended to 
include enablement of deeper renewable energy generation into the Grid.)  Therefore, the 
assessment of rNPP economic viability should proceed in concert with the activities outlined 
in Sections 9.5 and 9.6. 
9.10 Development And Deployment Of Resilient Critical Infrastructure 
Islands (RCIIs) 
The use of rNPPs as anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands stands apart from 
other potential rNPP applications in terms of its potential strategic value as a national 
Critical Infrastructure and societal resilience asset. This is particularly the case in light of the 
societal threats posted by natural events such space weather-induced GMDs, EMP attacks, 
and cyber attacks on the Grid. The development of RCIIs concepts and their deployment 
strategies would be primarily a federal responsibility. The cognizant federal entities would of 
course have to work closely with industrial leaders from the different Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors. Some potential RCII deployment strategies were discussed in Chapter 7. One 
initial goal could/should be to place one RCII in each of the three U.S. Grid 
Interconnections. Other approaches might be preferable for specific Grid/Critical 
Infrastructure hazards and threats portfolios.   
 
Two contemporaneous actions are in order.  Cognizant military and civilian planners should 
conduct a study to determine the appropriate U.S. RCII deployment strategy in light of U.S. 
national interests and the extended hazards and threats portfolio.  At the same time, 
detailed geospatial maps should be created for each U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sector.  
The regions of geospatial intersection between various Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
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represent obvious RCII siting options.  Specific plans for implementation of RCIIs can and 
should be formulated once the results of these two studies are available. 
9.11 Enhancing The Resilience Of Current U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 
Existing U.S. nuclear power plants have a remarkable safety record.  However their 
operation has with few exceptions been limited to baseload electricity generation. 
Additionally, their performance attributes during extended Grid blackouts (i.e. their need for 
offsite support to maintain a safe shutdown state and the burden this requirements places 
on Grid operators who would be immersed in Grid recovery efforts) is a reality. It is possible 
that some of the rNPP design features identified in this study could be backfitted to existing 
NPPs to enhance their performance capabilities and further improve their safety and 
operating risk profiles – especially as they related to extended Grid blackouts. This said, it 
seems unlikely such plant modifications could be justified on the basis of NRC’s current 
Backfit Rule or a purely financial cost/benefit analysis during a time in which current NPPs 
in merchant electricity markets are already under extreme financial pressure. 
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10 CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The scope of the analysis presented in this dissertation is expansive, necessarily 
integrating knowledge, information, and concepts from diverse social, scientific, and 
engineering disciplines. The depth of the analysis presented here is limited to that 
achievable by one person, interacting with many people, but working in isolation. Thus this 
analysis is best viewed as the first “baby step” along one possible path to enhanced U.S. 
societal, Critical Infrastructure, and Grid resilience in the 21st century – and to a future in 
which nuclear power’s promise as a transformational energy source is more fully realized.  
The challenges and obstacles to achieving this future are numerous and immense. Much 
work by many others will be required to validate the merit of the concepts presented here. 
In the mean time, U.S. societal dependence on electricity continues to grow, and the 
hazards and threats portfolio to the Grid continues to evolve.   
 
Time may not be on our side.  
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APPENDIX A – NUCLEAR POWER’S ROLE IN BLACK SKY GRID 
RECOVERY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
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A1. BACKGROUND 
 
The U.S. electric Grid is vulnerable to a variety of natural hazards and man-made threats 
presenting the potential to de-energize the Grid over large geographical regions for 
extended periods of time in so-called “Black Sky Events” or “BSEs”.  The nation’s ~ 100 
commercial power reactors present unique challenges during BSEs due to their need for 
continuous long-term shutdown cooling.  This appendix documents the results of a literature 
review conducted at the outset of the research effort documented in this report.  The intent 
of the review was to establish a basic understanding of the expected behavior of current 
U.S. nuclear power plants during BSEs and extended Grid outages, and the role today’s 
commercial nuclear power plants play in restoring Grid operations in the wake of a BSE. 
This information was a critical starting point for formulation of the research approached 
outlined in Chapter 3 of this report.  
 
The reader is referred to Appendix B for the definition of unfamiliar terms. 
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A2. LITERATURE REVIEW APPROACH 
 
The first step in the literature review process was to identify publications relevant to the 
issue of nuclear power and Grid resiliency – and more specifically to the matter of nuclear 
power and its role in Grid recovery following major Grid disruptions.   A literature survey 
was conducted via use of the major internet search engines (Google, Bing, etc.), searches 
of online public document bases maintained by relevant regulatory agencies such as the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) ADAMS document archive, and via direct 
inquiries to professionals in the electric power industry.   
 
Publications identified in the survey step were then screened for content and categorized 
with respect to their topical coverage and relevance. 
 
Finally, key publications of particular relevance were reviewed in detail to extract major 
observations and insights relative to operational, technical, regulatory, and economic issues 
associated with the nuclear power/Grid resiliency issue. 
 
Throughout the remainder of this appendix, notable observations from the literature will be 
highlighted in red for ease of identification and assimilation. 
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A3. LITERATURE METADATA 
 
It is useful to consider the following “search statistics” as a context for the review that 
follows: 
• A Google search conducted in August 2017 for the combined terms “nuclear” and 
“grid recovery” returned 2150 results. 
• A Google search conducted at the same time for the combined terms “nuclear” and 
“power system restoration” returned 10,800 results. 
 
These search results suggested there is a significant body of literature relevant to the 
subject of this review.  However, with a few notable exceptions to be discussed in this 
report, the vast majority of these internet search “hits” proved to be of little technical value.   
 
The void with respect to literature that deals specifically with NPPs and Grid recovery from 
Black Sky or major Grid blackouts can be demonstrated by two examples: 
• The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) published a volume 
entitled, “Power System Restoration: Methodologies & Implementation Strategies” in 
2000 [A3.1].  This volume, which is sometimes referred to by power system 
professionals as “the Black Start Bible,” is a collection of 87 reprints from IEEE’s 
Transactions on Power Systems, spanning the period between 1979 and 2000. It 
contains only one paper (reviewed later in this report) devoted to the role of NPPs in 
Grid recovery operations.   
• More recently, Liu, Ran, and Terzija published a review of power system restoration 
literature from the decade between 2006 and 2016 [A3.2].  Their review focused on 
Black Start procedures, network reconfiguration for Grid recovery, and load 
restoration during Grid recovery.  The review, which cites 82 publications, does not 
contain a single reference to nuclear power other than a brief mention of the 
accident at Fukushima Daiichi.   
 
Indeed, with a handful of exceptions to be discussed below, virtually all of the existing 
literature deals in one manner or another with only one main issue: how to assure NPPs 
quickly transition to and remain in a safe shutdown state during a blackout.  Even issues 
related to NPP restart and resynchronization following a blackout go largely unaddressed in 
the scientific and technical literature. 
 
The small body of academic and industrial literature identified in this review falls into one or 
more of several topical categories.  The relevant categories span a range of issues having 
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to do with the NPP, the Grid, and the interfaces between them.   Literature sources (of 
authorship) include: U.S. federal agencies (regulatory and otherwise), industrial entities, 
professional organizations, the federal research complex (e.g., national laboratories), and 
academia. 
 
The results of this literature review are organized to reflect the main relevant topical areas 
treated in the published literature.  The overwhelming majority of the published literature 
simply establishes the context in which NPP–Black Sky events must be considered, rather 
than dealing with the NPP-Black Sky or NPP Black Start issues themselves.  The principal 
relevant topical areas (“Categories”) treated in the literature are: 
1. nuclear regulatory requirements (that establish the current NPP design and 
operational safety context in which NPP–Black Sky issues must be considered) 
2. transmission system regulatory requirements (that establish the current Grid 
operational context (both normal operations and Black Start operations) in which 
NPP-Black Sky issues must be considered) 
3. NPP-Grid interface during routine operations (that provide a context for examining 
NPP-Grid interface issues during Black Sky events) 
4. Industry Grid recovery and Black Start plans 
5. NPP-Grid interface requirements during Grid-recovery / Black Start operations. 
 
The remainder of this appendix is organized in a manner mirroring these topical areas. 
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A4. RELEVANT REGULATORY LITERATURE 
 
There are two federal agencies within the U.S. that have jurisdictional authority relevant to 
NPPs and Black Sky issues: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  FERC’s regulatory authority primarily relates to 
operation and reliability of the bulk power system.  FERC typically operates by chartering 
the not-for-profit North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to draft standards, 
which FERC then reviews and approves.  The NRC’s jurisdictional authority governs the 
regulation of all matters relevant to the safety of commercial power reactors and NPPs.  
The regulatory jurisdictions of the two agencies intersect at the interfaces between the NPP 
and the bulk power system (the primary interface being the NPP station switchyard).  They 
also share jurisdictional authority in a limited number of other areas (such as cyber security) 
that are beyond the scope of this review. 
A4.1 FERC/NERC Regulations and Standards and Bulk Electric System 
Regulatory Context 
• NERC Standard NUC-001-3, Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination – [A4.1] 
requires coordination between NPP operators and transmission entities for the 
purpose of ensuring NPP safe operation and shutdown.  This standard stipulates 
that NPP operators and their host transmission entities must adopt a set of “Nuclear 
Plant Interface Requirements” or “NPIRs”.   The scope of information and issues to 
be addressed in the NPIRs is very broad, including structures, components, and 
systems design and operational parameters; communications requirements, 
operations and maintenance coordination, training, planning, and a host of other 
interfacial issues.  Noteworthy among the requirements placed upon NPP operators 
and their host transmission entities in NUC-001-3 is Requirement R9.3.5, which 
reads, “Provision for considering, within the restoration process, the requirements 
and urgency of a nuclear plant that has lost all offsite and onsite AC power.” 
• NERC Standard EOP-005-2, System Restoration and Black Start Resources – 
[A4.2] The purpose of this standard is to “Ensure plans, Facilities, and personnel 
are prepared to enable System restoration from Black Start Resources to assure 
reliability is maintained during restoration and priority is placed on restoring the 
Interconnection… The Restoration plan shall allow for restoring the Transmission 
Operator’s System following a Disturbance in which one or more areas of the Bulk 
Electricity System (BES) shuts down and the use of Black Start Resources is 
required to restore the shut down area to service, to a state whereby the choice of 
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the next Load to be restored is not driven by the need to control frequency or 
voltage regardless of whether the Black Start Resource is located within the 
Transmission Operator’s System.”  Notable among the requirements in EOP-005-2 
is Requirement R1.2, which stipulates that the restoration plan shall include: “A 
description of how all Agreements or mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols 
for offsite power requirements of nuclear power plants, including priority of 
restoration, will be fulfilled during System restoration.” 
 
NERC also has issued a standard for geomagnetic disturbance operations [A4.3]. However 
this standard does not directly address Black Start operations, nor nuclear power plant 
issues. 
 
The “bottom line” with respect to current FERC/NERC regulations and standards is: (1) 
NPPs play no role in Black Start planning other than that of a “critical load” that must be 
maintained / restored with the highest priority in order to facilitate their continued safe 
shutdown state; (2) transmission system operators and utilities must have an agreed plan 
and testable capability in place to assure sufficient offsite AC power is available to, or 
promptly restored to the NPP to assure a safe shutdown state can be maintained for as 
long as necessary during the blackout event, and (3) NPP operators and Transmission 
System Operators must collaborate in defining Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements that 
define the specific interfacial commitments each part can expect under all operating 
conditions. 
 
A4.2 Relevant NRC Regulations and Nuclear Safety Regulatory Context 
A4.2.1  NPP’s Ability To Withstand Station Blackout 
A station blackout or “SBO” is defined by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as “the 
complete loss of alternating current (ac) electric power to the essential and nonessential 
switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant (i.e., loss of offsite electric power system 
concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system).  
Station blackout does not include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station 
batteries through inverters or by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it 
assume a concurrent single failure or design basis accident. At single unit sites, any 
emergency AC power source(s) in excess of the number required to meet minimum 
redundancy requirements (i.e., single failure) for safe shutdown (non-DBA) is assumed to 
be available and may be designated as an alternate power source(s) provided the 
applicable requirements are met. At multi-unit sites, where the combination of emergency 
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AC power sources exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements for safe shutdown (non-
DBA) of all units, the remaining emergency AC power sources may be used as alternate 
AC power sources provided they meet the applicable requirements. If these criteria are not 
met, station blackout must be assumed on all the units.” [A.4] 
 
10 § 50.63 [A4.5] mandates that power reactors licensed in the U.S. “must be able to 
withstand for a specified duration and recover from a station blackout… The specified 
station blackout duration shall be based on the following factors: (i) The redundancy of the 
onsite emergency AC power sources; (ii) The reliability of the onsite emergency AC power 
sources; (iii) The expected frequency of loss of offsite power; and (iv) The probable time 
needed to restore offsite power.”  The regulation goes on to state, “(2) The reactor core and 
associated coolant, control, and protection systems, including station batteries and any 
other necessary support systems, must provide sufficient capacity and capability to ensure 
that the core is cooled and appropriate containment integrity is maintained in the event of a 
station blackout for the specified duration.”  Finally, the regulations states, “The alternate 
AC power sources(s)… will constitute acceptable capability to withstand station blackout 
provided an analysis is performed which demonstrates that the plant has this capability 
from onset of the station blackout until the alternative AC source(s) and required shutdown 
equipment are started and line up to operate… Alternate AC source(s) serving a multiple 
unit site where onsite emergency AC sources are not shared between units must have, as a 
minimum, the capacity and capability for coping with a station blackout in any of the units.  
At sites where onsite emergency AC sources are shared between units, the alternative AC 
source(s) must have the capacity and capability as required to ensure that all units can be 
brought to and maintained in safe shutdown.” 
 
An important observation with respect to these sections of 10 § 50.2 [A4.4] and 50.63 
[A4.5] is that the duration of the station blackout which an NPP must endure is not 
specified, but is a plant-specific parameter.   Indeed, 10 § 50.63 does not address: (1) 
station blackouts involving damage to both the onsite and offsite AC power sources 
(including unavailability of alternate AC power), or (2) station blackouts that extend 
indefinitely [A4.6]. 
A4.2.2  NPP Electric Power System Design Requirements 
10 § 50 Appendix A [A4.7] contains sixty-four “General Design Criteria” (“GDC”s) each 
commercial nuclear power plant design must meet. General Design Criteria establish 
“minimum requirements for the principal design criteria.”  “Principal design criteria… 
establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance 
requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is, 
	
187 
structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility 
can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.” GDC-17, entitled 
“Electric Power Systems” defines the high-level functional requirements and the system 
architecture the NPP’s electrical power systems must meet.  Briefly summarized, GDC-17 
mandates that each NPP must have both an onsite and offsite power supply to permit 
functioning of all structures, systems, and components required to assure (1) acceptable 
fuel design limits and design conditions for the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not 
exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) the core is cooled and 
containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated 
accidents.   
 
Onsite electric power supplies (including batteries and the onsite electric distribution 
system) must have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their 
safety functions assuming a single failure.  Electric power from the transmission network 
(offsite power supplies) must incorporate two physically independent circuits (not 
necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize the 
likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating, postulated accident, and 
environmental conditions.  A common switchyard for the two independent offsite supply 
circuits is acceptable.  One of the two offsite circuits must be designed to be available 
within seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident.  Efforts must be made to minimize the 
probability of a coincidental loss of power from the reactor, the onsite power sources, or the 
offsite power sources, or that a loss of any one of these sources can lead to the loss of the 
others. 
 
NRC Regulatory Guides 1.32 [A4.8] describes a method the NRC deems acceptable for 
complying with their mandated electrical power system design, operation and testing of 
NPP electric power systems (specifically GDC-17).  The guideline affirms that adherence to 
IEEE Standard 308-2012, “Criteria for Class 1 E Power Systems for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations,” [A4.9] is an acceptable approach for satisfying NRC’s requirements. 
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93 [A4.10] describes guidelines the NRC considers acceptable 
when the number of available electrical power sources are less than the number of sources 
required by the LCOs. (LCOs or “limiting conditions for operation” are codified in the plant 
Technical Specifications, and identify the lowest functional capability or performance level 
of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.)   
 
LCOs are very relevant to NPP operation in station blackout environments and to post-
blackout NPP restart protocols.  LCOs dictate the NPP’s systems functional capabilities and 
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conditions required to enable plant restart, and can be the controlling factor in the time 
required to restart the NPP after shutdown – especially in the case of failure of the 
surrounding Grid. 
 
A4.2.3  NPP Black Sky Coping Capability and FLEX 
Following the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP in March 2011, the U.S. NRC 
embarked upon an effort to identify “lessons-learned” from the event, and to convolve those 
lessons into the U.S. NPP regulatory framework [A4.11].  One of the many outcomes of this 
effort was the issuance of NRC Order EA-12-049 [A4.12] in March of 2012.  This order 
required U.S. NPPs to identify and implement strategies to enhance their ability to safely 
cope without their normal electric power sources for indefinite periods of time.  Specifically, 
“Order EA-12-049 requires a three-phase approach for mitigating BDBEEs.” (Author Note: 
See Appendix B for definition of BDBEE.) “The initial phase requires the use of installed 
equipment and resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling 
capabilities. The transition phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment 
and consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be accomplished with 
resources brought from off site. The final phase requires obtaining sufficient offsite 
resources to sustain those functions indefinitely.” [A4.12]  In November 2015, the NRC 
issued a notice of proposed rule making [A4.13], that would apply EA-12-049 to any 
operating or future U.S. nuclear power plant.   
 
EA-12-049 is very relevant to the issue of NPPs and BSEs, because it mandates that 
essential reactor cooling functions be maintained indefinitely in the presence of a complete 
station blackout, and approves the use of offsite resources and infrastructure to accomplish 
this function. 
 
The U.S. nuclear industry, lead by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), responded to this 
order by developing the “FLEX Program” (NEI 12-06 in various revisions) [A4.14].  As 
stated in [A4.14], “The objective of FLEX is to establish an indefinite coping capability to 
prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor and spent fuel pools and to maintain the 
containment function by using plant equipment and FLEX equipment.”   The coping actions 
are organized into three “phases” consistent with EA-12-049:  
• Phase I – Coping strategies rely on equipment already installed at the NPPs (plant 
specific duration, but at least 24 hours).   
• Phase II – Coping strategies involve the use of FLEX equipment and consumables 
pre-staged on site.   
• Phase III – Coping strategies rely on additional capabilities and redundancy from 
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offsite equipment “until power, water, and coolant injection systems are restored or 
commissioned.” [A4.14]  
 
Thus, Phase I and II coping strategies rely on resources already installed or pre-staged 
onsite, while Phase III coping strategies rely on delivery of additional resources to the NPP 
from offsite locations.   
 
Subsequent to NEI’s submission of NEI 12-06, the NRC issued interim guidance (JLD-ISG-
2012-01) [A4.15] endorsing with some exceptions, the FLEX Program as one acceptable 
approach for an NPP owner to comply with the requirements codified in EA-12-049. As of 
July 2016, some 68 of 100 commercial power reactors in the U.S. were in compliance with 
EA-12-049 by virtue of having implemented the FLEX program [A4.16].  All NPPs have 
emergency diesel generators (including spares) located onsite for provision of backup 
power in the event of a SBO or other extended Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) event.  Many, 
if not all NPPs have already expanded, or are in the process of expanding their onsite 
emergency diesel fuel supplies as an element of their FLEX program implementation.    
 
Our nation’s NPPs have invested heavily in the FLEX program and related mitigation 
actions in response to EA-12-049.  Nevertheless, the question remains, “How effective will 
FLEX strategies be in enabling NPPs to cope with Black Sky Events involving simultaneous 
and extended degradation of multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors?” 
 
NEI 12-06 states, “Once the analysis determines the FLEX equipment requirements for 
extended coping the licensee should obtain the required onsite equipment and ensure 
appropriate arrangements are in place to obtain the necessary offsite equipment including 
its deployment at the site in the time required by the analysis for the purpose of sustaining 
functions indefinitely.  In planning the coping strategies, water and fuel resources, among 
other things, needed to cope indefinitely would imply the need for an infinite source of 
supply.  Since site access is considered to be restored to near-normal within 24 hours, by 
72 hours from the event initiation, outside resources should be able to be mobilized by that 
time such that a continuous supply of needed resources will be able to be provided to the 
site.  Within these first 72 hours a site will have deployed its FLEX strategies which should 
result in a stable plant condition on the FLEX equipment and plans will have been 
established to maintain the key safety functions for the long term.  Therefore, FLEX 
strategies and/or resources are not required to be explicitly planned in advance for the 
period beyond 72 hours.” [A4.16] 
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Although the exact nature of an NPPs response to EA-12-049 and its FLEX implementation 
approach are plant-specific, an NPP that has implemented the FLEX program should be 
able to sustain all functions required for safe shutdown for a minimum of 72 hours 
employing only resources available onsite – perhaps much longer depending on the 
preparatory actions it has taken (e.g., Increased onsite diesel fuel inventories, pre-staged 
diesel generator spares and diesel-driven pumps onsite, etc.). Nevertheless, at some point 
during a continuing Grid blackout, the NPPs ability to maintain a safe shutdown status for 
the duration of the Black Sky Event will be completely dependent on offsite support – 
support that must be delivered by a civil infrastructure that is likely to have been seriously 
compromised or damaged. 
 
Thus (presuming no damage to NPP systems) the real challenge to NPPs in Black Sky 
Events will begin at the initiation of FLEX Phase III, as the plants become dependent on 
offsite support in order to remain in a safe shutdown condition.  Based on current plant-
specific configurations, this transition from Phase II to Phase III will be reached somewhere 
between three days and a few weeks after the onset of the Black Sky Event. 
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A5. NPP-GRID INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 
A5.1 NPP-Grid Interface Requirements 
A number of publications were identified that deal in various ways with the nature of the 
interface between the NPP and the Grid during normal operations.  The physical 
manifestation of this interface is, of course, the NPP’s switchyard.  Much of the literature 
deals with interface requirements and issues related to (1) the quality of the offsite power 
provided to the NPP, and (2) the constraints on the load-following capability (real and 
reactive power demand, phase/power angle, power ramping rate, etc.) of the NPP.  These 
publications are briefly reviewed below. 
  
Reference A5.1 (1983), deals with the selection and integration of NPPs into electric Grids 
(large and small).  The report discusses key Grid and NPP operating characteristics that 
must be reconciled if NPPs are to function safely and efficiently in the Grid.  Emphasis is 
placed on the Grid’s ability to provide high reliable and high-quality (stable voltage and 
frequency) power to the NPP for startup and shutdown cooling, and the ability of the NPP to 
maneuver as necessary to match the loads placed upon it by the Grid.  Basic NPP startup 
scenarios are described, along with reactor power set-back and load change limitations are 
discussed. 
 
Reference A5.2 (1987) extends the analysis documented in Reference A5.1 to focus on 
the introduction of NPPs into small Grids. The report discusses issues stemming from the 
large size of the NPP’s generating capacity relative to total Grid load demand, and the 
special challenges small Grids face with respect to frequency and voltage control, reactive 
power balance, and fault handling.  The report reviews the dynamic behavior of an NPP in 
response to voltage and frequency transients and the limits of NPP’s ability to respond to 
various types of Grid transients.   
 
Much of the discussion in References A5.1 and A5.2 is relevant to consideration of the use 
of NPPs as Black Start Units in a Black Sky Event in which the Grid is fractured into a 
number of smaller “generation/load islands”. 
 
References A5.3 (2001) and A5.4 (2011) focus on NPP safety considerations related to 
Grid power quality (for offsite power supply to the NPP) and load behavior.  These two 
publications review four basic types of transients: load rejection / loss of external load, 
degraded voltage and frequency, loss of offsite power due to external Grid disturbances, 
and the special case of the trip of an NPP that is carrying a large portion of the Grid’s load, 
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producing a cascading Grid collapse that results in the loss of the tripped NPP’s own offsite 
power.  The special challenges associated with long-term shutdown decay heat removal 
are also discussed.  Finally the key assumptions regarding the NPP-Grid interface that are 
“built into” the NPP design are discussed.  These assumptions include (1) the quality of the 
offsite power supply to the NPP is such that startup of the NPP’s largest pump motors will 
not “droop” grid voltage/frequency to levels that trip the plant, (2) NPPs will not be called 
upon to load faster than 5% per minute, (3) NPPs will be capable of unloading at ~ 5-10% 
per minute without tripping.  All of these considerations are relevant to the discussion of 
NPP response, restart, and reloading following in a Black Sky Event. 
 
Reference A5.5 (2007) reviews the history of NPP performance in the face of Grid voltage 
and frequency perturbations and concluded that an increasing penetration of nuclear power 
on the Grid has the potential to increase Grid fragility due to the fact that NPPs “do not 
provide automatic generation control in response to frequency decay and are also limited in 
providing voltage support.”  Again, these conclusions are relevant to the challenge 
embodied in restarting and operating NPPs in a Black Sky environment during a time when 
the Grid will be vulnerable to abnormal load variations. 
 
Reference A5.6 (2009) presents a broad overview of the issues involved in interfacing 
NPPs with the Grid.  It begins with a discussion of the brief history of large-scale Grid failure 
events, a review of the structure of the electric Grid, Grid operations, specific NPP-Grid 
interface requirements, NPP operational modes, and a detailed treatment of disturbances 
that have the ability to challenge the NPP-Grid interface and lead to NPP shutdown.  This is 
followed with a discussion of the potential for NPP performance limitations and shutdowns 
to lead to Grid failure.  The paper concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at 
strengthening NPP-Grid system resilience by enhancing the bulk electric system’s ability to 
accommodate unanticipated trips of NPPs. 
 
Reference A5.7 (2009) is (along with Reference A5.9) the most detailed examination 
published to date of NPP-Grid interface issues as they related to NPP safety.  The report, 
published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) describes the rational behind NPP electrical system design 
and its “defense in depth” philosophy; examines the benefits and risks of enabling NPPs to 
decouple from the Grid and run at the (much) reduced power levels required to meet its 
own house loads; examines the offsite power supply requirements for NPP protection and 
control systems; discusses desirable NPP electrical system “fail safe conditions” that would 
reduce the NPP’s vulnerability to Grid faults and perturbations; examines a number of 
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specific NPP electrical system design issues that impact the ability of the NPP to withstand 
Grid fault, voltage, and frequency transients, and discusses the role of the NPP operators 
and communications systems in managing the NPP-Grid interface. Reference A5.7 is very 
relevant to the question of if, and if so how, NPPs might be configured to reliably “runback 
and run through” a BSE. 
 
Reference A5.8 was published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2012.  
The report was “intended to provide an understanding of the characteristics of the electrical 
grid system from the point of view of an NPP and the special requirements of an NPP with 
regard to its grid connection; the quality and reliability of its electrical supply.” The report, 
“…describes the necessary characteristics of the electrical grid system that are required for 
the connection and successful operation of an NPP, and the characteristics of an NPP that 
are significant for the design and operation of the electric grid system.”  Among other 
things, this report discussed the key design features of NPPs and how they impact the 
NPP’s need for a stable and reliable Grid system, issues associated with integrating large 
NPPs into small Grids, the range of Grid events that have the potential to impact NPP 
safety systems; the need for and role of effective communications between the NPP 
operator and the transmission system operator (TSO) on NPP startup and operations.  
 
Reference A5.9 focuses on the regulatory requirements and standards relative to Grid 
voltage and frequency control that must be met during NPP operation, and discusses a few 
anecdotal incidences that demonstrate the approaches various NPP and Grid operators 
have taken to ensure these standards are met. 
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A6. NPP LOAD-FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES 
 
A small subset of the literature deals with the ability of NPPs to follow varying loads. 
 
Reference A6.1 (2011) and A6.2(2011) document the results of a study by the OECD-NEA 
to examine the load-following capability of current-generation nuclear power plants.  The 
reports observe that most current-generation NPPs were actually designed to be capable of 
maneuvering between ~ 50% and 100% of rated power, with a rate of change of 3-5% of 
rate power per minute.  Many NPPs in Europe currently operate in this manner.   
 
Reference A6.3 (2014) is a presentation given at the IAEA Technical Meeting on Flexible 
(Non-Baseload) Operation for Load Follow and Frequency Control in New Nuclear Power 
Plants, in Erlangen, Germany.  The presentation points out that NPPs prefer a reliable Grid 
with frequency control within plus or minus 1%, and voltage control within plus or minus 5%. 
It briefly summarizes the responsibilities of the Grid System Operator / TSO, the NPP 
operator, the electricity or energy regulator, and the nuclear regulator in defining the NPP-
Grid interface requirements.  The presentation focuses significant attention on one potential 
NPP-Grid interface issue: the problem of “low inertia,” or the tendency for Grid frequency to 
“free-fall” in the wake of Grid disturbances if the Grid is host to significant variable speed 
wind turbines, solar panels, or high voltage direct current (HVDC) inverters.  This behavior 
can pose a significant problem for NPPs due to the tight tolerances their offsite power 
sources must meet. 
 
Reference A6.4 (2014) is unique among the documents identified in this survey.  It is a 
forward-looking analysis of the  increasing need for operational flexibility in NPPs (“flexible 
power operations” or “FPO”), and the implications of this growing need on future NPP 
design and operations. The report discusses specific NPP structures, systems, and 
components (SSC) design features that inhibit for facilitate FPO, the potential impact of 
FPO on these SSCs, FPO implications for NPP balance of plant design and operability, 
NPP FPO operating modes, and other related issues.  This report provides a good point of 
departure for considering the types of NPP modifications and design evolutions needed to 
enhance the ability of NPPs to serve as Black Start and “early start” generating units in the 
wake of a Black Sky Event. 
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A7. NPP OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN BLACKOUTS 
 
This section provides a brief summary of available literature that focuses on operating 
experiences involving NPPs in “degraded Grid” or blackout conditions.   
 
Reference A7.1 (2007) provides an analysis of the “Millstone-2 Undervoltage Event” of 
1976 in which the NPP’s operators attempted to restart the plant promptly after an 
undervoltage trip resulted in additional undervoltage transients that placed the plant at 
higher risk than the original initiating event. 
 
Reference A7.2 (2008) presents a concise overview of eleven events in North America that 
involved significant NPP-Grid interactions between 1965 and 2008, beginning with the 
Great Northeast Blackout of November 1965.  The initiating event and the subsequent 
event cascade are described in each case, along with a description of the behavior and role 
of the “participating” NPPs in each event.   This presentation is notable in that it presents an 
interesting chronology tracing the evolution of commercial NPP’s ability to cope with load 
perturbations.  According to the author, the first commercial NPPs had the ability to respond 
to ± 10% step load changes.  The next series of NPPs had the ability to stay online 
following 50% load rejection via 45% steam bypass and automatic reactor regulation.  
Some mid 1970’s vintage U.S. NPPs had the ability to stay online following a full load 
rejection by bypassing 85% of turbine steam to large condensers coupled with cutting back 
reactor power to housekeeping load levels.  The NPPs designed and built during the 1980’s 
had the ability to stay on line following a full load rejection, runback to house load without 
tripping the unit, but with a smaller steam bypass capability (~55%) coupled with more 
aggressive reactor regulation.  The basic design objective in the event of a major load 
disruption was to “island the NPP, runback to House Load, allow the grid to stabilize, then 
use the NPP to restart grid consistent with FPC report” (here, “FPC report” refers to 
Reference A.7.3).  The author traces the subsequent compartmentalization and 
specialization of the NPP design practice into separate reactor design, turbine design, and 
balance of plant design disciplines with fixed interfacial requirements between each, 
resulting in inadequate attention being given to the integrated plant behavior and response 
to loss of load events. 
 
Reference A7.3 (2014) presents a detailed discussion of the performance of nuclear power 
plants in the U.S. and Canada during the August 14, 2003 blackout that impacted large 
portions of the Midwest and Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada.  Nine U.S. NPPs 
and seven Canadian NPPs experienced rapid shutdowns during the event. (Many non-
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nuclear generating units also tripped offline during the event.)  These shutdowns were 
triggered by the NPPs’ automatic reactor protection systems.  While four of the nine U.S. 
units that tripped offline returned to service three days later, the last of the nine did not 
return to service for eight days (August 22).  Four Canadian NPPs disconnected from the 
Grid due to the impact of the electrical transients they experienced, but continued to 
operate at reduced power levels while offline.  These four units returned to service within 7 
hours of the event and were available to assist in restoring the Grid.  The last of the 
remaining Canadian units did not return to serve for eleven days (August 25).  Six NPPs in 
the U.S. and one in Canada were able to ride through the event and continue generating 
electricity.  Some seventy other NPPs in the U.S. experienced some level of load or offsite 
power disturbance.  The report concluded that NPPs  “did not trigger the power outage or 
inappropriately contribute to its spread.”  The report is a very useful starting point for 
examining how differences in Canadian and U.S. NPP design and (NPP and Grid) 
operational characteristics impacted the NPPs’ performance during and after the event. 
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A8. NPPs AND GRID RESTORATION 
A8.1 Background 
Adibe, Adams, Jenkins, and Gill [A8.1] provided an analysis of NPP requirements during 
power system restoration as an element of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE) Power System Restoration Working Group in 1995.  This paper is the 
sole publication identified in this literature review that focuses specifically on the 
issues associated with NPPs and Grid restoration.  Reference A8.2 (by the same 
author) integrates some of the conclusions of Reference A8.1 into a broader discussion of 
post-blackout Grid restoration procedures.  Reference A8.3 echoes many of the 
observations and conclusions from Reference A8.1.  The following points are conveyed in 
the papers: 
1. An NPP’s plant technical specifications (see below) detail the conditions that must 
exist before an NPP that has automatically tripped or has been manually taken 
offline can restart.  The optimal mode for NPP restart following a Grid disruption is 
“hot standby”. (See discussion of reactor operating modes below.) 
2. NPPs that have been manually taken offline in a controlled manner might return to 
service within 24 - 48 hours.  Plants that automatically trip in response to external 
stimuli could take considerable longer to return to service.  For these reasons, 
current Grid restoration plans focus on providing assured offsite power to the NPPs 
in order to maintain their safe shutdown condition, while restoring as much of the 
service area load as possible without any assistance from the NPPs.  Therefore, full 
customer restoration may not be achievable for many days in areas in which nuclear 
power constitutes a significant fraction of the generation mix. 
3. Grid restoration strategies involving NPPs must incorporate real-time knowledge 
about the NPPs generation (mode) status, and must facilitate intimate and 
continuous communications between the NPP operator and the Grid system 
operator. 
4. Grid restoration is typically a “bottoms-up” approach. NPPs interface with the Grid 
via extra high voltage (EHV) transmission lines that are neither available nor stable 
early in the Grid restoration process. Given the power maneuvering limitations of 
large NPP turbogenerators, the ability to rebuild a sufficient amount of stable load 
for the NPP is a crucial constraint on the speed with which NPPs can return to 
service and contribute to the early Grid restoration process.   
5. Premature attempts to reload large NPPs can result in system-wide voltage and 
frequency perturbations that can trigger automatic NPP and Grid system protection  
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measures resulting in generating unit trips and Grid re-fragmentation (i.e. premature 
attempts to restart/reload large NPPs can make matters worse rather than better.) 
A8.2 Impact of NPP Operating Mode Status on Restart Capability 
As noted in Reference A8.1, commercial nuclear power plants have several “operating 
modes” and rules for transitioning between these modes, which influence the ability of and 
schedule for an NPP returning to service and reattaching to the Grid in the event of a major 
Grid disruption event.  The definition of the modes differs between reactor types and reactor 
vendors [A8.4] [A8.5].  Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) have six operational modes, 
while boiling water reactors (BWRs) have only five modes.  However, in all cases, a 
particular mode is defined by a unique combination of reactor thermal power level, reactor 
average coolant temperature, and the status of the reactor closure head bolts (all fully 
tensioned or not).   
 
Westinghouse PWRs are the most prevalent reactor type in the U.S. commercial nuclear 
fleet.  These reactors have six operating modes. [A8.4]  
• Mode 1 or “Power Operation” is the mode in which the reactor is tied to the Grid and 
producing power above 5% of its rated thermal power 
• Mode 2 is the “Startup Mode,” in which the reactor is ascending in power output (I.e. 
to Mode 1), but is operating at or below 5 % of its rated thermal power.   
• Mode 3 is termed “Hot Standby,” in which the reactor is subcritical and its average 
coolant temperature is greater than or equal to 350 ºF.  (This mode is unique to 
PWRs.) 
• Mode 4 or “Hot Shutdown” is the mode in which the reactor is subcritical and its 
coolant temperature greater than 200 ºF but less than 350 ºF.   
• Mode 5 or “Cold Shutdown” is the state in which the reactor is subcritical and its 
average coolant temperature is at or below 200 ºF.  
• Mode 6 is the “Refueling Mode” in which the reactor vessel is either open, or not 
fully sealed, as would be the case during refueling operations at the plant. 
 
It is important to note that Modes 3-5 all involve a reactor system that is sealed and ready 
to evolve to the next higher operating mode.   
 
With respect to NPPs and Black Sky Events, the relevance of reactor operating modes is 
that the operating mode the plant is in at any time dictates the speed with which the NPP 
can return to service (I.e. “Mode 1”) when called upon to do so.  This is true because the 
plant’s technical specifications dictate a diverse set of LCOs, surveillances, checks, tests, 
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and conditions that must be executed or achieved as pre-requisites for moving or “evolving” 
between operating modes.  In addition, the manner in which an NPP evolved to its present 
operating mode (e.g., whether the plant was tripped by the reactor protection system, or 
whether the plant was manually shutdown in a controlled manner), and the reactor’s 
operating history (reactor fuel burnup) also impact the operating mode evolution protocol.  
Given current NPP configurations and technical specifications, it is likely a PWR NPP 
involved in an extended Black Sky Event would be in either “Cold Shutdown” or “Refueling 
Mode” (if it was in that mode prior to the onset of the BSE) at the beginning of its restart 
evolution.  Thus, an NPP’s operating modes, LCOs, and operating history are of great 
importance with respect to consideration of its ability to and schedule for return to service in 
the wake of a Black Sky Event. 
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A9. NPPs ROLE IN SYSTEM RESTORATION PLANNING 
The availability of individual TSO/ISO Grid restoration plans is quite limited in the open 
literature.   Although NERC EOP-005-2 and NUC-001 require every TSO/ISO to have a 
system restoration plan, NERC does not require the operators to openly publish their plans. 
The two system restoration plans identified in this literature survey that address the role of 
NPPs in a system restoration are reviewed below.  
A9.1 The Role of NPPs in PJM’s System Restoration Planning 
PJM is a U.S. Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) that coordinates the flow of 
wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia.  Reference A9.1 (2016) describes PJM’s system 
restoration plan.   
 
“The high level strategy of the PJM System Restoration Plan is to restore the integrity of 
the interconnection as quickly as possible.  In general, the following steps are taken by 
PJM, Transmission Owners and Generation Operators: 
• Perform a system assessment to determine event of outage 
• Start Black Start units to form islands 
• Build cranking paths to other generations units, nuclear stations and critical gas 
facilities 
• Restore critical load as defined in Attachment A 
• Synchronize and interconnect islands to form larger islands 
• Connect to outside areas 
• Return to normal operations” 
 
The report continues: 
 
“Minimum Criteria for Meeting Objectives of Reliability Coordinators Restoration Plan (EOP-
006-2 R1.1) 
• Provide nuclear stations with auxiliary power to maintain safe shutdown.  Target 
time for restoration of this auxiliary power is 4 hours 
• Restore interconnections between all internal TOs 
• Restore interconnections to all external Reliability Coordinator Areas.” 
 
“…Nuclear units require additional consideration. Restoring customer load will normally 
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need to be accomplished without the help of nuclear units due to their start up 
requirements. Generally, the following prerequisites are necessary to restart a nuclear unit: 
(1) A minimum of two independent offsite power sources need to be available; (2) Adequate 
actual and unit trip contingency voltages must be observed on the transmission system 
supplying the nuclear unit; and (3) Stable system frequency must be present. Any decisions 
regarding the satisfying of the prerequisites for startup must be made by the nuclear plant 
personnel. NRC start-up checklists do not permit hot restarts of nuclear units and their 
diesels are not permitted to supply auxiliary power to other generating stations. Nuclear 
units that are taken offline on a controlled shutdown can normally be restored to service 
between 24 and 48 hours following the controlled shutdown.”  
 
“…Offsite safe shutdown power should be restored as soon as possible to nuclear units, 
both units that had been operating and those that were already offline prior to the system 
disturbance, without regard to using these units for restoring customer load.  Transmission 
Owners and Nuclear Power Plants must effectively communicate to keep Nuclear Power 
Plant apprised of the anticipated restoration time for offsite power.” 
 
“…Shutdown generating units that do not have black start capability require start-up 
cranking power from an offsite source… The following types of paths are defined: … 
• Critical Restoration Path (Nuclear) – transmission path from a Black Start unit (or 
other source) that provides offsite power to a nuclear plant’s auxiliary equipment to 
allow the nuclear plant to maintain safe shutdown…” 
 
Reference A9.2 (2016) defines, in detail the procedural protocols required for interactions 
and communications between an NPP and the Grid during blackout situations.  It makes 
extensive reference to the use of Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) as defined 
in NERC NUC-001, [A4.1]  but does not define specific operational protocols or restart 
protocols for NPPs during a blackout condition. 
A9.2 The Role of NPPs in Ontario Power System’s Restoration Planning 
With an installed electrical generating capacity of over 17,000 MWe, the Ontario Power 
System produces almost 50% of Ontario’s electricity.  About sixty percent of its power 
comes from NPPs (CANDU units) and about forty percent from hydroelectric stations.   
 
Reference A9.3 (2016) discusses Ontario Power’s restoration plan of the Ontario Power 
System.   Section 3.1 (Objective) of the report states…  
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“Following a blackout, our objective is to regain a reliable integrated power system by 
restoring the grid using the available equipment.  In doing so, we must ensure that voltage, 
frequency, and power flows are controlled so that restoration does not damage customer or 
poor system equipment or re-collapse the grid.  We meet this objective through execution of 
the strategy.” 
 
Section 3.2 (Strategy) continues… 
 
“Following a major disturbance, the grid may be totally or partially blacked-out and may 
contain isolated electrical islands consisting of load and generation.  The overall strategy is 
to: 
• Stabilize any surviving islands 
• Recover generation 
• Energize transmission 
• Restore loads 
• Synchronize islands to each other and to the remainder of the Eastern 
Interconnection 
Execution of the the strategy should reflect the priorities and load restoration principles 
below.” 
 
Section 3.3 (Priorities) indicates the first priority for grid restoration is to… 
 
“1.  Restore grid-supplied power to all nuclear sites – to secure the generation units and 
make them available to assist in restoration as soon as possible.”  The report continues… 
“…although restoring power to nuclear sites is the number one priority we will first need to 
restore some critical power system loads to enable this outcome.” 
 
Under Section 3.4 (Load Restoration Principles), the report states: “Surviving large thermal 
generation units (fossil and nuclear) need to be reloaded as soon as possible after the 
disturbance, otherwise the thermal stresses and other physical limitations can slow 
recovery or prevent them from recovering. So after the transmission path to these 
generation units is built, they must be reloaded as quickly as possible, typically using large 
blocks of load.” 
 
Sections 4.2 and 4.4 address a unique NPP operating constraint that is particularly relevant 
to CANDU reactors due to their low excess reactively margins and inability to override 
xenon poisoning. (This issue can also be relevant to some light water reactors depending 
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on their average core burnup and the point in their operating cycle when the shutdown 
occurs… Section 4.2 (Recover Generation) states “…surviving thermal and nuclear facilities 
must be loaded to respective minimum load points as soon as possible to ensure they 
remain available to support restoration.  This may include providing their own unit service.  
Failure to respect these minimums mean loss of the generation unit (poisoned out nuclear 
units) or very slow reloading times.”  Section 4.4 (Restoring Load), states, “In the early 
stages of restoration, load is restored solely to maintain an acceptable voltage profile and to 
ensure the survival of nuclear and fossil generation units so they will be available for 
subsequent phases of restoration.  Nuclear units are unavailable to the grid for a minimum 
of 36 hours if they are allowed to poison out.” 
  
CANDU NPPs do participate in Ontario Hydro’s Grid recovery operations to a much larger 
extent than is the case with U.S. LWRs.  This is possible, in large part, because of the 
CANDU plant’s ability to deal more effectively than U.S. LWRs with load rejection; it is 
necessary both because of Ontario Hydro’s dependence on nuclear power (~ 60% of total 
generating capacity), and the fact that CANDU NPPs become incapable of restarting for an 
extended period if they are not restarted within 36 hours due to xenon poisoning.   
A9.3 FERC–NERC Assessment of Current Industry Grid Restoration Plans 
NERC recently published the results of a review of a “representative sample of nine 
registered entities with significant bulk power grid responsibilities” [A9.4]. This review, 
commissioned in 2014 and completed in 2016, examined the entities’ system restoration, 
response, and recovery plans (including procedures for deploying Black Start resources); 
their actual practices; and Black Start experience.  Among the major conclusions and 
recommendations of the FERC–NERC review that are relevant to the issue of NPPs and 
BSEs were: 
1.  “Overall, the joint staff review team found that the participants have system 
restoration plans that, for the most part, are thorough and highly-detailed.”  
2.  “Those transmission operators responsible for providing primary or back-up service 
to nuclear power plants prioritize the restoration of offsite power to those plants for 
safe shutdown.” 
3.  “…All participants’ plans clearly identify as a top priority reestablishing offsite power 
supply to nuclear power plants”. 
4. Some participants in the study identifed a set of non-black start generators that are 
designed to start-up quickly (e.g., in 4 hours or less), and prioritize the provision of 
cranking power to them from the black start units. 
5. Additional attention should be given to system restoration planning steps that may 
	
211 
be difficult if Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), Inter-Control 
Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) and/or Energy Management System (EMS) 
operability is degraded or absent. 
6. Studies should be conducted to assess the “availability of black start resources, 
including the identification of strategies for replacing black start resources going 
forward and factors to be considered for such replacement resources (e.g., 
locational diversity, dual fuel, etc.)”. 
7. Studies should be performed to “identify options for expanding restoration plan 
testing beyond the currently-required black start resource testing, to ensure the 
black start resource can energize equipment needed to restore the system as 
intended in the restoration plan.” 
 
Some observations relative to the FERC–NERC review findings include: 
• With respect to #1 above, FERC’s use of the qualifiers “Overall” and “for the most 
part” imply that not all U.S. RTOs / TSOs are adequately prepared for Black Start 
recovery operations. 
• With respect to #1 above (the overall finding from the report), the Electric 
Infrastructure Security (EIS) Council summarizes their view of the NERC report’s 
overall conclusion in the following terms, stating that the report “…has confirmed that, 
under stressing “Gray Sky” conditions, the power industry’s Black Start system 
provides a solid foundation for grid restoration… However “Black Sky” hazards 
represent a substantial departure from Gray Sky events.  Power outages like 
Superstorm Sandy, while challenging, have not been characterized by a general 
communications breakdown or widely distributed damage to power grid hardware 
and SCADA control systems.  Blackouts in such severe scenarios will not be quickly 
recoverable.  Power outage durations would be unprecedented, and the resulting 
disruption of civil communications, transportation, water and other lifeline 
infrastructures would make conventional Black Start restoration procedures 
unworkable.” 
• With respect to #2 and # 3 above, FERC appears to be satisfied that operating 
entities have taken the appropriate steps to assure restoration of offsite power to 
NPPs will receive top priority in the event of a Grid disruption event. 
• With respect to # 5, there is a high likelihood that SCADA, ICCP and EMS 
infrastructures would be compromised if the BSE event were triggered by a 
Carrington-Class Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD) or an Electromagnetic Pulse 
(EMP) attack. 
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The summary conclusion from this review of existing industry Grid recovery planning is that 
current plans do not fully address the widespread damage and infrastructure disruption 
(electric power system and all other civil infrastructures) that distinguish a Black Sky Event 
from shorter duration Grid failures. 
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A10. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. Today’s electric Grid restoration strategies employ a “bottoms-up” incremental 
approach to rebuilding load and generating capacity (typically with incremental steps 
as small as several MWe) within Grid “islands” (fragmented and isolated portions of 
the Grid).  These islands are eventually reconnected via high-voltage transmission 
lines and interties once the islands are stable.  
 
2. While there is a large body of literature that is broadly relevant to the issue of NPPs 
and Grid recovery, virtually all of this literature deals in one way or another with one 
issue: that of maintaining NPPs in a safe shutdown state during a blackout. 
 
3. Commercial nuclear power plants within the U.S. do not participate in the early stages 
of post-blackout Grid restoration process other than as priority loads that must be 
continually served or restored as a first priority in order to maintain their safe 
shutdown status. 
 
4. NPP’s require both high-quality offsite cranking power (from voltage and frequency 
standpoint) to restart, and high-quality stable loads to remain attached to the Grid.  
Both of these conditions are, by definition, compromised in Black Sky Events. 
 
5. Premature attempts to reattach a nuclear plant to the Grid before the Grid is stable 
(from the frequency and voltage standpoint), can lead to the NPP tripping off line and 
destabilization of the Grid in the midst of the Grid recovery process (i.e. premature 
attachment of an NPP to an unstable Grid can exacerbate an already bad situation). 
 
6. Nuclear power plants are loaded by high-voltage transmission lines that typically are 
not energized until late in the Grid restoration process.  Due to this fact, and (probably 
to a lesser extent) the NPP’s relatively large minimum generating capacity, NPPs (at 
least in the U.S.) do not participate in the early stages of Grid restoration. 
 
7. By virtue of design, licensing, and operating protocols, the Canadian CANDU reactors 
play a more significant role in Grid restoration than do their U.S. light water reactor 
counterparts.  
 
8. Virtually all commercial NPPs were originally engineered to have a 50-100% load-
following capabilities and ramp rate potentials of ~ 5% of rated capacity/min within 
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certain power ranges.  Many NPPs in Europe operate in a load-following mode, while 
those in the U.S. do not. 
 
9. Attributes that enhance load-following capability of an NPP will likely enhance the 
ability of the NPP to serve as a Black Start or Early Start unit if a shutdown plant can 
be restarted; or if a plant can isolate from the Grid, runback its power level to match 
housekeeping loads during the blackout, and subsequently reattach to the Grid. 
 
10. Under current nuclear safety regulatory protocols and plant Technical Specifications, 
the length of time the NPP has been shutdown and the NPP’s Limiting Conditions for 
Operation will dictate the shortest time in which an NPP could return to service once 
called upon to do so.  A period of twelve hours to perhaps four days might be a 
reasonable estimate of the range of startup times for a plant that has been shutdown 
or has tripped off-line during a blackout, provided the plant has sustained no damage 
in the process.  Hard (automatic) shutdowns and plant damage can significantly 
expand these minimum restart times. 
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APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY 
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Precise terminology is essential for effective communications.  This is particularly true in 
highly technical endeavors.  The study of electric Grid, nuclear power plant, and Critical 
Infrastructure resilience necessarily involves the integration of diverse technical 
communities, knowledge bases, and vocabularies. It has been necessary to integrate 
vocabulary and terminology from several different technical fields to facilitate this study.  
Useful terminology did not exist in some cases, and had to be “invented”.  Many of the new 
or (possibly) unfamiliar terms employed in this report are defined here for the convenience 
of the reader. 
 
AC – Alternating Current 
 
Alternate AC Source – The NRC defines an “Alternate AC Source” as “an alternating 
current (ac) power source that is available to and located at or nearby a nuclear power plant 
and meets the following requirements: (1) Is connectable to but not normally connected to 
the offsite or onsite emergency AC power systems; (2) Has minimum potential for common 
mode failure with offsite power or the onsite emergency AC power sources; (3) Is available 
in a timely manner after the onset of station blackout; and (4) Has sufficient capacity and 
reliability for operation of all systems required for coping with station blackout and for the 
time required to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown (non-design basis accident)”  
[B.1]. 
 
Baseload – From a practical Grid operations standpoint, baseload is the minimum power 
demand encountered or expected to be encountered during a defined period of time – a 
day, week, month, year, etc.  An individual power generation plant operating in purely 
baseload mode operates at a steady power level, while other generating plants vary their 
power outputs as needed to accommodate Grid load (power demand) variations. 
 
BDBEE – Beyond-Design-Basis External Event – A event, originating outside the 
physical boundaries of the nuclear power plant that is outside or “beyond” the scope of 
events and accidents which a nuclear power plant is explicitly designed and built to 
withstand.  The term always includes natural events (such as a weather, space weather, 
and seismic events).  Some authors include malevolent human actions such as physical 
and cyber attacks in the definition.  As used in this document, the term includes both natural 
and human-induced external events. 
 
BES – Bulk Electricity System – The electrical generation resources, transmission lines, 
interconnections with neighboring systems, and associated equipment, generally operated 
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at voltages of 100 kV or higher [B.2]. The BES does not include local electricity distribution 
networks and assets. 
 
Black Start – The terms “black start” and “blackstart” are employed to characterize both (1) 
the startup of a power generation facility without support (specifically AC power) supplied 
from outside the physical confines of the facility; (2) the startup of a completely de-
energized Grid or portions thereof.  Both terms are employed in the electric power industry, 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation preferring the term “blackstart,” while many in the electric power industry prefer 
the term “black start”.  The term “black start” will be employed for consistency throughout 
this document. 
 
Black Start Plant –See Black Start Resource 
 
Black Start Resource – The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defines a 
“Blackstart Resource” as  “A generating unit(s) and its associated set of equipment which 
has the ability to be started without support from the System or is designed to remain 
energized without connection to the remainder of the System, with the ability to energize a 
bus, meeting the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for Real and Reactive 
Power capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been included in the 
Transmission Operator’s restoration plan.”  [B.2] 
 
Black Start Unit – see Black Start Resource 
 
Black Start Unit Functional Requirements – Four functional requirements (capabilities) 
derived from NERC’s Black Start Resource definition:  
 
• Black Start Unit Functional Requirement 1 – A Black Start Unit must have the 
ability to be started (“cranked”) without support from the electric Grid (i.e. without 
offsite power), or it must be designed to operate at power without being connected 
to and loaded by the the Grid (the so-called “Island Mode” of operation).  
 
• Black Start Unit Functional Requirement 2 – A Black Start Unit must have the 
ability to energize a bus.  
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• Black Start Unit Functional Requirement  3 – A Black Start Unit must meet the 
Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for real and reactive capacity, and 
frequency and voltage control. 
 
• Black Start Unit Functional Requirement  4 – A Black Start Unit must be included 
in the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan as a Black Start Resource. 
 
Black Start Unit Ready State – The state of operability from which a Black Start Unit is 
assumed to initiate its operations.  There are three Black Start Unit Ready States:  
 
• Black Start Unit Ready State 1 – The condition in which the plant is completely 
shutdown, but capable of self-cranking.  The plant is isolated from the Grid, 
producing no power, but is ready for immediate startup via self-cranking with no off-
site power support.  In the case of a nuclear power plant, this means the reactor is 
subcritical (e.g., any Operating Mode 5-3 in a PWR) and capable of self-cranking. 
 
• Black Start Unit Ready State 2 – The condition in which the plant is producing 
some level of power, is isolated from the Grid (operating in an Island Mode), but is 
available for immediate synchronization with and loading from the electric Grid.  In 
the case of a nuclear power plant, this means the reactor is critical and operating at 
sufficient power to meet all required plant housekeeping loads (Modes 2 and 1 in a 
PWR-based NPP). 
 
• Black Start Unit Ready State 3 – The condition of a dual purpose power 
production / Black Start plant when it is operating as a normal power generation 
facility, but capable of transitioning to Black Start Ready State 1 or 2 in the event of 
a major Grid anomaly. 
 
BSE – Black Sky Event – The Electric Infrastructure Security (EIS) Council defines a Black 
Sky Event as “…very large multi-region or potentially continent-scale outages, with widely 
distributed damage to major equipment… Outages would span very large regions, and 
utilities could require weeks or potentially months to restore power to even the highest 
priority customers… Black Sky hazards represent a substantial departure from Gray Sky 
events.  Power outages like Superstorm Sandy, while challenging, have not been 
characterized by a general communications breakdown or widely distributed damage to 
power grid hardware and SCADA control systems.  Blackouts in such severe scenarios will 
not be quickly recoverable.  Power outage durations would be unprecedented, and the 
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resulting disruption of civil communications, transportation, water and other lifeline 
infrastructures would make conventional Black Start restoration procedures unworkable”  
[B.3]. 
 
Bus (or Busbar) – An abbreviation for “busbar”.  A major point of interconnection between 
generators, loads, and feeders, etc. in an electric power system.  From the electrical 
standpoint, a bus is a network node characterized by four quantities: voltage magnitude, 
voltage phase angle, real power magnitude, and reactive power magnitude. 
 
BWR – Boiling Water Reactor 
 
Crank  – (A verb.) The act of starting-up a generating plant from a shutdown condition to a 
power level beyond which it can provide its own housekeeping power requirements for 
continued power ascension.  In the case of a traditional PWR nuclear power plant, this 
would involving providing all NPP power demands to bring the plant from Operating Modes 
5 (Cold Shutdown), 4, or 3; to Operating Mode 2 (Startup Mode). 
 
Cranking Loads – The electrical power needed to start-up a electric generating facility.  In 
the case of a traditional PWR nuclear power plant, cranking loads include all NPP loads 
required to bring the NPP from Operating Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to Operating Mode 2 
(Startup Mode). 
 
Cranking Path – NERC defines a cranking path as: “A portion of the electric system that 
can be isolated and then energized to deliver electric power from a generation source to 
enable the startup of one or more other generating units” [B.2].  It is effectively a 
transmission path from a Black Start Unit to another generating unit used to facilitate 
startup of that unit and thereby support the Grid restoration process. 
 
Critical Infrastructure – As defined by the Patriot Act of 2001, “Critical Infrastructure” is 
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
those matters.” 
 
Critical Infrastructure Sectors – Sixteen categories or “sectors” of Critical Infrastructure 
defined by Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Chemical; Commercial Facilities; 
Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency 
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Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; 
Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and 
Waste; Transportation Systems; and Water and Wastewater Systems. 
 
Critical Restoration Path – a transmission path from a Back Start Unit (or other source) 
that provides offsite power to a nuclear plant’s auxiliary equipment to allow the nuclear plant 
to maintain safe shutdown 
 
Dedicated Black Start Units – Electric generating facilities that function only as Black 
Start Resources (i.e. they are only connected to the Grid when powering Grid recovery 
[Black Start] operations). 
  
Dual-Purpose Black Start Units – Electric generating facilities that can and do function 
both as normal generating units, and in addition, have the capability to serve as Black Start 
Resources to power Grid recovery operations.  
 
EHV – Extra High Voltage – The terminology employed in electric power systems 
community to refer to voltages above 230 kV. 
 
EIS Council – Electric Infrastructure Security Council 
 
ELAP – Extended Loss of AC Power – The definition of this term is a matter of discussion 
between the U.S. nuclear power industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
NEI 12-06 [B.4] defines ELAP as “loss of off-site power, emergency diesel generators and 
any alternate AC source but not the loss of AC power from buses fed by station batteries 
through inverters.”  It is basically “a station blackout that extends indefinitely.” [B.5].   
Among other things, an ELAP would involve (1) complete loss of AC power to the essential 
and nonessential switchgear busses, (2) loss of offsite power that results in a reactor trip 
and concurrent turbine trip, (3) unavailability and non-recoverability of onsite emergency AC 
power sources and offsite AC power sources continuing beyond the duration determined by 
the licensee per § 50.63, and (4) unavailability and non-recoverability of a § 50.63 alternate 
AC power source [B.5].  This event can be viewed as one in which no AC power is 
available to the NPP except that available through inverters fed from station batteries. 
 
Electric Grid – The integrated network of electrical generating facilities, transmission 
infrastructure, distribution infrastructure, and supporting subsystems required to generate 
and deliver electricity to the end consumer. 
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EMP – Electromagnetic Pulse – The definition of this term is (somewhat surprisingly) 
appears to be in flux.  Reference B.6 (a joint product of the U.S. Department of Energy and 
the Electric Power Research Institute) defines the term as “A very intense pulse of 
electromagnetic energy, deliberately caused by the detonation of a high-energy explosive 
device (nuclear or non-nuclear) or generated by a high energy radio frequency, or direct 
energy weapon.”  Reference B.7, issued just six months later by the U.S. Department of 
Energy, expands the definition of the EMP to include certain space-weather induced 
phenomena; viz., EMPs “are intense pulses of electromagnetic energy resulting from solar-
caused effects or man-made nuclear and pulse power devices.” 
 
EMS – Energy Management System – A system of computer-aided tools used by bulk 
power system operators to monitor, control and optimize system performance [B.8]. 
 
External Event – A natural or human-induced event, originating outside the physical 
boundaries of the nuclear power plant (such as a weather, space weather, and seismic 
events; or physical and cyber attacks). 
 
FERC – U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
 
FPO – Flexible Power Operation – A power generation plant operational mode that 
departs from or addresses Grid load (power demand) requirements beyond baseload 
demand.  Flexible power operation would be characterized by a frequency of power ramps 
(number of power variations over a designated time period), magnitude of power ramps 
(difference between maximum and minimum power levels within a single power maneuver), 
power ramp rates (rate of change of power within a single power maneuver), time at power, 
etc., that differ from those typical of baseload operations. 
 
GDC – General Design Criteria – Requirements stipulated in 10 § 50 Appendix A, that 
establish the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria” for commercial nuclear 
power plants. “Principal design criteria… establish the necessary design, fabrication, 
construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and 
components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide 
reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and 
safety of the public.”  There are currently sixty-four GDCs. 
 
GMD – Geomagnetic Disturbance – A naturally occurring disturbance in the Earth’s 
magnetosphere that occurs when there is an exchange of energy between the solar wind 
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and the space environment surrounding the Earth.  The spatially- and time-dependent 
magnitude of the induced geomagnetic disturbance is a function of space-time-energy 
attributes of the intercepting charged particles, as well as local geomagnetic latitude and 
earth conductivity at the particular location on the Earth’s surface. 
 
Gray Sky Event – See Grey Sky Event  
 
Grey Sky Event – The EIS Council describes Grey Sky Events as “…occasional serious 
interruptions in electric service, typically when local or regional damage to power lines and 
other distribution hardware causes a shutdown to prevent more serious damage to the 
system.  In such instances restart of generation facilities generally uses power coming in 
from outside the affected area…In severe examples of “grey sky days” external power may 
be unavailable or impractical, and power companies then use “black start” procedures to 
restart a grid segment without assistance form external power.  Outages in such scenarios 
result from preplanned shutdowns designed to prevent damage or major hardware 
elements.  Power can usually be restored — at least to the most vital facilities — within 
hours.” [B.3] 
 
Grid – See “Electric Grid” 
 
Grid Anomaly – Any deviation of the electric Grid’s normal operating state (spatially 
dependent real and reactive power magnitudes and inter-bus flows, voltage magnitudes, 
and voltage phase angles) not intentionally introduced by system operators. 
 
House Loads – See Housekeeping Loads 
 
Housekeeping Loads  – The internal electrical loads in an electric generating facility 
(power plant).  The net electrical power output of the power generation facility is equivalent 
to the rated power capacity minus the housekeeping loads of the plant. 
 
Housekeeping Unit – The reactor module in a multi-reactor modular nuclear power plant 
that is designated to supply all of the housekeeping loads for the other reactor modules and 
the entire power plant. 
 
HVDC – High Voltage Direct Current – Direct current with voltages between 100 kV and 
1,500 KV. 
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ICCP – Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) – A data communications 
protocol employed by various Grid entities (RTO’s, ISO’s, distribution system operators, 
etc.) to provide data exchange over wide area networks between electric Grid control 
centers. 
 
IEEE – Institute of Electric and Electronics Engineering  
 
ISO – Independent System Operator – Typically a transmission system operations entity 
which coordinates, controls, and monitors electric Grid operations within a single state.  The 
term is also occasionally employed for multi-state entities, in which case it is essentially 
equivalent to Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). 
 
LCO – Limited Conditions for Operation – The lowest functional capability or 
performance level of equipment required for safe operation of the NPP and for evolution 
from one NPP Operating Mode to another.  LCO’s are typically codified in the NPP’s 
Technical Specifications. 
 
LOOP – Loss Of Offsite Power – An event or condition in which a power generation 
facility has lost access to all offsite AC power sources.  
 
Micro-Reactors – A nuclear power plant (NPP) with a rated capacity of 10 MWe or less. 
 
NEA – Nuclear Energy Agency 
 
NEI – Nuclear Energy Institute 
 
NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
 
NPIR – Nuclear Plant Interface Requirement – Requirements based on Nuclear Power 
Plant Licensing Requirements (NPLRs) and Bulk Electric System requirements that have 
been mutually agreed to by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable 
Transmission Entities [B.2]. 
 
NPLRs – Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Requirements – Requirements included in the 
design basis of a particular nuclear plant and statutorily mandated for the operation of the 
plant, including nuclear power plant licensing requirements for: (1) off-site power supply to 
enable safe shutdown of the plant during an electric system or plant event; and (2) avoiding 
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preventable challenges to nuclear safety as a result of an electric system disturbance, 
transient, or condition [B.2]. 
 
NPP – Nuclear Power Plant – An electric generation facility which employs a nuclear 
reactor as its energy source. 
 
NPP Operating Mode – A designator of a nuclear power plant’s physical configuration and 
thermodynamic state.  A particular mode is defined by a unique combination of reactor 
thermal power level, reactor average coolant temperature, and the status of the reactor 
closure head bolts (all fully tensioned or not).  Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) have six 
operational modes. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) have only five operating modes. 
 
NPP Operating Status – One of three basic configurations a nuclear power plant may be 
in at any point in time: Shutdown, Power Ascent/Descent, and Power Operations.  
 
NRC – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor – A common nuclear power reactor design in which 
very pure water is heated to a very high temperature by fission, kept under high pressure 
(to prevent it from boiling), and converted to steam by a steam generator. A PWR 
essentially operates like a pressure cooker, where a lid is tightly placed over a pot of heated 
water, causing the pressure inside to increase as the temperature increases (because the 
steam cannot escape) but keeping the water from boiling at the usual 212°F (100°C). About 
two-thirds of the operating nuclear power plants in the United States are PWRs [B.1]. 
 
RCS – Reactor Cooling System – The system used to remove energy from the reactor 
core and transfer that energy either directly or indirectly to the steam turbine [B.1]. 
 
Resilience – The ability of a system to withstand a change or a disruptive event by 
reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them 
(adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative capability). 
 
Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCII) – A Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island or 
“RCII” is an engineered network of (multiple) Critical Infrastructure Sector facilities and their 
interconnections (electric power, internet, pipelines, rail, etc.), powered by an rNPP or other 
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resilient electric generating facility functioning as a Secure Fuel Power Source, that 
enhances national Critical Infrastructure System resilience – a geographical zone (“island”) 
in which essential Critical Infrastructure functions (production and distribution of essential 
goods and services) are maintained, and from which national Critical Infrastructure 
functionality can be restored in the event of major Critical Infrastructure disruptions. 
 
resilient Nuclear Power Plant (rNPP) – A resilient nuclear power plant (rNPP) is one 
whose performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance electric Grid 
resilience – the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers 
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.  rNPPs are nuclear power plants that are 
intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a manner to enhance the resilience 
of their host electric Grid. 
 
RTO – Regional Transmission Organization – an electric power transmission system 
operations entity that coordinates, controls, and monitors a multi-state region of the electric 
Grid. 
 
Safe Shutdown – Nuclear Power Plant shutdown conditions specified in plant technical 
specifications as Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown, as appropriate (plants have the option of 
maintaining the Reactor Cooling System at normal operating temperatures or at reduced 
temperatures) [B.1].  The practical implication of this state is that the reactor is in a safe, 
stable, and managed, subcritical state. 
 
SBO – Station Blackout – A station blackout is defined by the NRC as “the complete loss 
of alternating current (ac) electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses 
in a nuclear power plant (i.e., loss of offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine 
trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system). Station blackout does not 
include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or 
by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it assume a concurrent single 
failure or design basis accident. At single unit sites, any emergency AC power source(s) in 
excess of the number required to meet minimum redundancy requirements (i.e., single 
failure) for safe shutdown (non-DBA) is assumed to be available and may be designated as 
an alternate power source(s) provided the applicable requirements are met. At multi-unit 
sites, where the combination of emergency AC power sources exceeds the minimum 
redundancy requirements for safe shutdown (non-DBA) of all units, the remaining 
emergency AC power sources may be used as alternate AC power sources provided they 
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meet the applicable requirements. If these criteria are not met, station blackout must be 
assumed on all the units.” [B.9] 
 
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition – A system of remote control and 
telemetry used to monitor and control the transmission system [B.2]. 
 
Secure Fuel Power Source – An electricity generation facility that can serve both as a 
Black Start Resource, and as a source of sustained electricity generation during the post-
disruption Grid Recovery and Restoration Phases.  Secure Fuel Power Sources must be 
capable of operating for at least ninety days without resupply of fuel from offsite locations.  
 
Self-Cranking – Self-cranking is the act of starting up an electric generating plant while 
powered strictly with onsite power sources independent of any offsite power or other offsite 
support from the Grid. 
 
SFP – Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Pool – the pool of water in which nuclear fuel that 
has been discharged from the reactor is stored. 
 
SMR (Small Modular Reactor) – The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines Small 
Modular Reactors as “light water reactor (LWR) designs generating 300 MWe or less”.  The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more broadly defines SMRs as “small and 
medium sized advanced reactors that produce electrical power up to 300 MWe”. 
 
SSC – Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components 
 
Transmission Line – A system of structures, wires, insulators, and associated hardware 
that carry electric energy from one point to another in an electric power system.  Lines are 
operated at relatively high voltages varying from 69 kV up to 765 kV, and are capable of 
transmitting large quantities of electricity over long distances [B.2]. 
 
TSO – Transmission System Operator – An entity responsible for operating 
Transmission Lines within the electric Grid. 
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